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AKCHOLOGY; 


ou, 


THE    SCIE:NCE   or   aOYERiS^MEI^T. 


^•^  BY 

sT  y.    BLAKESLEE, 

OAKLAXD,   CAL. 


NEW  YORK  AND  SAN  FRANCISCO  : 

A.  ROMAN  AND  COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS, 

1876. 


Copyriu'ht, 
S.   V.   BLAKESLEE, 
1876. 


New  York  :  Lunge,  LKtIe  &  Co.,  Frlnt«r>. 
U)  tu  m  A>t<jr  Place. 


\     , 


J 

.-56 
PREFACE. 


Modern  civilization  lius  been  characterized  by  the 
great  variety  and  rapid  development  of  the  physical 
sciences.     The  vast  material  fields  of  thought  have 
been  vigorously  canvassed,  and  their  facts  carefully 
studied,  for  the  discovery  of  principles.     These  have 
been  clearly  explained,  exactly  defined,  and  arranged 
into  different  systems  of  science,  which  again  have 
been  wonderfully  applied  in  practice  for  the  improve- 
•f>raeut  of  the  physical  welfare  of  man. 
^        But,  in  the  rich  fields  of  abstract  thought,  there  has 
.     been  comparatively   very  little  done  in  the  form  of 
^    developed  science.      Especially  in    the   all-important 
^science  of  government,  bearing  directly  on  the  wel- 
V  fare  of  nations,  and  affecting  the  interests  of  every 
V^intelligent  being,  this  failure  of  a  scientific  treatment 
lias  been   most  remarkable.     Thousands  of  volumes, 
scores  of  thousands,  have  been  written  upon  the  prac- 
tice and  enforcement  of  law,  as  if  an  art;  but,  in  the 
opinion  of  the   writer,  not  proi)erly   one,  on  govern- 
ment,  treated    from   a    generic    point    of  view,   as  a 


PREFACE. 


science.  Only  few  autliors  Lave  suggested  sucli  a 
treatment  as  possible,  while  a  specific  name  for  it  is 
not  found  in  any  civilized  language. 

As  an  attempt  to  remedy  this  defect,  by  the  devel- 
opment of  a  distinct  science  of  government,  the  fol- 
lowing treatise  has  been  prepared ;  but,  as  a  pioneer 
eflfort,  it  has  been  made  with  much  hesitation  on  the 
part  of  its  author,  through  a  conscious  sense  of  its 
deficiencies  in  completeness,  and  of  imperfections  in 
matter.  Still,  as  an  effort  in  a  right  direction,  it  is 
offered  to  the  favorable  notice  of  a  forbearing  and 
criticising  public,  with  confidence  that  other  writers, 
with  better  facilities,  will  improve  upon  it,  and  per- 
fect a  work  on  Archology  which  shall  suri:)ass  the 
physical  sciences  for  good,  as  mind  surpasses  matter. 

Oakland,  Cal.,  1876. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Archology  ;  Government ;  Origin  of  Government ;  Aim  of  Qovern- 
.  ment ;  Manner  of  Government ;  Law. 

CHAPTER  n. 

Classes  of  Government  ;  Material  ;  Instinctive  ;  Rational ;  Dis- 
tinguishing Feature  of  Eacli  ;  Reason  ;  Will. 

CHAPTER  ni. 

Classes  of  Government  Contrasted  ;  Primal  Element  in  which 
Begins  Control  ;  Higher  Government  Maj'  Degrade  ;  Lower 
Government  Naver  Ascends. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Rational  Government  ;  Necessity  to  Success  of  Rational  Govern- 
ment ;   Right ;     Moral  and  Practical  Right ;  Motive. 

CHAPTER  V. 

Means  of  Government  ;  Instruction  ;  Compulsion ;  Law,  Its 
Essential  Elements  ;  Advice  ;  Sanctions  of  Law. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Sanctions  of  Law  ;  their  Magnitude ;  their  Legal  E^^dence  ; 
Magnitude  of  Crime. 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Fuller  Consideration  of  Law  ;  Origin;  Aim;  Peculiarities  of  Law; 
Must  he  Declared  ;  Must  be  Protected ;  Vigor  of  Executive  to 
Enlorce  Law. 


6  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Right  of  Government  to  Enforce  Law  ;  Principle  of  Benevolence  ; 
of  Liberty  in  this  Enforcement. 

CHAPTER  IX. 
Governments  Above  Governments  Necessary  ;  Mutual  Duties  of 
Higher  and  Lower  Governments. 

CHAPTER   X. 
Divisions  of  Rational   Government ;    Legal ;    Disciplinary  ;    Six 
Distinctions, 

CHAPTER  XI. 
Punishment  and  Chastisement ;   How  Clearly  Distinguished. 

CHAPTER  XIL 
Punishment  More  Exactly  Examined  ;  Its  Design  ;  Its  Magnitude  ; 
Punishment  Instructive  ;  Protective. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Other  Facts  of  Punishment  ;  Its  Applications  ;  To  Protect  Wealth ; 
Person  ;   Liberty  ;   Life. 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Pardon  ;  When  Possible  as  Right ;  Atonement ;   A  Necessary  Pre- 
requisite to  Pardon  ;   Commutation  of  Punishment. 

CHAPTER  XV. 
Taxation  ;   Right  of  Taxation  ;   Amount  of  Taxation. 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
Right  of  Government  to  Enforce  Contracts  ;   To  Carry  on  War, 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
Right  of  Government  to  Establish  Public  Schools. 

CHAPTER    XVIH. 
Conscience,  and  the  Relation  between  it  and  the  Government. 


ARGHOLOGY; 


OR, 


THE   SCIENCE   OF    GOVERNMENT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

AraJwlogy  is  the  Science  of  Governinent. 

Derived  from  the  two  Greek  words,  "arclio,"  govern, 
and  "logos,"  science,  its  signification  accords  with  the 
definition  given. 

Government  is  the  whole  system  of  control  in  any 
particular  case. 

"  Whole  "  is  used  in  the  definition,  because  there 
may  be  predicated  of  parts  tliat  which  is  not  true  of 
the  whole.     Government  is  the  whole. 

System  signifies  all  the  things  under  consideration 
regarded  as  arranged  in  some  methodical  manner. 

A  system  of  control  includes  both  the  controller 
and  the  controlled  ;  also  the  laws  and  the  means  of 
control,  together  witli  all  else  involved  in  considering 
the  subject. 

Control  signifies  either  originating,  or  directing^  or 
restraining,  the  actioii  of  that  which  is  controlled. 

The  clause  "  in  any  particular  case  "  limits  the  word 
whole  to   that  which  is  under  consideration   at  the 


8  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OK, 

time.  Illustrations  of  government :  That  of  the  sun 
over  the  planets;  of  instinct  over  animals  ;  of  parents 
over  the  family;  of  an  officer  over  an  arm}';  of  a 
king  over  his  subjects  ;  and  of  God  over  the  universe. 
In  each  speciiication  government  is  the  whole  system 
of  control  in  the  particular  case  ;  it  includes  all  under 
consideration  at  the  time. 

ORIGIN  OF  GOVERNMENT  ;  OR,  WHAT  IS  THE  PUILOSOPH- 
ICAL  GROUND  OR  REASON  OF  ITS  EXISTENCE,  AS  A 
FACT  ? 

Government  Originates  as  a  Necessity  to  the  Secur- 
ing of  Ends. 

This  statement  is  proved  by  considering  the  facts 
that  ends  can  be  secured  only  by  action.  But,  in  re- 
spect to  every  end,  there  are  always  two  classes  of 
possible  actions :  those  which  would  result  in  securing 
it,  and  those  whicli  would  prevent  the  securing  of 
it.  Hence,  to  secure  an  end,  there  is  a  necessity  of  a 
control  to  originate,  direct,  or  restrain,  the  actions  pos- 
sible in  the  case,  according  as  they  would,  or  would 
not,  result  in  the  securing  of  the  end.  Now,  the 
whole  system  of  this  control  is,  according  to  defi- 
nition, a  government.  Therefore,  government  orig- 
inates as  a  necessity  to  the  securing  of  ends. 

Gavernment  Exists  as  a  Means  Helpful  to  its  Entities 
in  Securing  the  Ends  of  their  Existence. 

The  word,  "entities  "  is  used  as  the  most  general  in 
signification  to  include  all   of  which  action  or  influ- 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  VJ 

ence,  can  be  predicated,  even  such  as  desires,  emotions, 
etc.  It  includes  all  over  which  control  can  be  ex- 
erted. 

"  Helpful  "  is  used  with  means,  because  often  govern- 
ment is  more  than  a  means.  For,  as  an  actor,  it  often 
both  offers  its  help,  and  compels  its  acceptance. 

Inasmuch  as  government  is  a  necessity  to  the  secur- 
ing of  any  end,  it  follows  at  once  that,  to  entities,  it 
is  a  necessity  in  securing  the  ends  of  their  existence. 
In  the  innumerable  variety  of  actions,  all  possible  to 
be  put  forth  by  entities,  affecting  the  ends  of  their 
existence,  there  are  incalculable  liabilities  for  actions 
to  clash  with  actions,  pre%'enting  their  securing  such 
ends.  Hence,  to  entities,  in  securing  the  ends  of  their 
existence,  as  a  helpful  means,  there  is  a  necessity  of  a 
government,  to  control  all  possible  actions,  in  such  a 
manner  that  those,  and  those  only,  shall  be  put  forth 
which  are  adapted  to  result  in  securing  the  ends  of 
their  existence. 

Illustrations  of  this  necessity:  The  government  of 
the  sun  is  a  necessity  to  the  planets,  that  the  ends  for 
which  they  exist  may  be  secured.  AVere  such  govern- 
ment to  cease,  they  must  whirl  away  into  ruin,  or 
dasli  together  in  mutual  destruction.  Among  migrat- 
ing animals,  were  all  government  of  instinct  to  cease,  in- 
cessant clashings  of  actions  with  actions  w'ould  take 
place,  destroying  the  ends  for  which  the  creatures  exist, 
and  even  the  existence  of  the  creatures  themselves.  So, 
also,  among  rational  beings,  should  all  rational  govern- 
ment cease,  and  each  one  act  only  for  himself,  merely  in 
accordance  with  his  own  will,  then  in  the  clashing  of 
1* 


10  archology;  or, 

desires  of  objects  to  be  secured,  and  in  tlie  clashing  of 
means  selected  witli  which  to  secin*e  thoni,  and  in  the 
clashing  of  actions  put  forth  for  this  purpose,  there 
would  follow  the  dcsti'uction  of  all  ends  for  which 
rational  beings  exist.  Hence,  government  exists  as  a 
necessity  to  entities,  to  their  securing  the  ends  of  their 
existence,  by  so  controlling  all  actions  put  forth  as  to 
insure  a  harmonious  adaptedness  in  those  put  forth  to 
result  in  the  securing  of  such  ends. 

Aim  or  Purpose  of  Government. 

The  examination  of  the  origin  of  government  ren- 
ders apparent  also  its  purpose,  or  aim. 

The  Aim,  or  Purpose,  of  Government  is  to  JEnable 
its  Entities  to  Secure  the  Ends  of  their  Existence. 

It  is  not  the  province  of  government  to  secure  these 
ends.  It  is  only  a  helpful  means  to  its  entities,  in  se- 
curing, themselves,  the  ends  of  their  own  existence. 
They  are  the  agents  in  securing  these  ends,  while  gov- 
ernment is  only  a  necessary  aid  to  them  in  doing  this, 
by  controlling  actions,  which,  Avithout  it,  would  be 
constantly  clashing;  in  the  use  of  means  where  other- 
wise there  would  be  continual  interferences,  while  se- 
curing emls  in  which  otherwise  there  would  be 
incessant  conflicts.  In  all  this,  government  is  to  secure 
a  harmony  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  the  ends 
for  which  its  entities  exist. 

The  government  of  the  sun  over  the  planets  is  not 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  11 

for  tlie  benefit  of  tlie  sun,  Imt  for  tliat  of  the  planets, 
as  a  necessary  aid  to  them  in  attaining  the  ends  for 
which  tliey  exist.  So,  also,  in  the  State  and  nation, 
the  government  is  not  for  the  benefit  of  itself,  nor  for 
that  of  the  officers  of  the  State.  It  is  wholly  for  the 
benefit  of  the  subjects  of  government,  to  enable  them, 
each  and  all,  to  secure  the  ends  for  which  they  exist. 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  scientific  treatment  of 
the  subject  of  government  consists  in  the  systematic 
unfolding  of  its  features  and  peculiarities,  as  a  help- 
ful means  to  entities  in  securing  the  ends  for  which 
they  exist.  But  the  idea  of  the  helpfulness  of  a 
means  to  an  end  is  generally  expressed  by  the  word 
usefulness.  Hence,  the  origin  of  government  is  found 
in  its  usefulness  to  the  entities  comprehended  in  it,  in 
,  securing  the  ends  of  their  existence,  and,  also,  its 
aim  or  purpose  is  foujul  to  be  this,  its  usefulness  to 
entities  in  securing  such  ends.  In  other  words,  the 
principle  in  the  case  is  that  hoth  the  origin  and  the 
aim  of  Government  are  found  in  its  usefulness  to  the 
entities  comprehended  nnder  it.  It  exists  as  a  means 
of  usefulness  necessary  to  them,  both  in  avoiding  the 
evils  to  which  they  are  exposed,  and  in  securing  the 
ends  for  which  they  exist. 

MANNER   OF    GOVERNMENTAL   CONTROL. 

All  Governmental  Control  is  through  Laxo. 

A  single  act,  involving  no  law,  if  such  a  thing  is 
possible,  is  not  government,  and  the  control  involved 
in   such  act   is   not   frovernment.     But  jjovernmcnt  is 


12  AECHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

the  whole  system  of  control  in  the  ease,  and  this  must 
be  through  law. 

Law  is  a  uniform  mode  of  action^  so  long  as  there 
is  occasion  for  uniformity. 

The  laws  of  matter  are  the  uniform  modes  of  the 
actions  of  matter,  so  long  as  there  is  occasion  for  such 
uniformity.  If  ever  the  occasion  for  the  uniformity 
of  a  law  of  matter  should  cease, — for  example,  if  ever 
the  occasion  for  the  law  of  gravitation  should  cease, — 
science  cannot  assert  that  the  law  would  still  continue 
and  be  uniform.  So,  in  rational  government,  as  in 
national  affairs,  if  the  occasion  for  the  uniformity  of  a 
law  ceases,  no  science  or  philosophy  or  moralizing  can 
rationall}'-  assert  that  the  law  will  or  ought  to  continue 
as  a  law.  It  may  then,  in  perfect  harmony  with  science, 
be  changed  to  that  for  which  there  is  occasion.  Hence  . 
the  principle  : 

The  uniformity  of  a  law,  and  the  law  itself  in  any 
government  may  cease  v)hen  the  occasion  for  it  ceases. 
Or,  wJienever  in  view  of  all  circumstances,  %isef\dMess 
is  no  longer  promoted  hy  the  uniformity  of  a  law,  that 
uniformity  in  any  government  may  cease,  and  the  law 
ie  changed. 

Tims,  law  is  a  uniform  mode  of  action,  so  long  as 
there  is  occasion  for  such  uniformity,  and  the  manner 
of  governmental  control  is  through  law.  In  respect 
to  matter,  it  evidently  can  exert  a  control  only  through 
the  laws  of  matter :  as,  for  example,  the  government  of 
the  sun  over  the  planets  is  a  system  of  control  exerted, 
only  through  the  laws  of  gravitation,  light,  heat,  etc.  So 
the  government  of  instinct  in  animals  is  only  through 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  13 

the  laws  of  Instinct.  So  also  the  i^oveniiiient  of  i-ational 
beings  is  a  control  tlironi;h  the  laws  of  such  beings. 

In  all  cases  law  is  generically  the  same, — a  uniform 
mode  of  action,  so  long  as  there  is  occasion  for  uni- 
formity, and  the  manner  of  governmental  control  is 
tlirouirh  law. 


14  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 


CHAPTER    ir. 

CLASSES    OF    GOVERNMENT. 

Governments  are  divided  into  classes,  according  to 
their  nature  and  manner  of  exerting  control. 

Some  governments  are  without  consciousness;  others 
involve  consciousness  and  a  will,  but  are  destitute  of 
some  peculiarities  of  these ;  while,  again,  other  gov- 
ernments   involve   them.      Hence,    as    thus    divided, 

There  are  Three  great  Classes  of  Governments :    the 
Material,  the  Instinctive,  and  the  Rational. 

The  rational  is  again  divided  into  disciplinary  and 
legal,  but  this  division  will  be  considered  farther  on. 

Material  government  is  the  government  of  m.atter 
over  matter. 

In  this  definition  are  included,  under  the  word 
matter,  all  the  adjuncts  of  matter;  such  as  light,  heat, 
electricity,  the  organizing  principle  in  plants,  etc., 
whatever  these  may  be.  Illustrations  of  material 
government  appear  numberless,  as  that  of  the  moon 
over  the  tides  ;  the  heart  over  the  circulation  of  the 
blood  ;  vegetable  life  in  shaping  the  growing  plant; 
the  wind  in  controlling  the  waves ;  etc.  They  answer 
to  the  definition  as  the  whole  system  of  control  in 
each  particular  case.  They  originate  as  a  necessity  to 
the  entities  involved  in  them   in  securing  the  ends 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  15 

f(»r  which  tlicv  exist.  Their  uiiu  is  the  in»unng  a 
haniiuny  ot"  action  among  these  entities  necessary  to 
seciirino:  the  ends  for  wliich  thev  exist  ;  and  the  man- 
ner  of  their  control  is  tiirough  hiw,  the  laws  of  matter, 
uniform  modes  of  action,  so  long  as  there  is  occasion 
for  uniformity. 

The  distinguishing  featui^e  of  material  govern- 
Tnent  is  control  without  consciousness  on  the  jjari  of 
its  actors. 

This  statement  has  reference  only  to  the  govern- 
ment in  itself  alone  considered.  For  there  must  have 
been  consciousness  as  necessary  to  knowledge  on  the 
part  of  the  Creator,  to  give  matter  all  its  wonderful 
capabilities,  adaptations,  forces,  and  laws  of  action. 
Yet  in  matter  itself  there  is  discoverable  not  the  least 
evidence  of  consciousness  or  knowledge.  And  being 
destitute  of  knowdedge,  it  is  therefore  without  self- 
directing  power,  acting  only  as  acted  upon  in  accord- 
ance with  its  laws  of  action. 

INSTINCTIVE    GOVERNMENT. 

Instinctive  government  is  the  sijstem  of  control 
exerted  under  the  determining  force  of  ijistinct. 
Instinct  is  an  original  and  conscious  impulse  to  do 
certain  actions  loithout  regard  to  'fnal  residts  heyond 
the  imrni  diaiefuthre. 

This  instinct  is  original,  because  implanted  at  the 
origin  of  instinctive  beings  in  their  very  nature.  It 
is  proved  to  have  been  thus  implanted,  because  it  is 
uniform  in  all  of  the  same  species;  unchanged  by  repe- 
tition ;  unaltered  however  object's  in  the  distance  may 


16  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

change;  and  unmodified  except  by  immediate  circum- 
stances, and  even  then  but  slightly.  It  is  without  a 
regard  to  final  results,  because  it  is  not  changed  in 
view  of  such  results  ;  and  is  often  intensely  active 
and  minutely  exact,  where,  in  the  peculiarities  of  the 
being  and  the  circumstances,  it  could  not  have  any 
knowledge  of  such  results.  The  butterfly,  of  only  a 
few  da^'s'  existence,  deposits  eggs  in  a  manner  exactly 
adapted  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  seasons  for  months 
to  come,  and  also  to  the  needs  of  the  hatching  larvae, 
in  conditions  of  life  entirely  different  from  the  parent, 
through  various  and  most  wonderful  transformations. 

There  must  have  been  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
Creator  as  to  the  future,  in  giving  the  creature  the 
impulse  of  instinct  to  act  in  such  a  manner  adapted 
to  secure  needed  results  far  in  the  future.  Yet  there 
could  be  no  such  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  crea- 
ture itself.  Its  knowledge  is  that  of  immediate  cir- 
cumstances, with,  probably,  very  limited  remembrance 
of  the  past,  but  without  any  conscious  reference  to 
ultimate  results  in  the  future. 

Illustrations  of  instinctive  government  are  found 
throughout  all  tlie  animated  world :  as  in  migrating 
wild  fowls,  passing  over  continents  and  oceans  at  the 
proper  time  to  escape  the  severity  of  the  seasons  ;  in 
herds  of  buffaloes  traversing  immense  regions  of  terri- 
tory in  the  needed  direction  to  secure  a  supply  of 
food  ;  in  a  hive  of  bees,  constructing,  with  perfect 
fitness,  and  with  mathematical  exactness,  their  comb, 
adapted  to  its  purposes  in  meeting  the  wants  of  their 
existence ;  in  the  anthill,  where  every  insect, from  the 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  17 

beg-iniiing,  does  with  j^erfectioii  jii.-t  wliat  is  needed 
to  be  done;  in  the  bird  huiidiiii^  its  nest;  tlie  mule 
its  burrow;  tlie  spider  its  web  ;  and  thus  on  with(jut 
limit.  In  -dW  tliese  cases  there  is  an  impulse  to  do  that 
M'hic-h  is  adapted  to  result  in  distant  objects  of  good, 
without  a  knowledge  of  these  objects  bejond  tlie 
immediate  future.  Their  Creator  must  have  known 
these  objects,  but  not  they. 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  instinctive  govern- 
ment is  conscious  impulse  to  action,  with  a  form  of 
will,  hut  without  conscious  reference  to  ultimate 
results. 

Consciousness,  with  an  impulse  which  may  be  called 
a  form  of  will,  distinguishes  instinctive  government 
from  material  government.  They  both  are  active 
systems  of  control,  necessar}'  to  the  entities  compre- 
hended in  them  in  securing  the  ends  for  which  they 
exist ;  and  operate  through  laws,  uniform  modes  o^ 
action,  so  long  as  there  is  occasion  for  uniformitj-. 
One  is  unconscious;  the  other  conscious,  and  with  a 
form  of  will.  But  the  will  is  irrational  under  the 
control  of  impulse,  and  must  obey  the  law  of  impulse, 
without  reference  to  iinal  results. 

Will  is  that  in  an  intelligent  heing  which  dictates 
action,  and  controls  it  directly  at  its  beginning  as  the 
primal  cause. 

Not  all  the  actions  of  an  intelligent  being  are  thus 
dictated  by  will,  but  that  which  does  dictate  is  the 
will.  Much  of  thinking  is  action  without  will  or  dic- 
tation. Yet  the  will  may  assume  control  and  dictate 
the  method  and  objects  of  thought,  the  same  as  it  may 


18  archology;  or, 

dictate  the  order  of  breathing.  So,  also,  tlie  art  of  will- 
ing in  a  rational  being  is  not  dictated.  Science,  in  its 
limiting  ignorance,  stops  and  declares  that,  as  far  as 
evidence  goes,  the  will  in  a  rational  being  dictates 
actions,  but  nothing  dictates  to  it. 

"While  every  action  dictated  by  will  is  directly  con- 
trolled by  the  will  at  its  beginning,  yet,  afterwards, 
every  such  action  flows  onward  in  single  or  branching 
trains  of  results  without  liniit.  After  the  beginning 
of  action,  many  other  forces  may  affect  and  control 
it  more  or  less  continnalh\  But,  in  its  beginning, 
such  action  is  controlled  directly  by  the  will. 

KATIOXAL    GOVERNMENT. 

Rational  government  is  the  system  of  control  com- 
mencing in  the  will,  in  harmony  loith  reason,  and 
exerted  consciously  hy,  and  over^  'rational  Ijeings. 

The  word  "consciously"  is  used  in  the  definition, 
because  a  rational  being  often  exerts  a  control  of  the 
same  character  with  matter,  unconsciously.  Only  that 
which  is  conscious  pertains  to  rational  government. 

Reason,  as  used  in  this  definition^  signifies  the 
power,  or  faculty,  lohich  hoth  perceives  truths  in  their 
different  relations,  and  infers  new  truths  from  those 
already  apprehended. 

Truths  here  signify  whatever,  as  an  object  of  belief, 
the  intellect  holds  in  the  belief  as  truth.  And  when- 
ever the  belief  is  so  clear  and  positive  as  not  to  admit 
of  the  least  conscious  doubt  or  hesitation  in  the  mind, 
it  is  called  knowledge.  Hence,  belief  and  knowledge 
differ  only  in  the  degree  of  the   intellectual  assent, 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  19 

with  wliic'h  tlie  uiiii(J  receives  their  objects  a&  true. 
Therefore,  in  this  treatise,  hereafter,  instead  of  belief 
and  believe,  the  words  knowledge  and  know  will  gen- 
erally be  used  as  the  more  conv^enient. 

Since  a  clear  apprehension  of  what  rational  govern- 
ment is,  and  an  exact  definition  of  it,  are  of  the  utmost 
importance,  each  portion  of  the  definition  here  given 
is  separately  specified. 

In  the  first  place,  the  governmental  control  is  exerted 
by  and  over  rational  beings — i.  e.,  those  possessing 
faculties  for  perceiving  truths,  and  inferring  new  ones 
from  those  already  apprehended.  Hence,  government 
needs  to  correspond  to  the  wants  of  snch  beings,  and 
be  modified  according  to  their  necessities. 

It  needs  to  affect  them,  not  like  blind  force,  as  that 
of  matter,  nor  the  equally  blind  impulse  of  feeling  or 
instinct;  but  as  a  rational  force,  acting  through  intelli- 
gence, reaching  the  subjects  of  government  for  good. 
In  all  its  features,  and  entire  influence,  it  needs  to 
harmonize  with  their  natures  as  rational  beings,  and, 
through  truth,  become  to  them  a  means  of  usefulness 
in  securing  the  ends  for  which  they  exist. 

If  rational  government  should  appear  to  involve,  also, 
creatures  of  instinct,  this  is  so  only  in  appearance. 
For,  it  is  in  such  case,  at  most,  only  a  mixed  govern- 
ment. Because,  while  on  the  part  of  those  who  exert 
the  control,  there  is  reason,  yet,  on  tlie  part  of  the 
creatures  of  instinct,  the  control  reaches  them  only 
through  the  laws  of  instinct,  and  therefore  to  them 
it  is  instinctive  government. 

In  the  second  place,  rational  government  involves. 


20  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

on  the  ])art  of  those  by  and  over  whom  the  control 
is  exerted,  knowledge  of  truths,  as  the  basis  of  all 
governmental  action.  Hence,  government  must  cor- 
respond with  truth,  known  and  to  be  known.  It 
needs  to  commence  with  truth,  and  proceed  witli 
truth,  in  all  its  actions  affecting  its  subjects  in  accord- 
ance with  their  knowledge,  and  ever  add  to  this 
knowledge  as  a  means  helpful  to  them  in  securing  the 
ends  for  which  they  exist.  Rational  government  is 
not  an  abstract,  arbitrary  power  or  reality.  The 
whole  system  of  it  harmonizes  with  reason,  and  its 
every  featui-e  lias  its  basis  in  knowledge. 

In  the  third  place,  rational  government  involves,  on 
the  part  of  those  by  and  over  whom  it  is  exerted,  the 
fact  of  reasoning,  tliat  of  inferring  new  truths  from 
those  ah-eady  apprehended,  and  of  distinguishing 
truth  from  error.  Hence,  government  needs  to  be  a 
help  to  tliem  in  reasoning,  in  inferring  truths  from 
truths,  that  they  may  secure  the  ends  for  which  they 
exist. 

And  in  the  fourth  place,  rational  government  in- 
volves, on  the  part  of  those  by  and  over  whom  it  is 
exerted,  as  its  great,  all-important  element,  the  will  of 
the  rational  being,  with  all  the  peculiarities  of  it.  In 
view  of  this  as  the  primal  element  of  control,  the 
features  of  rational  government  must  be  most  care- 
fully modified,  and  be  exactly  conformed  to  its  prin- 
ciples, as  an  aid  to  it  in  its  executive  capacities,  that 
all  action  nuiy  tend  to  result  in  good. 

The  will  has  been  defined  to  be  "  that  in  an  intel- 
ligent  being  which  dictates   action    and    controls  it 


THE  SCIENCE   OP  GOVERNMENT.  21 

directly  at  its  he^innini^."  In  instinctive  govcrnniont 
tlie  form  of  will  is  controlled  by  impulse  ;  bnt  in  ra- 
tional government  the  will  is  under  no  control.  For, 
first,  were  the  will  under  the  control  of  impulse,  it 
would  be  an  entity  of  instinctive  government,  and 
thus  there  would  exist  no  rational  government  at  all. 
Again,  were  the  will  under  the  control  of  matter,  it 
would  be  an' entity  of  material  government,  and  again 
there  would  exist  no  rational  government  at  all. 
Lastly,  therefore,  if  in  rational  government  the  Avill  is 
under  control,  it  must  be  undei'  that  of  reason.  Now 
reason,  as  delined,  consists  of  only  two  things,  as  ''  the 
faculty  or  power  which  perceives  truths  in  their  differ- 
ent relations,  and  infers  new  truths  from  those  ali'cady 
apprehended."  In  the  first  function  of  reason  as 
perceiving  truth,  it  acts  only  so  far  as  to  perceive 
truths  in  their  different  relations;  and  here  its  action, 
as  nierelyperceiving,  ceases.  It  does  not  dictate  and 
control  other  actions,  to  l)ringthcm  into  harmony  with 
its  perceptions.  It  is  the  function  of  the  will,  as  de- 
fined, to  do  this — to  dictate  actions  in  harmony  with, 
or  contrary  to,  the  reason.  Again,  if  the  second  func- 
tion of  reason  be  considered — that  of  inferring  truths 
from  others — this  is  only  one  action  :  that  of  inferring ; 
while  after  this,  after  the  whole  process  of  inferring 
truths  is  finished,  there  is  that  of  dictating  and  con- 
trolling the  actions  of  the  intelligent  being,  either  in 
harmony  or  not  in  harmony  with  ti-utli  given  in  the 
inferences  of  reason.  This  latter  act  is  that  of  the 
will.  Xow  here  both  ex])erience  and  consciousness 
prove  that  the  will  is  often  in  oj^position  to  trutli  and 


22  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

reason,  not  in  harmony  with  the  decisions  of  reason, 
effectually  rejecting  the  inferences  of  reason,  and 
yielding  itself  up  in  obedience  to  impulse  and  self- 
gratification.  Thus  it  is  proved  that  the  will  in  rational 
government  is  not  under  the  control  either  of  matter, 
or  of  impulse,  or  of  reason,  and  hence  is  under  no 
control. 

Again,  in  rational  government  the  will  is  itself 
alone  sovereign.  Nothing  is  practically  superior  to 
it.  Nothing  can,  or  does,  compulsorily  control  it. 
Deciding  for  itself,  it  may  determine  action  either  in 
harmony  with  reason,  with  truth,  with  right,  with 
good,  with  benevolence,  or  it  may  determine  action  in 
opposition  to  all  these,  dictating  all  for  self,  for  im- 
pulse, for  passion,  and  for  the  unreasonable. 

Again,  in  rational  goveimment  the  will  is  a  free  will. 
As  sovereign,  the  will  is  necessarily  free,  not  governed, 
not  controlled  by  any  force  or  power.  It  may  be  per- 
suaded by  reason,  it  may  be  influenced  by  impulse,  it 
may  be  induced  by  desire,  it  may  be  affected  by  cir- 
cumstances, but  it  is  itself  to  decide  to  yield  or  not  to 
yield  to  the  influence.  As  sovereign,  it  is  the  only 
dictating  power,  free  in  its  actions,  going  out  through 
a  whole  system  of  control,  but  controlled  itself  by 
nothing.  Keason  is  its  chief  minister,  its  constant 
companion,  its  faithful  adviser,  and  its  truest  guide; 
but  itself  is  alone  sovereign  and  free,  the  real  source 
of  efficiency,  the  ultimate  authority  in  the  case,  deter- 
mining the  whole  system  of  control  affecting  every 
entity  of  the  government.  Nothing  exists  for  the 
benefit  of  this  will,  but  it  should  exist  wholly  for  the 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNHrENT.  23 

benefit  of  the  entities  coinjM'elieiided  in  government. 
To  act  for  itself,  called  wilfulness,  or  for  others  to  act 
for  it,  or  in  its  place,  is  a  perversion.  It,  or  tliev,  or 
both,  are  wrung  in  such  a  case.  The  will,  as  a  free 
sovereign,  is  alone  to  dictate,  order,  control  all  others, 
in  view  of  securing  the  ends  for  whicli  they  exist. 

THE    MANNER    OF    THE    WILl's    CONTKOL. 

1st.  As  to  actions,  the  loill  controls  the  actions  hy 
immediate  and  direct  force.  Not  all  actions,  thi-ongli 
rational  government,  are  thus  controlled  by  will,  since 
actions  result  from  actions  in  endless  series  and  com- 
binations;  but  the  will  begins  actions  by  immediate 
and  direct  force  upon  the  active  powers. 

2d.  As  to  feelings,  the  will  controls  the  feelings  hy 
mediate  and  indirect  force.  The  feelings  are  moved 
only  by  their  exciting  causes,  whicli  are  found  in  the 
conditions  of  things.  Hence,  the  will  can  reach  these 
feelings,  to  move  them,  only  by  holding  before  the 
emotional  powers  their  exciting  causes.  In  this  manner, 
by  means  of  these  causes,  the  will  can,  and  does, 
control  the  feelings  indirectly.  Still  it  is  an  effectual 
control,  as  truly  so  as  is  its  direct  control  over  the 
actions. 

3d.  As  to  the  reason  and  belief,  the  will  also  con- 
trols the  reason  hy  mediate  and  indirect  force. 

The  reason  as  defined  signifies  "  both  the  faculty  to 
infer  and  the  process  of  inferring  new  truths  from 
those  already  apprehended."  But  the  will  can  hold 
before  the  reasoning  faculties  such  truths  as  it  may 
select  and  in  such  relations  as  it  mav  determine,  so  as 


24  aechology;  ok, 

to  direct  the  process  of  reasoning,  and  in  general 
make  certain  the  decision  as  to  what  shall  or  shall  not 
be  believed.  Thus  indirectly  the  will  controls  the 
reason  and  the  belief.  He  that  will  believe  an  error 
can  generally  do  it,  and  he  that  will  receive  a  truth 
can  probably  always  do  it.  The  will  is  as  sovereign 
indirectly  over  the  feelings,  the  reason  and  belief,  as 
it  is  directly  over  actions.  I71  both  cases  some  things 
are  impossible.  In  actions,  if  the  will  determines  a  man 
to  jump  to  the  sun,  it  is  impossible.  So,  as  to  the  belief, 
if  the  will  determines  that  the  reason  shall  infer  one 
and  one  to  be  tliree,  it  probably  is  impossible.  Or  that 
a  truly  and  clearly  good  mother  shall  be  hated  ;  yes, 
this  in  particulnr  cases,  might  be  possible.  The  will  is 
somewhat  limited,  but  indirectly  it  is  as  sovereign  over 
the  feelings  and  the  reason,  i.  e.,  belief,  as  it  is  directly 
over  the  actions.  Thus  in  rational  government  tlu; 
will  is  the  originating,  determinating,  compulsory 
source  of  all  control.  It  alone  is  sovereign,  free,  un- 
controlled, but  may  control  all  else  within  that  govern- 
ment— the  actions,  the  feelings,  the  reason,  or  belief. 
It  may  be  influenced,  persuaded,  urged,  affected,  but 
it  alone  is  free  to  determine  to  yield  or  not,  and  all 
must  obey  its  dictum. 

The  distinguishing  feature  of  rational  govern- 
raent  is  conscious  haowledge  of  actions  determined 
ujyon  liy  the  will  in  view  of  final  results  as  given  in, 
the  reason. 

Illustrations  of  rational  government  appear  almost 
limitless,  as  the  l^yceum,  the  family,  the  school,  the 
city,  tlie  State,  the  kingdom  of  Heaven,  etc.     In  each 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  25 

there  is  knowledge  of  iinal  results,  in  the  securing  of 
ends  for  which  entities  exist,  with  will  controlling 
actions  put  forth  for  the  securing  of  such  ends.  In  the 
famil}'  there  is  the  will  of  the  parent;  in  the  State, 
the  will  of  the  executive  ;  in  the  kingdom  of  Heaven, 
the  will  of  God;  and  the  manner  of  governmental 
control  is  through  law;  uniform  modes  of  action — so 
long  as  there  is  occasion  for  uniformity — insuring  a 
harmony  of  action  necessarj'  to  entities  in  securing 
the  ends  for  which  tliej  exist. 
2 


26  AECIIOLOGY  ;   OR, 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    THREE   CLASSES   OF   GOVERNMENT   CONTRASTED. 

In  tlie  distinguishing  feature  of  each  class  of 
government  is  found  the  single  element  from  which  or 
in  which  commences  the  control. 

In  Material  Government  the  jprinial  element  in 
which  the  control  legins  is  matter.  In  Instinctive 
Government  the  primal  element  in  which  the  control 
hegins  is  impulse.  In  Rational  Governynent  the  primal 
element  in  which  the  control  hegins  is  will. 

In  the  development  of  the  science  of  archology  it 
is  of  the  utmost  importance,  that  these  three  primal 
elements  of  control  be  kept  clear  and  distinct  in  the 
mind.  The  mixing  or  confusing  of  them  with  one 
another,  or  with  other  elements,  is  sure  to  result  in  the 
greatest  errors.  They  are  in  themselves  simple,  and  in 
their  departments,  supreme.  They  are  matter,  im- 
pulse, will;  unconscious  matter;  impulse  with  con- 
sciousness and  a  form  of  will;  and  w^ill  with  conscious- 
ness, knowledge,  reason,  desire,  impulse,  motive,  plan, 
and  all  else  pertaining  to  a  rational  being. 

Matter,  impulse,  will ;  each  simple  and  supreme  in 
its  department,  controlling  and  necessitating  all  within 
the  sphere  of  its  government. 

The  higher  government  can  control  the  lower 
through  its  laws  ',   never  the  lower  control  the  higher. 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  27 

The  instinct  of  the  animal  may  govern  matter  and 
determine  its  action  in  harmony  ^vith  impulse;  and 
this  it  must  do,  if  done  at  all,  by  availing  itself  of  the 
laws  of  matter.  But  matter  cannot  govern  the  animal 
by  availing  itself  of  the  huvs  of  instinct.  Matter, 
through  the  laws  of  matter,  may  govern  the  animal 
as  matter,  but  never  through  the  law  of  instinct. 
So  also  the  will  of  a  rational  being  rjiay,  through  the 
laws  of  instinct  and  of  matter,  force  the  instinct  of 
the  animal  and  all  the  elements  of  matter  into  sub- 
servience to  the  designs  of  the  rational  being.  But  in- 
stinct Can  never  recognize  anything  higher  than  it- 
self as  reason,  and  thus  bring  it  into  subservience  to 
itself  for  its  own  purposes.  Impulse  in  a  creature  of 
instinct  may  force  the  animal  into  conflict  with  a 
rational  being  and  compel  such  being  contrary  to  his 
will.  But  this  is  done  only  as  one  creature  of  instinct 
overcomes  another  creature  of  instinct,  with  no  refer- 
ence to  reason.  The  will  through  reason  may  take 
advantage  of  instinct  and  govern  it  for  its  own  pur- 
poses, but  never  can  instinct  thus  avail  itself  of 
reason. 

Again,  the  higher  government  may  lose  its  distin- 
guisJiing  feature,  and  descend  into,  or  he  supplanted 
5y,  the  lower  ;  hut  never  the  lower  ascend  to  heconie  tlie 
liigher. 

A  creature  of  instinct  may  lose  all  conscious  im- 
pulse, and  become  governed  only  as  so  much  matter. 
This  may  result  from  sickness,  or  an  injury  to  the 
brain,  and  the  animal  is  only  as  so  much  matter.  So, 
also,  in  rational  government,  the  will,  as  free  and  su- 


28  archology;  or, 

preme,  may  yield  itself  a  slave,  in  obedience  to  impulse, 
to  anger,  or  passion,  or  sellisljness,  etc.,  and  the  gov- 
ernment descend  from  its  rational  character,  to  be 
only  one  of  unnatural  instinct ;  an  instinctive  govern- 
ment of  most  wretched  perversion.  Yet  in  the  op- 
posite direction,  matter  cannot  ascend  to  involve 
instinct,  for  it  can  only  act  through  its  own  laws,  and 
in  those  is  no  will.  Neither  can  instinct  ascend  to 
reason,  for  it  can  only  act  in  accordance  with  its  own 
laws.  And  those  laws  are  only  those  of  impulse,  with 
no  reference  to  ultimate  results.  Thus  instinct  can 
never  become  reason. 

Again,  m  case  of  the  descending  of  the  higher  gov- 
ernment to  become  the  loioer,  disaster  to  the  entities 
comprehended  in  the  higher  is  inevitable. 

The  government  upon  which  the  entities  were  de- 
pendent, that  they  might  secure  the  ends  of  their  ex- 
istence, has  turned  from  its  assistance  to  them,  and 
become  subservient  to  another  government,  w^ith  an- 
other class  of  results.  Without  their  needed  govern- 
ment, the  entities  in  their  actions  must  come  into 
unavoidable  conflicts ;  hence  disaster,  destruction, 
death,  are  the  inevitable  results. 

Again,  in  case  of  the  degradation  of  the  higher  gov- 
ernment to  the  lower,  there  is  no  prohalAlity,  if  there  is 
any  possibility,  of  a  recovery  of  the  degraded  giwern- 
mnent  hack  to  its  original  position  a?id  character  by  its 
own  efforts  alone. 

"When  once  the  impulse  of  instinct  in  the  animal  is 
gone,  and  he  has  become  only  so  much  matter,  decom- 
position begins,  dispersion   rapidly  follows,  and  the 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  29 

former  government  of  instinct  is  forever  at  an  end.  It 
has  no  power  to  restore  itself  as  it  was.  The  activity 
of  impulse  may  be  temporarily  suspended,  and  the 
power  of  impulse  remain  for  a  time  paralyzed.  In 
this  case,  when  the  suspending  cause  is  removed,  the 
impulse  resumes  again  its  control.  Yet  there  is  no 
degrading  of  the  government  of  impulse  in  this  case, 
only  a  suspension  of  it,  and  when  the  suspending  cause 
is  removed,  it  merely  goes  on  in  its  activity  as  before. 
But  when  the  power  of  impulse  no  more  exists,  and 
the  whole  system  has  gone  under  the  control  of  matter, 
as  in  death,  then  the  individual  instinctive  government 
has  ceased,  without  the  least  possibility  of  self-recovery.' 
It  is  very  much  so  also  in  rational  government.  When 
once  the  fi'ee  will,  which  should  have  controlled  all  in 
harmony  with  reason,  with  truth,  and  the  welfare  of 
the  entities  involved  in  the  government,  has  ceased  its 
proper  restraint  of  all  the  activities,  and  yielded  itself 
a  slave  to  impulse,  its  sovereignty  is  practically  gone; 
its  freedom  is  perverted  in  exercise  ;  its  control  of  ac- 
tions, which  should  have  been  in  accordance  with  reason 
and  truth  for  good,  is  now  itself  controlled  by  another 
power,  one  which  has  no  reference  to  reason  or  truth. 
The  previous  government  is  in  ruins  ;  its  sovereign  is 
in  vc)luntary  slavery,  and  science  unfolds  in  the  case 
no  probability,  if  there  is  any  possibility,  for  the  slave 
to  recover  the  mastery,  and  reestablish  the  former 
government.  The  free  will,  voluntarily  renouncing 
its  control,  and  becoming  obedient  to  another  power, 
can  scarcely  revolt  against  its  new  lord,  correct  the 
ruin  begun,  and  restore  to  harmony  all  actions  for 


30  A.RCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

the  good  of  those  inchideJ  in  the  first  government. 
If  restoration  conies,  it  must  come  at  least  with  aid 
from  some  other  and  higher  source  than  that  of  the 
government  itself  alone — a  source  outside  of  itself 
and  superior  to  it — or  ruin  inevitably  must  follow. 

Again,  only  rational  government  can  degrade  itself 
to  a  lower. 

Material  government  is  as  low  as  it  can  be.  As 
matter  came  from  the  hand  of  its  Creator,  so  of  itself 
it  must  remain. 

Also,  as  to  instinct,  it  has  no  freedom  or  self-con- 
trol. Impulse  is  simply  impulse,  just  such  as  the 
Creator  made  it,  and  must  ever  be  in  exact  harmony 
with  its  own  laws,  unchanged  by  itself,  for  it  possesses 
no  self-modulating  power. 

But  in  rational  government  the  primal  element  of 
action  is  w^ill,  as  to  which  there  is  nothing  compul- 
sorilj  controlling  it.  It  may  decide  for  good  or  evil, 
for  right  or  wrong ;  for  impulse  or  reason  ;  for  self- 
gratification  or  for  the  M'elfare  of  all  the  entities 
involved  in  the  government.  Hence  it  has  the  power 
to  degrade  itself  and  degrade  its  government  from 
its  rational  character  and  objects,  involving  all  in  ruin. 
If  it  will  ever  choose  reason  as  its  adviser  and  constant 
guide,  ever  aiming  at  truth,  right,  and  welfare,  it  may ; 
if  it  will  not  so  do,  but  will  do  the  opposite,  it  can. 

In  the  very  necessities  of  rational  government  the 
Creator  gave  to  the  will  this  power,  freely  to  control 
all  for  good,  or  for  what  involves  the  o))posite;  to  be 
ti'ue  to  all  excellence,  or  to  degrade  itself  and  the 
government  to  a  lower  character. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  31 

Had  he  not  giv'cii  tin's  power  to  the  will,  no  rational 
eovcrnment  could  have  existed.  For  a  free  and  sov- 
ereign  will  is  the  very  element,  the  essential  and 
])rinial  element,  of  such  government,  without  which 
such  ofovernment  would  not  he.  Aside  from  this  free 
and  sovereign  will  —  sovereign,  as  heing  its^elf  uncon- 
trolled by  any  compulsory  })ower  within  its  own  ])ruv- 
inee  of  action — there  would  exist  only  the  two  forms 
of  material  and  instinctive  government.  Thus  there 
could  be  none  of  the  higher  joys,  and  dignities,  and 
activities,  and  limitless  progress  of  the  creatures  of 
rational  government.  The  inconceivably  higher 
interests  of  the  universe  demanded  rational  govern- 
ment. And  in  this  was  necessarily  involved  the  free 
will  of  the  intelliojent  creatures  of  such  government. 
Hence,  there  was  necessarily  involved  the  power,  and 
even  also  the  opportunity,  for  the  will  to  degrade 
itself  by  deciding  actions  for  that  which  is  not  reason- 
able, not  true,  not  good. 

Thus,  in  rational  government,  the  Mill,  being  free, 
must  be  able  to  degrade  itself  and  the  government. 
For  the  existence  of  such  rational  government,  involv- 
ing such  power  of  selt'-degi-adation,  the  Creator  is 
responsible;  and  if,  in  the  fact  of  allowing  the  exist- 
ence of  such  government,  there  is,  or  was,  wrong, 
then  the  Creator  is  to  blame.  But  if,  in  view  of  all 
things  forever,  it  was  best  that  rational  governments 
should  exist  at  all,  then,  of  necessity,  in  the  nature 
of  such  governments,  the  will  controlling  them  must 
possess  the  freedom  and  power  to  degrade  itself  and 
them.     The}',  through  the  Mill,  are  alone  the  blame- 


32  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OE, 

worthy  party  for  such  degradation  and  consequent 
disaster.  Morally  the  Creator  must  do  all  he  consist- 
ently can  to  prevent  such  degradation  and  consequent 
ruin.  But  there  must  necessarily  be  a  possibility  of 
its  takiug  place ;  and  if  there  be  a  will  to  do  it,  the^ 
possibility  must  become  a  reality,  with  all  the  fearful, 
inevitable  results. 

In  the  truth  of  the  freedom  and  the  sovereignty  of 
the  will  is  involved  the  necessary  truth  that  there  is 
no  power  which  can  reach  the  will  to  compel  it  to  be 
right.  Hence,  if  it  wills  to  refuse  the  guidance  of 
reason,  and  to  yield  itself  to  impulse  and  selfishness, 
it  can  do  so,  become  wrong  itself,  and  degrade  its 
government  in  character,  whelming  all  in  ruin. 

Now  the  whole  object,  effort,  and  benefit  of  archol- 
ogy  as  a  science  is  to  aid  either  in  avoiding  this  degra- 
dation, or  in  recovei'ing  from  it  if  it  be  a  reality. 
Therefore,  as  the  science,  in  its  application  to  Mate- 
rial and  Instinctive  governments,  is,  comparatively,  of 
little  importance,  and  seems  easily  exhausted,  the 
remaining  development  of  it  will  be  confined  to  the 
fuller  investigation  of  the  principles  and  peculiarities 
of  Rational  Government. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  33 


CHAPTER    lY. 


RATIONAL    GOVERNMENT. 


Rational  government  has  been  delined  to  be  "the 
system  of  control  commcncin*;^  in  the  will,  harmoniz- 
ing with  reason,  and  exerted  consciously  by  and  over 
rational  beings."  According  to  this  definition,  as 
previously  explained,  the  will,  in  true  rational  gov- 
ernment, accepts  the  reason  as  its  adviser  and  guide, 
conforms  to  its  decisions,  and  controls  all  actions  for 
the  benefit  of  the  rational  entities  involved  in  such 
government.  But  the  entities  of  a  rational  govern- 
ment arc  properly  called  subjects.  Tlierefore,  in 
accordance  M'ith  the  principles  discovered  in  the  exam- 
ination of  gover.nment  as  a  genus,  it  follows,  in  the 
application  of  those  principles  to  rational  government 
as  a  species,  that  the  whole  origin  and  aim  of  such 
government  are  found  in  the  necessities  of  its  sub- 
jects, as  a  means  indispensable  to  their  securing  the 
ends  of  their  existence.  Its  aim  is  in  no  manner  for 
itself,  but  Avholly  for  the  welfare  of  its  snbjects.  Its 
principle  of  existence,  its  virtue  and  force,  consist  in 
the  fact  of  its  nsefulness  as  far  as  possible  to  them, 
as  a  means  necessary  in  securing  their  own  good. 
The  word  good,  or  welfare,  is  a  cojnjrre/iensive  term 
signify ing  all  the  ends  taken  collectively  for  which 
2* 


34  AECHOLOGY  ;   OE, 

sensitive  heings  exist,  together  loitli  the  means  hy  which 
they  are  secured. 

In  order  to  secure  this  good,  as  a  means  of  useful- 
ness necessary  to  subjects,  rational  government  exists, 
exerting,  so  far  as  possible,  such  a  control  over  them 
that,  without  conflicting  interference,  they,  in  harmony 
together,  may  secure  their  truest,  higliest  welfare. 
Just  in  proportion  as  government  is  changed  from 
this  usefulness  to  its  subjects,  it  becomes  changed  from 
a  rational  government  to  be  perverted  into  a  form  of 
corrupt  instinctive  government,  under  the  control  of 
impulse.  In  this  case,  being  destitute  of  tlie  regH- 
lating  restraints  and  protective  guards  of  a  naturally 
instinctive  government,  as  establishedby  the  Creator, 
the  perverted  government,  as  previously  shown,  must 
probably  become  an  utter  ruin.  It  has  in  itself  little 
or  no  remedial  quality,  and  seems  very  sure  to  pro- 
gress, of  itself  alone,  from  bad  to  worse  without 
known  limit. 

For  the  perfect  success  of  rational  government,  in 
insuring  the  real  good  of  all  its  subjects,  there  is  a 
necessity  of  three  things  : 

1st.  That  the  intelligence  of  the  governing  authority 
shall  correctly  apprehend  the  ends  for  which  the  sub- 
jects exist. 

All  rational  actions  necessarily  presuppose  knowl- 
edge of  that  for  which  the  action  is  put  forth;  hence 
the  governing  authority  must  know  the  ends  for  which 
subjects  exist.  Otherwise  it  could  not  govern  them 
successfully  in  securing  tliese  ends,  or  their  real 
good. 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  35 

2d.  That  thereason  correctly  decide  iijpon  the  means 
with  which  to  secure  these  ends. 

3d.  That  the  lolll,  in  accordance  with  the  decisions 
of  reason^  succeed  in  so  controlling  all  actions,  as  to 
secure  their  harmonious  adaptation  to  result  in  these 
ends. 

If  tlie  intolli.^-ence  fails  of  appi-eheiiding  the  real 
objects  of  existence,  i.  e..,  the  real  good  and  welfare  of 
the  subjects  of  government,  disaster  must  follow.  If 
the  reason  does  not  point  out  correctly  the  means  to 
be  used,  and  the  actions  to  be  put  forth,  adapted  to 
secure  such  good,  disaster  must  follow.  If  the  will, 
as  the  primal  element  of  control,  fails  to  accord  with 
reason,  by  yielding  itself  to  impulse,  or  in  any  other 
way  fails  to  control  the  actions  put  forth  so  as  to  se- 
cure an  adaptation  to  result  in  such  good,  disaster  must 
follow. 

Intelligence,  reason,  will,  must  all  be  correct,  and 
the  will  must  be  successful,  or  disaster  must  follow. 
The  true  objects  of  good  must  be  known,  the  true 
means  of  securing  them  must  be  perceived,  and  the 
will  must  succeed  in  controlling  all  actions  in  a  manner 
adapted  to  result  in  their  attainment,  or  disaster  must 
follow,  the  good  of  the  subjects  must  be  lost,  the 
very  objects  for  which  alone  government  ex'sts  not 
be  secured,  and  evils  incalculable  be  the  result. 

Knowledge^  plan,  and  execution,  must  he  right,  or 
disaster  follows. 

The  word  right  is  one  of  fre(|uent  use  in  rational 
government.  It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  its 
exact  signitication   be  understood.      Peiliaps  no  other 


36  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

word  is  so  difl'erentlj  regarded  by  able  men  as  to  its 
real  meaning. 

The  word  right  has  generically  onl}^  one  significa- 
tion, yet  specifically  it  has,  in  practice  or  in  common 
use,  two. 

Generically^  as  an  adjective^  right  signifies  adapted 
to  the  end  designed  in  the  case. 

A  garment  is  made  right  when  exactly  adapted  to 
the  end  designed  in  the  making  of  it.  A  plow  is 
made  right  when  exactly  adapted  to  do  the  thing  de- 
signed in  its  making.  A  good  man  does  right  when 
acting  in  a  manner  adapted  to  result  in  the  welfare  of 
all.  Adaptedness  to  a  designed  end  is  the  generic 
meaning  of  the  word  right,  used  as  a  noun.  But, 
specifically,  the  word  has  two  significations,  called 
Moral  right,  and  external  or  Practical  right.  Practi- 
cal or  external  right  is  adaptation  in  external  action 
or  thing  to  ends  designed  in  the  case.  But  Moral 
right  is  adaptation  in  the  tnotives  influencing  the  will 
to  the  great  ends  of  all  existence. 

However  moral  philosophers  may  attempt  to  bring 
out  other  meanings  of  the  word  right,  yet,  in  an  ex- 
ecutive sense,  as  in  rational  government,  these  two  are 
the  only  significations  in  which  it  is  used.  Govern- 
ment and  law  have  no  reference  to  any  right,  except 
in  motive  ^and  in  action,  in  design  and  in  thing, 
moral  and  practical. 

External  or  practical  right  has  no  reference  to  the 
actor,  but  only  to  the  action,  or  external  thing  as  adapted 
to  an  end.  But  moral  right  has  entire  reference  to  the 
actor  as  influenced   l)y  a  motive  adapted  to  promote 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVEBNMENT.  37 

tlie  good  of  i\]\.  Motive  signifies  either  an  object  of 
desire,  or  the  desire  of  an  object  ultimate  in  the  jrxz'/'- 
tievlar  case,  influencing  the  will. 

This  motive  is  only  an  iiiflueiico  upon  the  will,  not 
a  necessitating  cause  to  it ;  not  a  compulsoiy  force. 
The  will,  as  the  primal  element  of  control,  is  to  de- 
cide or  dictate  action  in  the  case ;  yet  motive  is  a 
strong  inducing  influence.  When  this  motive  is  the 
universal  good  of  all,  then  it  is  adapted  to  the  great 
ends  of  all  existence;  i.  e.,  to  the  highest  welfare  of 
all,  and  is  right.  The  rational  being  is  right  in  motive, 
and  is  7norally  right.  Moral  has  always  reference  to 
motive.  Moral  truth  is  truth  in  reference  to  motives. 
Moral  law  is  law  in  reference  to  motives.  Moral  right 
is  right  in  reference  to  motives.  Moral  obligation  is 
obligation  in  reference  to  motives.  Moral  good  is 
good  in  reference  to  motives.  So  the  opposite  of 
these,  moral  wrong,  moral  error,  or  moral  evil,  etc.,  all 
have  reference  to  the  motives. 

Illustrations  of  practical  right  have  been  given. 
Yet,  in  addition,  a  locomotive  is  made  right  when  ex- 
actly adapted  to  move  both  with  safety  and  with 
power  along  the  track.  A  book  is  bound  right  Mhen 
the  best  adapted  to  the  end  for  which  a  book  is  bound. 
A  house  is  built  right  when  the  best  adapted  to  the 
ends  for  which  a  house  is  built.  And  a  ruler  rules 
right  when  so  ruling  as  the  best  to  promote  the  good 
of  his  subjects — the  one  true  object  of  ruling. 

But  moral  right  refers  to  the  innermost,  secret,  in- 
fluencing, design  of  the  rational  being;  a  design  which 
is  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  actur  in  determining  upon 


38  ARCHOLOGY  ;    OK, 

tlie  action.  The  man  whose  motive  is  constantly  to 
do  that  which  is  for  the  highest  good  of  all,  and 
therefore  chooses  the  perfect  law  of  right  in  all  his 
dealings  and  actions,  is  morally  right,  even  though,  in 
necessary  ignorance,  he  may  fail  of  doing  the  good 
designed  in  particular  cases.  His  motive  is  right,  and 
hence  he  himself  is  morally  right. 

If  a  rational  being  possessed  knowledge  so  as  uner- 
ringly to  know  the  results  of  all  actions  possible  for 
him  to  put  forth,  then,  in  his  case,  moral  right  and 
practical  right  would  perfectly  harmonize,  and  always 
coexist.  For  perfect  moral  right,  or  the  motive  of 
universal  good,  would  insure,  through  his  unerring 
knowledge,  the  choosing  of  perfect  practical  right,  or 
the  actions  adapted  to  result  in  the  highest  good  of  all. 
There  exists  only  one  such  being,  the  one  Creator  and 
God  over  all,  infinite  in  knowledge,  righteousness,  and 
power.  With  Him  perfect  moral  right  and  perfect 
practical  right  must  always  coincide  and  harmonize. 

But  in  the  case  of  every  finite  being  these  two  spe- 
cies of  right  may  coincide,  or  they  may  conflict. 
Hence,  in  the  case  of  every  finite  heing  an  act  may  he 
at  the  same  time  both,  moralltj  right  and  jpractically 
wrong  /  or  it  may  he  hotli  morally  wrong  and  practi- 
cally right. 

K  a  rational  i)eing,  with  the  evil  intention  of  mur- 
der, so  strikes  his  victim  as  really  to  open  an  other- 
wise fatal  abscess  and  thus  saves  the  man's  life,  the  man, 
restored  to  health,  would  say,  "  The  knife  was  struck  just 
rigid  to  save  my  life;"  but  the  decision  of  a- righteous 
jury  in  the  case  would   be,  "The  intentional  assassin 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  39 

was  monilly  wroni^,  and  is  guilty  of  assault  -with  intent 
to  kill."  Again,  a  company  of  good  and  oxperiLMiccd 
surgeons  may  be  morally  right  in  an  operation  in- 
volving an  unperceivable  difficulty,  so  that  a  life  be 
lost.  Practically  there  was  an  error,  a  wrong;  yet 
they  were  morally  riglit,  free  from  all  blame  or  guilt. 
In  all  things  everi/  rational  heing  ought  to  he  morally 
right.  He  ought  in  all  things  to  linve  the  motive  of 
promoting,  to  the  utmost  of  his  ability,  the  highest 
welfare,  the  truest  good  of  all  sensitive  beings.  This 
is  moral  right,  a  right  in  motives.  Still  every  finite 
heing  is ^  of  himself  ^  and  ever  must  he,  liahle  to  practi- 
cal wrong.  Since  practical  right  is  external  to  the 
actor,  in  the  condition  of  things,  and  in  the  tendency 
of  actions,  he,  the  finite  being,  is,  through  ignorance, 
constantly  liable  to  failure  in  this  right,  and  thus  to  do 
practical  wrong  because  of  the  limited  character  of  liis 
powers. 

This  failure  of  the  finite  heing  in  practical  right 
may  originate  in  part,  or  in  all,  of  three  things:  in 
want  of  knowledge,  loant  of  will,  or  loant  of  -power. 

He  may  know  the  right  and  will  to  do  it,  but  fail 
in  power.  He  nuiy  know  the  right  and  have  })Ower 
to  do  it,  but  fail  in  will.  He  may  have  the  power  and 
the  will  to  do  it,  but  fail  in  knowledge.  In  case  of 
want  of  power,  or  want  of  knowledge,  if  this  was  uiui- 
voidable,  the  rational  being,  when  influenced  by  a 
riglit  motive,  is  morally  riglit,  thongh  failing  of  prac- 
tical right  in  the  case,  and  so  doing  ]iractical  wrong. 
But  in  the  case  of  the  failure  of  the  will,  when  there 
is  knowledge  and  power,  then  there  is  moral  wron^-  in 


40'  APiCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

the  case;  there  is  a  wrong  motive,  and  tlie  being  is  in 
character  morally  wrong.  Then,  when  the  motive  is 
wrong,  the  will  M'ill  be  wrong,  leading  to  wrong  ac- 
tions in  practice,  or  to  practical  wrong.  Hence,  in 
'moral  wrong  is  involved  all  wrong,  loth  moral  and 
practical.  For  in  this  case  the  will  is  refusing  the 
guidance  of  reason,  and  is  yielding  itself  to  the  impulse 
of  selfishness,  in  conflict  with  reason,  with  truth,  with 
good.  In  this  case,  the  more  the  M^ilL  yields  itself  to 
impulse,  the  more  the  efticiency  of  reason  to  influence 
the  will  diminishes,  and  the  ability  of  the  will  to  con- 
trol the  feelings  and  actions  in  harmony  with  rea- 
son weakens,  while  the  power  of  impulse  to  control 
the  will  increases,  with  little  or  no  saving  laws  of 
restraint. 

Thus  the  being  becomes  more  and  more  perverted 
from  a  rational  being  into  a  being  of  unnatural  instinct, 
under  the  power  of  selfishness,  envy,  jealousy,  anger, 
malice,  revenge,  and  every  evil  passion,  in  conflict  with 
all  the  real  welfare  of  others,  and  of  all  future  good. 
The  will  is  wrong,  and  is  becoming  more  and  more 
wrong,  and  the  whole  nature  of  the  being,  of  himself 
alone,  is  changed  into  greater  and  greater  wrong. 
Now  there  is  very  little  probabilit}^,  even  if  there  be 
any  possibility,  that  the  moral  being,  thus  perverted 
in  nature  and  character,  will,  alone  of  himself,  recover 
from  his  moral  ruin,  and  the  reason  regain  its  influence 
over  the  will  as  its  counsel  and  guide,  and  the  will 
again  recover  its  control  over  the  feelings,  the  intel- 
lect and  the  actions,  to  brini::  all  once  more  into  har- 
mony  with  immutable  right. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  41 

All  these  facts  illustrate  and  make  more  evident  the 
necessity  of  rational  government  as  a  means  indispen- 
sahle  to  rational  beini:^*  in  scL-uring  good.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  the  individual  himself,  in  all  the  activities  of 
his  being,  through  all  his  existence.  It  is  necessary 
in  the  family,  and  in  every  association  of  numbers,  to 
securing  the  good  ever  to  be  attained  by  such  associ- 
ated numbers ;  necessary  to  societies,  to  cities,  to  States, 
to  the  universe  of  rational  beings,  and  ever  must  be 
so.  It  is  necessary  to  them  as  a  great,  helpful  means 
indispensable  to  them  in  their  very  nature  as  finite 
beings,  and  in  the  constitution  of  things,  to  their 
avoiding  the  evils  to  which  they  are  liable,  and  to  the 
securing  of  the  good  possible  to  them  throughout  their 
course  of  existence.  This  still  more  will  appear  in 
the  succeeding  chapters. 


42  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 


CHAFTER  Y. 

THE  MEANS  OF  GOTERNMENTAL  CONTEOL. 

While  the  manner  of  governmental  control  is  al- 
wsijs  through  law,  The  means  of  governmental  con- 
trol in  rational  government  are  two.  They  are  instruc- 
tion,  and  compulsion,  or  physical  force.  Instrxiction 
signifies  the  imparting  of  knowledge.,  or  the  com- 
municating of  information,  to  another. 

In  supplying  the  wants  of  subjects  so  that  they  may 
secure  good  and  avoid  the  opposite,  as  unfolded  in  the 
previous  chapters,  government  becomes  an  aid  to  them, 
first  of  all,  by  giving  information  as  to  objects  of  good 
to  be  secured,  the  means  to  be  used,  and  the  actions 
to  be  put  forth  for  this  purpose,  togetiier  witli  what 
must  be  avoided.  This  is  the  first  and  great  work  of 
government,  and  consists  of  the  instruction  govern- 
ment must  give  its  subjects.  This  it  may  give  in  any 
manner  and  by  any  means  consistent  witli  good,  it  may 
judge  best.  But  its  one  great,  and  necessary  instru- 
mentality for  tliis  purpose,  and  the  one  whicli  pecub'- 
arly  affects  all  other  means,  determining  their  matter 
and  manner,  is  law.  Through  law  is  given,  hy  govern- 
ment,  instruction  necessary  to  its  subjects  in  securing 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  43 

their  own  real  good,  i.  e.,  the  real  ends  of  their  exist- 
ence. 

Law  is  designed  to  be  the  speoitication  of  those  uni- 
form courses  of  action  wliich  the  government  is  sup- 
posed, fi-om  its  superior  opportunities,  to  know  to  be 
best  for  the  subjects  to  put  forth  ;  and  hence  it  in- 
structs them  by  giving  them  information  in  the  form 
of  hiw.  So  also  as  to  what  they  are  to  avoid  it  in- 
structs them  by  prohibitory  Jaws,  This  is  only  one 
element  of  law.  A  second  is  involved  in  it  as  essen- 
tial to  its  existence. 

For,  instruction  is  not  all  wliich  is  necessary  to  sub- 
jects. They  need  also  protection  against  those  actions 
which  tend  to  Ihe  destruction  of  good,  and  against 
those  who  will  to  put  forth  such  actions.  This  pro- 
tection on  the  part  of  govei-nmcnt  is  given  its  subjects 
in  connection  with  law,  and  is  involved  in  it  as  an 
element,  so  that  without  it  law  would  be  no  law.  This 
element  of  law  is  the  obligatory. 

Hence  TJte  essential  elements  or  qualities  of  law  are 
two,  the  instructive  and  the  obligatory. 

While,  as  instructive,  law  is  designed  to  present  that 
which  is  necessary  to  be  known  by  subjects  in  secur- 
ing good  ;  as  obligatory,  it  is  designed  to  bind  them 
to  conform  to  it.  Hence,  as  a  full  definition.  Law  in 
a  rational  government  is  an  authoritative,  reqidred, 
mode,  or  rnle,  of  action,  made  obligator  rj  ujpon  the  sub- 
jects, and  nnifof'm  so  long  as  there  is  occasion  for 
u)iiformitg,  as  judged  of  by  the  law-mahing  'power. 

This  definitiun  is  designed  to  include  every  variety 
of  law  in  rational  government,  both  the  eiToneous, 


44  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

the  bad,  as  well  as  the  good.  A  generic  delinition 
must  do  this,  or  else  it  is  defective.  Thus  the  words 
anthoritative  and  obligatory  as  here  used  do  not  in- 
clude the  ideas  ofanj^  supposed  abstract  duty,  or  ob- 
ligation, or  moral  binding,  or  whatever  other  word 
writers  on  morals  have  attempted  to  use,  expressing 
something  they  have  generally  called  inexplicable,  or 
incomprehensible.  These  words  here,  in  this  treat- 
ise, are  designed  to  express  only  that  wliich  the  gov- 
ernment through  its  law-making  department,  and  its 
legal  executive,  originates,  in  the  making  of  its  laws, 
and  in  the  enforcing  them  upon  its  subjects.  They 
signify,  that  which  is  true  both  in  an  erring  govern- 
m.ent  as  well  as  in  a  perfect  government.  Hence, 
authoritative  does  not  include  the  idea  often  connected 
with  it  of  a  right  to  command  and  enforce  obedience. 
This  idea  is  involved  in  the  phrase  "  made  obliga- 
tory." Therefore  in  this  definition  Authoritative 
signifies  simjjly  possessing  sufficient  evidence  of  trutli- 
fulness  in  the  character  of  its  author.  liequired 
signifies,  that  obedience  is  commanded.  Though  some- 
times law  appears  in  the  form  of  permission,  yet  it  is 
a  command,  commanding  no  interference  with  him  to 
whom  the  permission  is  given. 

Made  obligatory  by  government  is  necessary  to  law, 
to  its  being  law,  in  distinction  from  being  mere  ad- 
vice. For  Ad/oice  is  information  given  in  a  manner 
expressing  the  author's  opinion  that  it  would  he  best 
the  information  be  chosen  and  put  into  corresponding 
practice.  Yet  this  advice  possesses  in  itself  no  legal 
or  governmental   obligation,  and    he  to  whom  it  is 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  45 

given,  is  at  full  liberty  to  conform  to  it,  or  not,  in 
practice. 

But  law  is  more  than  this.  In  its  nature,  as  an 
clement  of  it,  it  is  made  obligatory  upon  the  sub- 
ject to  conform  to  it  and  obey.  And,  That  which 
makes  law  to  he  obligatory^  distiixguishing  it  from, 
advice^  is  its  sanctions^  i.  e.,itsj)unis/<nients  and  chas- 
tisements. 

Rewards  for  obedience  to  law  are  not  sanctions, 
and  true  law  never  justifies  or  uses  them.  Rewards 
are  only  right  where,  either,  there  is  done  beneficially 
more  than  law  requires,  or  else  as  an  estimated  remedy 
for  evils  which  are  liable  to  be  suffered  in  the  exe- 
cution of  law.  The  aim  and  true  operation  of  gov- 
ernment are,  so  to  control  all  things  as  to  enable  sub- 
jects to  secure  real  good.  And  when  a  subject  yields 
to  the  helpful,  needed,  control  of  government,  by 
obeying  law,  and  thus  really  secures  his  own  good  and 
the  good  of  others,  verily,  he  does  not  deserve,  and 
should  not  receive,  a  reward  for  it.  Indeed,  the  re- 
ward, if  any,  should  be  on  the  other  side,  and  he  re- 
ward the  government  for  its  so  necessary  aid  in  his 
securing  his  own  and  others'  good. 

Thus  law,  to  be  law,  involves,  as  sanctions,  only 
punishments  and  chastisements. 

T/ie  Sanctions  of  laio  are  some  species  of  suffering^ 
threatened  or  inflicted  iipon  the  transgressor,  on  ac- 
count of  his  transgression,  rendering  ohedience  to  law 
sensihly  obligatory,  upon  the  subjects  of  government. 

The  sanctions  of  law  are  sometimes  called  the 
penalties  of  law.     But  as  penalty  signifies  the  specifi- 


46  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

cation  of  suffering,  while  both  ])iiiiishineiit  and  elias- 
tisement  generallj^  signify  the  inflicted  specifications, 
these  nice  distinctions  are  not  deemed  necessary,  and 
penalty  is  never  used  in  this  work. 

Now  it  is  very  important  to  observe  that  while  the 
sauctions  of  law  give  to  it  its  element  of  being 
obligatory,  i.  e.,  its  quality  of  binding  the  subject  to 
obey,  yet  they  are  not  presented  by  the  government 
as  objects  of  fear,  to  insure  obedience  through  the  im- 
pulse of  terror  like  an  instinctive  government.  They 
are  presented  as  evidence,  as  testimony,  as  proofs,  of 
truth,  which  the  subject  needs,  and  are  addressed  only 
to  the  reason  of  the  truly  rational  being.  While  they 
are  thus  evidence,  they  also  act  as  a  protection  against 
the  actions  of  those  who  wish,  or  will,  to  violate  the 
laws  of  the  government,  and  thus  involve  all  in  the 
danger  of  suffering  the  evils  consequent  on  disobe- 
dience. 

Hence,  in  their  nature  the  sanctions  of  law  are  in- 
structive and  protective. 

They  are  instructive  to  all  tlie  subjects  of  govern- 
ment, and  are  protective  to  the  obedient. 

For  a  clear  understanding  of  these  two  qualities 
of  sanctions  of  hiM',  it  is  important  to  examine  tliem 
separatel_y,  the  instructive  and  the  protective,  as  in 
the  next  chapter.  But  before  proceeding  to  the  fuller 
examination,  it  is  well  to  epitomize  the  facts  of  this 
chapter  by  the  following  forms: 

national  government  is  instructive  and  compul- 
sory, through  law.  Law  is  instructive  and  obligatory, 
throuiTch   sanctions.      Sanctions   are    instructive    and 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  47 

protective  through  themselves.  By  their  first  element 
they  address  themselves  each  to  the  intelligence  and 
reason  of  the  subject,  communicating  information. 
By  their  second  element  they  attain,  in  their  diller- 
ent  ways,  the  good  to  which  they  are  specifically 
adapted. 


48  archology;  or, 


CHAPTER  YI. 

SANCTIONS    OF    LAW. 

It  has  been  stated  that,  in  tlieir  nature,  the  sanctions 
of  law  are  instructive  and  protective.  Considered 
first,  as  instructive,  The  sanctions  of  law  are  the  legal 
evidence  of  the  importance  of  law,  and  hy  their  mag- 
nitude express  the  'magnitude  of  that  importance. 

A  being,  to  act  rationally,  must  act  in  view  of 
truth,  presented  to  his  reason,  through  the  evidence 
of  it.  Hence,  in  order  that  the  subject  of  govern- 
ment may  act  rationally  in  his  obedience  to  law,  he 
must  have  the  evidence  of  the  law,  and  also  of  its 
importance.  Yet,  being  only  as  one  of  the  vast  num- 
bers of  the  subjects  of  government,  he,  in  his  limited 
circumstances,  cannot,  from  natural  reasoning,  and 
from  personal  observation,  so  comprehend  the  various 
results  and  bearings  of  actions  on  his  own  good  and 
also  the  good  of  others,  as  to  select  without  failure 
the  right  course  of  actions  adapted  to  result  in  the 
good  of  all.  But  the  government,  from  its  greater 
opportunities,  is  supposed  to  be  able  to  make  this 
selection  for  him,  and,  through  the  law-making  depart- 
ment, it  does  this,  expressing,  in  the  form  of  law,  its 
opinion  of  what  is  right,  and  of  how  great  is  its 
importance. 

Therefore  the  subject  must  uniformly  depend  upon 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  49 

this  expressed  opinion  of  gcn-ernnient  as  to  the 
importance  of  hiw  and  obey  it  aceordin<i;ly.  X(j\v  the 
opinion  of  i^overnnient  as  to  the  hiw  and  its  impor- 
tance, is  k^i^ally  e\i)ressed  hy  the  sanctions  wliicli  the 
law-making  department  attaches  to  the  violation  of 
law. 

Therefore  these  sanctions  of  law  are  to  eachsul)jcct 
of  government  the  legal  evidence  of  law  and  of  its 
importance.  Without  them  he  could  have  no  such 
evidence,  and  the  so-called  law  would  be  to  him  only 
as  advice,  for  him  to  adopt  or  reject  at  his  option. 
But  in  the  sanctions  he  has  the  evidence  of  the  law, 
and  of  its  ianportance,  given  him  in  the  expressed 
opinion  of  the  law-making  department  of  government. 

These  sanctions  thus  become  to  him  of  vast  impor- 
tance as  a  rational  being,  just  equal  to  the  importance 
of  his  having  evidence  at  all  in  the  case.  AVith  this 
evidence  he  may  rationally  act  in  his  obedience,  and,  by 
obedience,  secure  liis  own  good  and  that  of  others  : 
without  it,  irremediable  evils  are  certain.  This  sup- 
poses that  the  government  is  right  in  its  opinion  as 
expressed  by  law  and  its  sanction,  and  the  confidence 
of  the  subject  that  the  law  is  right  and  for  the  best 
good  of  all,  will  be  in  proportion  to  his  confidence  in 
the  ability  and  righteousness  of  the  government. 

Now  to  the  rational  subject  of  government,  21ie 
•magnitude  of  the  sanctions  of  law  expresses  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  importanee  of  the  law.  Or,  The  sanc- 
tions of  law  arc  the  measure  of  the  iinportance  of 
law. 

A    law,  to  be  ti-uthful,  must  have  sanctions  of  a 


50  AECHOLOGY  ;   OE, 

magnitude  equal  to  its  own  importance,  or  else  they, 
the  sanctions,  as  evidence,  belie  the  truth.  Laws  of 
great  importance,  to  be  truthful,  must  have  great 
sanctions;  laws  of  medium  importance,  medium  sanc- 
tions ;  laws  of  little  importance,  little  sanctions.  If 
the  sanctions  of  law  are  small,  when,  in  reality,  the 
importance  of  the  law  is  great,  they  falsify  the  truth, 
testifying  that  the  law  of  great  importance  is  only  of 
little  iniportance.  So  also  if  the  sanctions  of  law  are 
great,  when  the  importance  of  law  is  small,  they  fal- 
sify the  truth,  testifying  that  the  law  of  little  impor- 
tance is  of  great  importance.  The  sanctions  of  law, 
and  its  importance,  must  correspond,  or  the  evidence 
in  the  case  is  erroneous,  leading  the  subjects  of  gov- 
ernment into  error,  certain  to  result  in  disaster,  the 
very  thing  government  exists  to  prevent. 

In  practice  this  principle  admits  of  modifications  in 
view  of  other  considerations,  yet,  of  itself,  the  prin- 
ciple is  true. 

When  the  subject  of  government,  approving  of  law 
in  view  of  its  imiJortance,  as  proved  hy  its  sanctions 
taken  only  as  evidence,  not  as  ohjects  of  fear,  chooses 
obedience  to  the  law,  he  is  acting  rationally,  and  is 
mou'dlly  rigid. 

But  when,  disregarding  the  importance  of  law,  he 
fears  its  sanctions  only  as  objects  of  terror,  then, 
though  he  may,  in  external  action,  obey  the  law  to 
escape  suffering,  he  yet  is  morally  wrong  in  his  very 
obedience,  for  his  motive  is  wrong,  and  he  deserves 
moral  ^condera  nation. 

Again,  The  sanctions  of  lavj  are  also  the  legal  evi- 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  61 

clcnce  of  the  ciHminaUtij,  or  hadness,  involved  iyi  trans- 
gressing a  law^  and  of  the  degree  or  magnitude  of  t)nit 
criminality.  The  crime  of  violating  a  law  is  in  pro- 
portion to  the  importance  of  the  law,  while  the  impor- 
tance is  in  proportion  to  the  welfare,  the  true  good, 
which  the  law  is  designed  to  protect  and  insure. 

As  the  sanctions  express  this  importance  of  law,  so 
also,  in  the  same  manner,  they  express  the  criminality 
of  transgressing  that  law.  Thus  the  crime  of  trans- 
gressing a  law  of  little  importance  is  little  in  degree  ; 
one  of  medium  importance,  medium  in  degree  ;  one 
of  great  importance,  great  in  degree.  The  crime  of 
violating  a  law  and  the  degree  of  the  crime,  are 
expressed  by  the  sanctions  of  law.  Hence  these  sanc- 
tions, to  be  truthful,  as  evidence,  must  correspond  to 
the  crime  in  magnitude.  If  great  crime  were 
expressed,  in  its  evidence,  by  little  sanctions,  these 
would  belie  the  truth,  testifying  great  crime  to  be 
little.  So  if  little  crime  were  expressed  in  its  evi- 
dence by  great  sanctions,  these  again  would  belie  the 
truth,  testifying  the  little  crime  to  be  great. 

The  sanctions  of  law  must  be  truthful.  Crime,  and 
the  legal  sanctions,  exjiressing  that  crime,  must  be  in 
propoi'tion,  or  the  sanctions  are  wrong.  Thus  the 
sanctions  give  instruction,  testifying  by  their  magni- 
tude, to  both  the  magnitude  of  tlie  importance  of  law, 
and  also  to  the  magnitude  of  the  crime  of  transgress- 
ing the  law.  The  great  principle  in  the  case  is  as 
follows  :  Little  importance,  little  crime,  little  legal 
sanctions;  great  imjiortance,  great  crime,  great  legal 
sanctions;  tinite  importance,  Unite  crime,  tinite  legal 


52  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

sanctions;  infinite  importance,  infinite  crime,  infinite 
legal  sanctions.  Such  are  the  proportions  in  archol- 
ogy,  such  the  truth,  and  such  the  necessities  in  reason, 
or  else,  in  the  legal  evidence,  there  is  error;  a  false- 
hood;  a  lie.  Truth  cannot  lie;  and  a  true  rational 
government  must  express,  by  sanctions,  truthfully, 
the  real  magnitude  of  the  importance  of  law  and 
also  of  the  crime  involved  in  transgressing  the  law. 

When  the  subject  of  government,  with  the  motive  of 
avoiding  crime,  through  abhorrence  of  it  as  bad, 
takes  the  sanctions  of  law  as  the  evidence  of  the  crime 
of  transgression  not  as  objects  of  terror,  and  avoids 
the  crvme  by  obedience,  he  is  acting  rationally,  OAid  is 
morally  right. 

But  when,  through  fear  of  suffering,  he  avoids  the 
transgression  of  law  to  escape  the  pain,  solely  as  an 
object  of  terror,  he  is  wrong  in  motive,  and  is  thus  a 
moral  transgressor  even  in  his  obedience.  There  is 
also  another  principle  in  respect  to  crime,  which  is  in 
exact  harmony  with  the  previous  one.  This  is,  that 
In  any  ^;<zr^iCwZ«r  government,  the  crime  of  trans- 
gressing law,  is  in  proportion  to  the  authority  of  that 
government,  and  the  sanctions  of  law  are  the  measure 
of  that  crime. 

The  crime  of  transgressing  law  in  a  government 
of  little  autliority,  as  that  of  a  voluntary  lyceum,  is 
little  in  degree,  and  the  sanctions  of  law  are  corre- 
spondingly sniall,  perhaps  only  a  vote  of  censure,  or 
expulsion  from  the  association.  But  the  crime  of  vio- 
lating the  law  of  the  family  wiiich  is  a  government  of 
higher  authority,  is  greater,  and  the  sanctions  of  law 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  53 

measuring  the  crime,  are  greater.    The  same  is  tnie  in 
the  city,  the  State,  the  general  g<n'eriunent,  etc.    As  tlie 
authority  of  the  government  rises  liigher  and  higher, 
the  crime  of  transgressing  law  is  greater  and  greater 
in  degree,  and  the  sanctiuns  of  hiw  are  proportionally 
greater.     Now  were  a  fully  competent  rational  being, 
from  a  world  of  superior  intelligence,  to  assume,  right- 
fulh',  the  governniLMit  of  the  whole  world  as  a  united 
kingdom,  the  crime  of  violating  a  law  of  that  govern- 
ment would  be  yet  greater,  and  the  sanctions  of  law 
in   the   case    would    be   greater.     Once   more,  if  the 
authority  of  the  government  of  the  Creator  of  the 
universe  is  intinite,  then  the  crime  of  violating  law  in 
that  government  is  intinite,  and  the  sanctions  of  law, 
expressing,  or  measuring,  that  crime,  must  be  infinite. 
The  sanctions  of  law  in  a  truly  rational  government 
must  be  true,  giving,  as  evidence,  truthful  testimony 
as  to  the  importance  of  law  and  as  to  the  crime  of  trans- 
gressing law.      Then    the    rational  subject  can  take 
those   sanctions  as   evidence   of    the    importance    of 
law,  toirethcr  with  that  of  the  magnitude  of  the  crime 
of  violating  it,  and  rationally  obey  the  laws  of  the 
government;  not  as  the  law  of  a  tyrant;  not  as  the 
law  of  a  feared  compulsory  power;  not  as  law  which 
he  would   reject  if  he  could   yet  cannot ;  but  as  the 
direction    of  a  most  truthful,   sympathizing,  loving, 
capable  and  necessary  helper,  to  him  and  to  all  con- 
cerned,  through   the  whole    government:    a    lR'l[)er, 
kindly  and  truthfully,  j^ointingout   the   mode  of  ac- 
tion necessary  to  their  securing  their  own  best  good, 
their  real  welfare. 


54.  aechology;  or, 

III  tliis  manner  law  and  the  sanctions  of  law  be- 
come incalculably  beneficial  to  the  obedient  subjects 
of  government,  necessary,  in  the  nature  of  things,  to 
their  good,  instructing  them  as  to  the  real  and  only 
manner  possible  in  which  tiiey  can  secure  the  ends  for 
which  the}'  exist.  Thus  the  sanctions  of  law  are  first 
instructive  ;  but  secondly  they  are  also  protective. 

The  sanctions  of  law  are  protective,  hy  protecting 
the  obedient  from  the  evils  consequent  on  the  trans- 
gression of  law. 

In  the  freedom  of  the  will  of  rational  beings,  there 
is  immense  danger  that  some  sul)jects  will  not  obey 
law  upon  which  depends  the  welfare  of  all,  and  thus 
both  themselves  and  all  others  become  involved  in  in- 
calculable evils.  But  the  sanctions  of  law  protect 
against  these  evils,  and  in  three  different  ways.  First, 
by  preventing  them,  through  means  of  their  giving 
evidence  of  the  importance  of  law  and  of  the  badness 
of  transgression  ;  with  some  proper  influence  also  as 
evils  like  others  to  be  avoided.  Secondly,  by  being 
a  terror  to  the  evilly  disposed,  preventing  their  trans- 
gression of  the  law  ;  and,  thirdly,  by  so  confining  or 
affecting  the  transgressor,  as  to  prevent  the  repetition 
of  transgression.  Thus  the  sanctions  of  law  are  in- 
structive and  protective  ;  instructive  as  evidence  of 
the  law  and  of  its  importance  ;  of  crime  and  of  its  de- 
gree ;  protective,  as  protecting  the  obedient  from  tlie 
evils  of  transgression,  by  their  instruction  to  all  ;  by 
their  terror  to  the  evilly  disposed;  and  by  their  con- 
fining, or  so  affecting,  the  transgressor  that  the  act  of 
transgression  may  not  be  repeated. 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  55 


CHAPTER  YII. 

A   FULLER   CONSIDERATION   OF   LAW. 

In  rational  goveninient,  the  historical  oriijjin  of  law 
is  found  in  tlie  law-iaakinr^  department  of  govern- 
ment. 

But,  The  rational  origin^  or  reason  for  the  existence 
of  law,  is,  that  it  is  a  necessary  jp art  of  government  in 
enabling  suhjects  to  secure  the  ends  for  which  they 
exist. 

Since  ends  can  be  secured  onlj  by  putting  forth  the 
proper  actions  adapted  to  result  in  secui-ing  them,  it  i.s 
necessary  that  sulg'ects  should  know  those  actions  which 
ai-e  adapted  thus  to  result.  Z,aw  is  designed  to  express 
these  actions  that  they  may  he  Tinown  to  suhjects.  But 
not  all  actions  can  thus  be  expressed  by  law,  for  in  the 
endlessly  varying  circumstances  of  existence,  there 
are,  and  must  ever  be,  endlessly  varying  and  particu- 
lar actions  put  forth,  which  cannot  be  pointed  out  in 
the  form  of  law  by  government.  These  must  be  de- 
cided uj)on  by  the  subject  himself  in  the  exercise  of 
his  own  reason.  Still  there  are  uniform  principles  of 
action  involved  in  all  cases;  and  often  uniform  trains 
of  actions,  as  well  as  uniform  actions  themselves  to 
be  put  forth,  or  else  objects  of  good  must  be  lost,  and 
great  consequent  evils  suffered.      Law  is  designed  to 


56  archology;  ok, 

express  those  prinGvples  and  trains  of  actions,  as  well 
as  the  actions  themselves,  which  can  he  expressed  hy 
rules.  A  rule  of  action  is  the  expressed,  or  appre- 
hended, mode  of  action,  and  lience  the  term  rule  is 
more  generally  used  in  rational  government. 

In  conflict  with  actions  tending  to  result  in  good, 
there  are  many  possible  ones  tending  to  prevent  the 
securing  of  such  good.  Law,  hy  prohihiting  these  ac- 
tions, is  designed  to  prevent  their  heing  put  forth  to 
the  injury  of  the  suhjects. 

Law,  as  a  uniform  rule,  is  designed  to  express  those 
actions  which  can  be  expressed  as  uniform,  requiring 
the  right  and  forbidding  the  wrong.  The  subject  of 
government  is  to  accept  of  this  law  as  an  immensely 
important  help  to  him  in  securing  good  for  himself 
and  for  others ;  but  not  as  his  direct  guide  with  no 
exercise  of  reason  on  his  own  part. 

For,  an  intelligent  heing  in  acting  rationally,  has 
only  one  direct  guide  in  selecting  what  is  right,  and  in 
avoiding  what  is  wrong.  This  one  direct  guide  is  his 
own  reason. 

But,  in  his  limited  knowledge  as  a  flnite  being,  he, 
in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  is  under  the  necessity 
of  accepting  the  indirect  guide  of  another's  reason. 
Still,  in  this  case,  his  own  reason  is  his  direct  guide, 
for  it  must  determine  whetlier  he  can  rejiose  confi- 
dence in  the  reason  of  the  other,  so  as  to  accept  of  it 
as  indirect  guide.  Laio  is  the  authoritative  expression 
in  a  particidar  case,  of  another'' s  reason  as  to  what  is 
right,  and  what  is  wrong,  in  action,  and  that  other,  in 
this  case  is  the  law-making  department  of  government. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  57 

No  two  or  move  beings  can  come  into  any  relations 
to  one  another  withont  the  certainty  of  more  or  less 
diversity  and  conflict  of  feelini;s,  impnlscs,  choices, 
beUefs,  purposes,  actions,  and  so  forth.  A  harmony  of 
objects  of  choice,  and  of  the  means  with  which  to  at- 
tain them,  and  of  the  actions  put  forth  for  this  pur- 
pose, is  necessar}',  or  else  a  failure  of  the  objects 
desired,  and  of  all  real  good,  is  certain  to  follow,  while, 
also,  the  conscfjuent  evils  must  be  suffered. 

Laws  in  rational  government  are  the  uniform  rides 
of  actions  designed  to  insure  the  harmony  of  all  these 
things  to  result  in  securing  good. 

AVithout  law,  such  harmony  is  impossible  ;  but  with 
law,  originating  in  a  fully  competent  law-making  de- 
partment, and  with  a  fully  efficient  executive,  such 
harmony  may  be  secured,  and  thus  the  securing  of 
the  real  good  of  subjects  be  rendered  certain  to  the 
obedient. 

Throughout  the  whole  system  of  government  — 
and  this  must  extend  as  far  as  relationship  extends  — 
the  welfare  of  each  subject  is  so  involved  in,  and iden- 
tiiied  with,  the  welfare  of  each  and  all  the  others,  that 
the  Avelfare  of  one  can  be  secured  only  in  securing 
also  the  welfare  of  all  ;  and  the  welfare  of  all  can  be 
secured  oidy  in  securing  also  the  welfare  of  each.  Hence, 
in  order  that  any  one  may,  of  himself,  unaided,  secure 
his  own  real  welfare,  he  must  know  not  only  the 
results  of  his  actions  ail'cctiiig  himself,  but  also  the 
results  affecting  all  others. 

In  his  ignorance  this  is  im})ossible.  But  if  it  were 
not  so,  and  he  did  know  all  these  results,  still  there 
3 


68  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

would  also  be  a  necessity  tliat  he  botli  will  exactly  the 
right  actions  adapted  to  result  in  good  to  himself  and  all 
others,  and  also  succeed,  in  putting  forth  just  these 
actions  at  all  times  and  no  others,  or  else  again  the 
good  must  be  lost  and  all  evils  follow. 

But  there  is  yet  a  still  greater  difficulty,  for  all  this 
must  be  true  also  of  every  individual  of  the  whole 
system,  or  the  good  of  each  and  of  all  must  fail  to  be 
secured,  while  evils  beyond  all  conception  must  follow. 

Here  absolute  certainty  on  certainty  accumulates, 
that  every  finite  being  of  himself  alone  must  fail  in 
this  knowledge  ;  that  he  probably  will  fail  in  this  will ; 
that  also  he  must  fail  in  power,  and  entirely  fail  of 
succeeding.  Then,  in  his  failure,  are  involved  the 
failure  of  his  own  good  and  the  good  of  all  the  others, 
together  with  the  suffering  of  the  untold  consequent 
evils. 

These  evils,  in  case  each  one  were  to  act  only  on  his 
own  responsibility,  would  rapidly  increase,  and  in  fear- 
ful ratio,  because  of  increasing  wrong  actions  put 
fortli  in  the  excitement  of  suffering;  in  the  arousing 
of  intense  feelings ;  in  the  enraging  of  angry  pas- 
sions;  in  the  clashing  of  believed  interests,  objects  of 
desire,  and  plans,  with  no  possibility  of  a  remedy,  if 
each  were  to  act  only  as  guided  alone  by  his  own 
unaided  reason. 

To  avoid  such  evils,  laws  as  a  necessity  are  estab- 
lished, and  enforced  b}^  the  power  of  government. 
They  are  indispensable  in  the  securing  of  good. 

Laws  are,  to  subjects,  the  expressed  decisions  of  the 
reason  of  government  through  the  law-making  depart- 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  59 

ment  unfolding,  autlioi-itativel y,  and  obligatorialh-,  tlie 
objects  of  good  consistently  to  be  securetl ;  the  means 
safely  to  be  used  in  securing  them  ;  and  the  actions 
liarmoniousiy  to  be  put  forth  adapted  to  result  in  the 
securing  of  them.  Thus  through  government,  as  au 
efficient  aid,  by  means  of  law,  those  who  choose  obedi- 
ence may  secure  real  good,  even  all  ends  of  their 
existence.  This  is  on  the  supposition  that  the  govern- 
ment is  certainly  right  in  all  its  qualifications  and 
requisitions. 

Ill  every  rational  government  there  is  a  necessity 
of  the  giving  of  ex])licit  and  ])ositive  law  to  suhjecis 
hy  the  government. 

This  is  evident  from  what  has  just  l)een  said.  If 
subjects  are,  without  law,  left  to  tlie  inferences  of 
their  own  reason  alone,  they  must  inevitably  ditier  in 
their  judgments,  wills,  choices,  feelings,  impulses,  and 
actions.  The  consequence  must  be  unavoidable  clash- 
ings  in  their  selection  of  objects  to  be  secured,  in  their 
choice  of  means  with  ■which  to  secure  tlieni,  and  in 
actions  put  forth  for  this  purpose.  In  these  clashings, 
necessary  to  subjects  when  left  to  their  own  reason 
alone,  there  arises  the  necessitj'  that  government, 
through  express  law,  instruct  the  subjects  and  enforce 
obedience  to  insure  the  harmony  indispensable  to  the 
securing  of  good  aiul  avoiding  of  evils  in  the  case. 

Thus  law  in  rational  government  must  be  positive, 
direct,  and  expressed,  not  left  to  be  inferred.  The 
giving  of  law  may  be  called  promulgation,  revelation, 
command,  edict,  or  anything  else  expressive  of  the 
idea,  and  it  nuiy  be   made  known   by  words,  or  signs, 


60  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

or  even  looks,  and  this  be  tlirongli  personal  presence 
of  the  supreme  official,  or  through  authorized  heralds, 
messengers,  teachers,  or  books,  or  through  any  other 
means  the  government  may  select;  yet  it  must  be 
done  by  the  government  itself  as  express  law  from  it 
to  the  subjects. 

Not  by  any  means  is  it  necessarj^  that  every  tiling 
or  action  should  be  specified  by  law.  This  is  impossi- 
ble. But  as  to  the  great  uniform  ])rinciples  of  actions, 
and  the  uniform  classes  and  trains  of  actions,  there 
must  be  expressed  law.  The  government  must  di- 
rectly instruct  and  compel  obedience  through  law, 
which  shall  directly  instruct  and  be  obligatory  by 
means  of  sanctions,  which  shall  truthfully  instruct 
and  protect  the  obedient  subjects  through  themselves, 
and  thus  there  be  secured  a  harmonious  adaptation  of 
all  things  to  result  in  the  securing  of  good. 

Moreover,  when  laws  have  been  directly  given.  It 
is  necessary  that  government  protect  the  laws  from 
any  alteration  or  corruption  to  which  they  may  he 
liable. 

For  the  very  object  of  law,  in  its  first  great  ele- 
ment, of  being  instructive,  is  to  give  i^iformation  to 
subjects  for  their  good,  where  otherwise  they  are 
ignorant.  Hence,  if  the  law  becomes  altered  or  cor- 
rupted, the  subjects,  in  their  ignorance,  cannot  deter- 
mine the  true  from  the  false,  the  original  from  the 
cori'uption,  i.  e.^  they  cannot  do  this  from  reasoning 
u])on  the  nature  of  things  in  the  case  on  account  of 
their  ignorance.  Therefore,  government  must  itself 
preserve  its  laws  uneorrupted  and  clearly  distinguished 


THE   SCIENCE   OP   GOVERNMENT,  01 

from  any  miuiithoiized  chancre.  To  ])reserve  its  laws 
pure  is  as  necessary  on  the  part  of  government,  as  it 
is  to  g'we  tlicm  at  first.  And,  if  any  subject  uses  as 
autlioi'ity  a  known  corrupted  law,  where  tlie  true  can- 
not be  clearly  and  definitely  distinguished  from  the 
corrupt,  he  is  insulting  the  government  nnder  which 
he  is  assumiuij:  to  act,  and  otferinu"  an  outrag-e  to  his 
fellow  subjects.  He  should  be  judged  criminal  by  the 
courts  of  justice. 

In  liational  Government  there  is  a  necessity 
that  the  law  orixjinate  in  a  department  possessed 
of  the  greatest  I'noioledge^  and  of  the  greatest  benevo- 
lence. 

The  reason  of  the  law-making  department  of  govern- 
ment, expressed  through  law,  must  be  the  indirect 
guide  of  the  subject,  and  this  law  he,  in  his  reason, 
is  to  accept,  because  of  his  confidence  in  the  govern- 
ment. But  if  the  law-making  department  fails  in 
knowledge,  so  as  not  to  be  able  to  specify  the  right 
Jaws,  or  if  it  fails  in  its  benevolence,  so  as  not  to 
clioose  laws  designed  for  good,  the  subjects  must  be 
involved  in  disasters.  But  with  the  greatest  knowl- 
edge, and  the  greatest  benevolence,  i.  <'.,  choice  of 
good,  there  is  a  certainty  of  the  best  laws  possilde, 
insuring  the  greatest  good  to  the  subjects.  In  this 
case,  the  subjects  will  i)ossess  the  best  pos6il)le  guide 
fur  their  reason,  in  the  reason  of  the  government  ex- 
pressed to  them  by  law. 

In  national  Government  there  is  a  necessity  of 
vigor  of  will  to  enforce  the  law,  and  also  of  power  on 
the  part  <f  the  executive. 


62  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OK, 

The  enforcement  of  Liw  depends  entirely  on  the 
will  and  the  j)ower  of  tlie  executive.  If  he  fail  in 
will  or  in  ability,  the  laws  fail  in  the  essential  element 
of  "being  made  obligatory  by  government,"  as  de- 
lined  ;  so  far  it  fails  to  be  law,  or  is  only  dead  law,  and 
so  the  good  designed  to  be  secured  through  it  must  be 
lost  and  all  consequent  evils  be  suifered.  In  all 
rational  governments  there  is  liability  that  some  will 
not  obey  law,  and  thus  involve  all  in  the  danger  of 
suffering  untold  evils.  Govei'nment  is  pledged  to  the 
obedient  to  protect  them  from  a  repetition  of  the 
danger  from  those  evilly  disposed.  For  this  purpose 
the  executive  needs  vigor  of  will  and  ability  to  exe- 
cute the  law. 

Thus  law  in  rational  government  is  necessary  to  the 
good  of  subjects ;  it  must  be  expressed  directly  and 
positively  by  the  government ;  it  must  be  preserved 
by  the  government  from  unauthorized  alteration  and 
from  all  corruption  ;  it  is  educative  to  all,  and  is  pro- 
tective to  the  obedient ;  and  it  needs  on  tiie  part  of  the 
government  the  greatest  knowledge  and  greatest  be- 
nevolence, with  proper  vigor  of  will  and  power  for  its 
enforcement. 

If  the  law-making  department  of  government  and 
the  executive  together  are  possessed  of  perfect  knowl- 
edge, perfect  benevolence,  perfect  will,  and  perfect 
power,  then  there  is  a  certainty  that,  to  the  obedient, 
there  will  be  no  failure  in  securing  the  highest  good 
possible  in  the  case.  There  can  be  only  one  such  gov- 
ernment, and  this  that  of  the  infinite  Creator.  In  all 
finite  governments  there  is,  and  always  must  be,  lia- 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  63 

bility  to  failure,  and  conseqncnt  evils  to  follow.  This 
failure  may  be  ai)proxiuiately  avoided,  by  each  infe- 
rior trovenuuent  seekiuir  the  rational  aid  of  hiudier 
governnieiits  up  to  the  highest.  But  this  last  fact 
is  to  be  still  more  fully  considered  under  its  proper 
head. 


64  archology;  or, 


CHAPTER  yill. 

BIGHT  OF  GOVERNMENT   TO   ENFORCE  OBEDIENCE  TO  LAW. 

The  right  of  government  to  enforce  obedience  to 
law  is  involved  in  the  principles  of  goodness^  henevo- 
lence,  and  beneficence,  as  a  necessity  for  good. 

Witliout  government,  as  previously  seen,  subjects, 
through  their  faihire  of  one,  or  all,  of  Icnowledge,  will 
and  power,  must  become  wlielmed  in  suffering;  in 
wretchedness,  ruin,  death.  With  fully  qualified  gov- 
ernment they  may  escape  these  and  secure  true  and 
permanent  good.  Hence  goodness,  benevolence,  love, 
demand  obedience  to  government  and  justify  the  ap- 
plication of  any  compulsory  force  to  secure  it  and  de- 
feat the  schemes  of  the  disobedient  and  evilly  dis- 
posed. 

This  involves  the  right  of  using  any  compulsory 
force  lohatever  in  the  support  of  government  and  the 
execution  of  law,  enforcing  obedience  hy  the  infliction 
of  its  sanctions  upon  its  violaters. 

The  sanctions  of  law  are  species  of  suffering, 
threatened  or  inflicted,  upon  the  disobedient  for  spe- 
cific objects  of  good.  But  in  the  infliction  of  the  sanc- 
tions of  law,  there  is  doubtless  not  so  great  suffering, 
as  the  actions  of  the  disobedient  are  adapted  to  pro- 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  Go 

diice,  without  government,  both  to  themselves  alone, 
and  also  to  all  others.  In  the  iniiictlon  of  these  sanc- 
tions the  government  relieves  and  protects  the  obedi- 
ent from  the  threatening  evils,  restricting  snffering  to 
those  who  will  to  produce  it  by  their  course  of  wrong- 
doing. 

Therefore,  tlie  government,  by  the  enforcing  of  obe- 
dience, is  doing  the  very  greatest  kindness  possible 
in  tlie  case,  removing  suffering  from  the  obedient, 
and  diminishing  it  to  the  disobedient,  so  far  as  is  con- 
sistent. The  restricted  siiifering  of  the  sanctions  of 
law,  by  the  disobedient,  are  doubtless  less  than  would 
be  the  unrestricted  sufferings  even  by  themselves 
alone,  to  say  nothing  of  those  of  others,  without  the 
inflictions  of  the  sanctions,  so  that  even  to  the  disobe- 
dient themselves,  the  government  is  acting  more  kindly 
than  it  would  be,  were  it  not  to  inflict  the  sanctions. 
Moreover, 

Jn  this  is  exemplified  the  common  princi])le  of  he- 
nevolence.  That  in  the  alternative  of  one  or  the 
other  of  two  ahsolnte  evils,  it  is  rujht  to  escape  the 
greater  hy  accepting  the  less.  For,  in  the  enforcement 
of  the  sanctions  of  law,  there  is  an  escape  from  the 
immensely  great  suffering  of  all,  by  inflicting  deserved 
suffering  upon  the  evilly  disposed,  who  in  this  case 
endure,  even  for  themselves,  doubtless,  only  i):irt  of 
what  they  must  suffer  if  there  were  no  such  enforce- 
ment, and  hence  no  government. 

There  is  also  a  lyrinciple  of  Liherty  involved  in  the 
case.  For,  in  government,  each  subject  possesses  the 
means,  by  obedience,  of  securing  for  himself  and  for 


66  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

others,  the  very  highest  possible  good.  So  also,  by 
disobedience,  he  possesses  the  means  of  whelming 
himself  in  great  evils  and  suffering.  Now  there  can 
be  no  greater  personal  liberty  than  to  do,  and  receive, 
what  one  wills.  Therefore,  in  accordance  with  this 
idea  of  lil)erty,  no  one  can  reasonably  complain  of 
government,  if  it  insures  to  each  sul)ject  what  he  wills. 
If  he  wills  to  secure  good  to  himself  and  toothers, he 
has  the  liberty,  by  obedience  to  law,  to  do  so;  while 
the  government  is  with  him  to  insure  this  good  in  a 
manner  the  very  highest  possible  in  the  case. 

But  if  one  wills  to  produce  evils  to  himself  and  to 
others  througli  the  means  of  disobedience,  he  has  the 
personal  liberty  to  do  so  to  himself,  only  that  his  lib- 
erty must  not  extend  to  intei'fere  with  that  of  others 
who  choose,  by  oTiedience,  to  secure  good ;  and 
government  is  with  him  to  insure  to  him,  in  pai't 
at  least,  the  evil  he  wills  by  enforcing  upon  him  the 
suffering  necessar}'  in  the  case  for  the  good  of  others. 

The  common  and  probably  generic  meaning  of  lib- 
erty is,  "  the  opportunity  to  do  as  one  wills  to  do." 
It  does  not  mean  that  it  is  right  so  to  do,  but  oiily 
that  he  has  the  opportunity,  without  restraint.  Now 
if  one  is  not  restrained  from  doing  evil,  and  has  the 
opportunity  to  do  so  if  he  wills,  he  certainly  has  a 
kind  of  personal  liberty  in  the  case. 

The  manner  and  kind  of  the  resulting  suffering  in 
its  effect  u])on  the  evil-doer,  are  changed  by  govern- 
ment in  order  that  the  liberty  of  those  who  choose  to 
do  right  may  not  be  interfered  with.  This  modifica- 
tion is  a  necessity  that  the  liberty  of  tlie  good  may 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  67 

not  be  destroA'ed,  but  docs  not  destroy  the  liberty  of 
the  wrong-doer  to  receive  evil  which  lie  wills. 

Government,  by  its  power,  insures,  as  far  as  pos- 
sible, to  each  free  agent  and  sulgcct,  that,  in  principle, 
which  he  wills  to  secure  ;  good  to  those  who  will  to 
secure  good,  and  evil  to  those  who  will  to  secure  evil, 
only  modified  in  the  forms  of  the  evil  in  view  of  the 
necessities  of  good  to  those  who  choose  good. 

If  it  is  said  that  no  one  wills  evil,  the  answer  is 
that,  if  a  rational  being  directly  wills  a  means,  clearly 
knowing  the  end  ;  if  he  wills  an  action  clearly  know- 
ing the  result ;  legally,  he  is  held  as  having  willed  the 
end  and  the  result  itself,  so  as  to  be  responsible  for  it. 
Now  the  rational  subject  of  government  knows  that 
obedience  will  result  in  good  ;  that  disobedience  will 
result  in  evil.  He  knows  that  this  is  so,  not  merely 
because  such  isthe  law,  but  that  this  is  true  in  the  nature 
of  things  before  the  law  said  so,  and  therefore  that 
the  law  says  it. 

Hence,  if  he  wills  disobedience,  he  legally  wills 
clearly  the  resultant  evil.  It  is  in  accordance  with  a 
form  of  liberty  that  he  should  have,  and  suffer,  the 
evil  he  thus  wills.  Government  modifies  slightly  this 
evil  to  him  as  a  necessity  so  that  his  liberty,  badly 
used,  may  not  interfere  with  the  liberty  of  those  who 
use  theirs  for  good. 

This  principle,  even  without  others  which  tend  to 
the  same  conclusion,  would  probably  lead  to  the  infer- 
ence that,  in  a  perfect  rational  government,  those  sub- 
jects who  will  ciioose  evil  by  willfully  practicing  that 
which  leads  to  suifering,  must  be  separated  from  those 


68  archology;  or, 

who  choose  good,  and  be  placed  by  tjiemselves 
where  they  may  receive  for  themselves  the  evils  they 
choose  without  interfering  with  the  others;  while 
those  who  will  choose  good  by  obedience  to  law,  shall 
be  by  themselves  where  they  may  receive,  and  com- 
municate to  others,  all  the  good  consistent  in  the  case, 
without  interference  from  those  who  will  that  which 
results  in  evil. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVEllMNENT.  01) 


CHAPTER  IX. 

GOVERNMENTS  ABOVE  GOVERNMENTS  NECESSARY. 

Various  governments  sustain  to  one  another  rela- 
tions tlie  same  as  individuals.  In  these  relations  they, 
like  individuals,  need  a  higher  government  to  secure 
among  them  harmony  in  their  desires  of  objects,  in 
their  choice  of  means  for  securing  them,  and  in  the 
actions  put  forth  for  this  purpose.  Hence  the  prin- 
ciple : 

]Vhe7iever  two  or  more  governw,ents  on  an  equality 
come  into  relations  to  each  other,  there  is  a  necessity  to 
their  securing  the  ends  for  lohichthey  exist,  that  there 
he  another  government  properly  called  the  Higher,  to 
control  them  as  its  subjects.  As  easily  can  individnals 
exist  and  secure  all  real  g-ood  ^vithout  a  controllinj; 
power  to  prevent  conflicts  and  insure  hai-mony  in  their 
activities,  as  can  governments  thus  exist,  each  acrting 
only  as  it  sees  lit  to  act  in  securing  its  own  good,  with 
no  controlling  power. 

There  must  be  such  a  controlling  power,  and  its 
whole  system  of  control  is,  according  to  definition,  the 
government  in  the  case,  higher  than  the  others,  iiuis- 
much  as  it  is  over  them. 

And  the  necessity  of  such  higher  governments  over 
the  related  governments,  originates  in  tacts  the  same 
with  those  of  other  governments,  viz.,  that,  as  they 


70  ARCHOLOGY  ;    OR, 

are  finite,  or  limited  in  knowledo^e,  in  ability,  and  in 
will,  tliere  must  inevitably  be  among  them,  of  them- 
selves alone,  clashings  in  their  desires,  and  choice  of 
objects,  ill  their  use  of  means  to  secure  them,  and  in 
actions  put  forth  for  this  purpose,  resulting  in  incal- 
cnlable  evils,  uidess  there  be  over  them  a  governmental 
control  to  correct  all  this,  and  insure  the  harmony 
necessaFy  to  their  securing  good. 

Individuals,  in  their  varied  relations,  are  united  in 
families,  and  in  society  organizations  ;  each  a  govern- 
ment in  its  system  of  control.  Families  are  united  in 
districts,  wards,  cities,  etc. ;  each  a  government  in  its 
system  of  control.  Cities  are  under  States ;  States 
under  nations;  and  nations  under  a  more  or  less  per- 
fect system  of  treaties,  balances  of  power,  interna- 
tional laws,  etc. ;  in  all  which  cases  the  system  of  con- 
trol is  the  government  in  the  case. 

Thus  from  the  individual  upwards,  governments 
above  governments  appear,  up  to  the  highest ;  all  oi-ig- 
inating,  so  far  as  principles  are  concerned,  as  a  neces- 
sity to  the  securing  the  ends  of  existence,  or  real  good. 

Moreover,  in  this  series  of  governments  thci'e  are 
involved,  identically,  the  same  relationships  and  ne- 
cessities of  each  higher  government  towards  the  lower, 
as  are  found  in  a  single  government  towards  its  indi- 
vidual sul)jects,«'.  e.,  the  higher  government  must  be,  to 
the  lower  under  it,  instructive  and  compulsory,  through 
laws,  which  again  must  be  instructive  and  obligatory 
by  means  of  sanctions,  while  these  must  be  instructive 
and  protective  through  themselves. 

Also,  in   this  series  of  governments,  there  is  the 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  71 

same  liability  to  failure  and  disaster  as  in  the  single 
government,  over  individuals;  a  failure  through  want 
of  kuowledge,  want  of  will,  and  want  of  power.  In 
the  tailureis  involved  a  failure  of  good,  and  the  suffer- 
ing of  consequent  evils.  Such  results  are  inevitable 
in  case  of  the  failure  of  either  the  three  necessities  to 
success,  to  be  avoided  only  through  the  successful  con- 
trol of  the  higher  government  over  the  lower. 
'  Hence  in  the  series  of  governments  above  govern- 
ments, if  the  series  ever  ceases,  in  a  government  of 
limited  knowledge,  will,  or  abilit}'',  there  is  a  ratio  of 
probability  of  failure  of  good  and  of  suffering  of  evils, 
against  the  ])robability  of  success,  incalculably  great, 
amounting  to  a  certainty  of  failure.  For,  all  actions 
set  in  course  trains  of  consequences,  flowing  on  in 
their  results  forever.  Hence,  to  be  certain  that  such 
results  shall  be  good,  there  is  a  necessity  of  a  knowl- 
edge of  those  results  in  order  that  the  actions  adapted 
io  result  only  in  good  may  be  selected  by  the  reason, 
dictated  by  the  will,  and  put  in  operation  through 
power,  while  all  other  actions  tending  to  evil  or  tend- 
ing to  prevent  the  securing  of  good,  shall  be  avoided. 
But  if  the  higher  government  fails  in  knowledge 
of  results,  or  in  will  to  secure  them,  or  in  power  to 
do  this,  a  failure  in  the  selection  of  proper  actions, 
adapted  to  result  in  good,  is  inevitable,  and  evil  must 
be  the  result.  Hence  to  success  in  the  securing  of 
good,  by  rational  beings, by  means  of  rational  govern- 
ments, there  is  a  necessity  that,  in  a  series  of  govern- 
ments over  governments,  the  highest  of  all  should  be 
a  government  of  perfect  knowledge,  perfect  will  and 


72  archology;  or, 

perfect  power.  "VVitlioiit  such  government  there  is  a 
certainty  of  tailiire  and  a  suffering  of  incalculable 
evils.  The  highest  government  must  be  one  of  in- 
finite knowledge,  iniinite  will,  with  infinite  goodness, 
and  of  infinite  power,  or  else  incalculable  evils  must 
be  realized  ;  must  be  suffered. 

There  must  be  government  to  harmonize  objects  of 
choice,  means  to  secure  them,  and  actions  put  forth  for 
this  purpose ;  while  for  success,  there  must  be  on  the 
part  of  government,  knowledge,  will  and  power,  com- 
mensurate with  the  results.  Hence,  as  all  actions  set 
in  operation  trains  of  results, flowing  onward  and  out- 
ward without  limit,  there  must  be,  for  perfect  and  per- 
manent success  in  securing  good,  a  supreme  govern- 
ment of  knowledge,  will  and  power,  commensurate 
with  these  results,  even  of  infinite  knowledge,  wnll, 
and  power,  or  else  conflicts,  disasters,  evils  irremedia- 
ble in  themselves  must  come. 

In  this  series  of  governments,  each  higher  govern- 
m.ent  is  to  include  and  control  all  the  lower  ones  un- 
der it. 

From  the  definition,  government  is  a  whole.  But 
to  control  a  whole,  includes  the  controlling  of  all  its 
parts.  Hence,  for  a  higher  government  to  control  a 
lower,  it  must  control  all  its  parts,  all  the  subjects  of 
that  government,  as  well  as  itself.  And  if  these  subjects 
of  the  government  controlled,  are  governments  over 
other's  subjects,  then  to  control  them  involves  the  con- 
trol of  those  others,  their  subjects,  and  thus  onward 
to  the  lowest  in  the  series,  to  the  individual.  The 
higher  government  is  to  have  regard  to  eveiything 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVEIINMENT.  73 

throun^h  the  scries  I)cluw  it  and  so  control  all  as  to  in- 
sure the  good  of  all. 

In  this  series  of  governments  each  lower  needs  to 
yield  ohedience  to  each  and  all  the  higher^  so  far  as 
their  laios  can  he  knovm. 

The  only  ])ossil)]e  manner  m  which  <i:ood  can  be 
secured  is  in  the  harmony  effected  through  govern- 
ment. Now,  as  this  hai-nn)n\'  can  be  secured  only 
through  tlie  control  of  the  highest,  extending  down 
through  all  to  the  lowest,  the  lower  needs  to  regard 
the  higher  governments  up  to  the  highest,  and  yield 
obedience  to  their  control,  that  the  necessary  harmony 
may  be  realized  and  the  good  of  all  secured. 

Again,  each  government^  from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest,  is  to  enforce  its  own  laws,  and  see  that  the  sub- 
jects ohey,  Ijut  no  lower  government  may  enforce  the 
laws  of  the  higher. 

Each  lower  government  is  a  subject  or  entity  of  the 
higher.  Its  part  is  obedience,  and  not  the  making  it- 
self to  be  the  higlier  government  bv  exercising  its 
controL  The  enforcement  of  law  is  a  function  of 
government,  and  when  the  subject  without  authoriz- 
ation assumes  to  enfoice  law,  he  is  assuming  a  function 
not  his  own,  and  is  falsely  making  himself  what  he  is 
nut.  Thus,  in  ct)nflict  with  truth,  he  will  be  in  con- 
flict with  good,  and  involve  himself  and  others  in 
evils.  The  government  of  man  has  nothing  to  do 
with  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  God.  The  city 
has  iu)tliing  to  do  \vith  the  oforccimiit  of  the  laws  of 
the  State.  The  family  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  en- 
forcement oi  the  laws  of  the  city. 
4 


74  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

Eacli  government  is  to  enforce  its  own  ]a\A's,  upon 
its  own  subjects,  but  not  assume  the  control  of  a 
higher  government  by  enforcing  the  laws  of  it. 

Tiie  lower  government  is  to  have  a  regard  to  the 
liigher,  and  ought,  in  all  whicli  it  does,  to  conform  to 
the  laws  of  the  higlier.  The  city  onght  to  conform 
to  tlie  laws  of  the  State ;  yet  it  may  not  assume  to 
enforce  those  laws.  The  laws  of  the  family  ought  to 
conform  to  the  laws  of  the  city  and  of  the  State,  but 
the  lamily  may  not  assume  to  enforce  those  laws  by 
inflicting  their  sanctions  on  the  disobedient.  The 
same  is  true  of  tlie  State :  it  should  conform  in  its 
actions  to  the  laws  of  God  ;  but  it  has  nothing  to  do 
in  the  manner  of  enforcing  Divine  laws.  This  be- 
longs to  the  Divine  government,  and  not  to  man's. 

The  lower  government  may  rightly  teach  the  laws 
of  the  higher,  as  the  citj'  may  teach  the  laws  of  the 
State,  and  require  them  to  be  read,  yet  it  may  not  en- 
force them,  nor  even  require  belief  in  them  as  right 
or  good.  The  belief  of  a  rational  being  is  wholly  his 
own,  and  no  human  government  has  the  least  right  to 
enforce  any  peculiar  form  of  it ;  still  a  government 
may  teach  whatever  it  judges  l)est  to  teach,  even  the 
laws  of  the  higher  government,  though  it  must  not 
enforce  them. 

However,  a  lower  government,  for  its  own  good 
purposes,  in  meeting  the  wants  of  its  own  subjects  may 
enact  identically  the  same  law  with  the  higher,  as  its 
own,  but  not  as  that  of  the  higher.  Yet,  since,  in  the 
lower  government,  the  importance  of  law  is  smaller, 
and  the  guilt  of  transgression  is  less,  accordingly  as 


THE   SCIENCE    OF   GOVERNMENT.  75 

the  authority  of  the  government  is  less,  the  sanctions 
in  the  lower  government  ninst  be  less  than  in  tlie 
higher.  Tims,  Avhile  the  laws  of  the  kingdom  ol 
Heaven  are,  Tiiou  shalt  not  steal,  not  kill,  not  bear 
false  witness,  etc. ;  the  State  also,  ma3^  make  the  same 
laws,  and  the  city  the  same,  and  the  family  the  same, 
each  forbidding  all  theft,  murder,  and  lying.  But  each 
lower  government  must  enforce  the  law  as  its  own, 
not  as  of  the  higher,  and  with  sanctions  appropriate 
to  truth  in  its  own  system. 

Thus,  a  human  goverinncnt  may  enforce  its  own 
laws  as  to  marriage,  as  to  hours  of  rest,  or  a  day  of 
(juietude  and  relaxation  from  labor;  any  day  it  may 
judge  to  be  for  benefit  to  its  subjects.  But  this  it 
must  do  as  its  own  regulation,  or  law,  for  good  in  its 
own  system  of  control,  to  its  own  subjects. 

Human  governments  have  nothing  to  do  in  en- 
forcing a  religion.  That  pertains  to  a  higher  govern- 
ment— the  government  of  the  Divine  Being,  and 
science  unfolds  the  fact  that  a  higher  government  is 
alone  to  enforce  its  own  laws. 

Still,  if  a  higher  government  authorizes  the  lower 
to  enforce  its  laws,  as  if  the  State  authorizes  the  city 
to  enforce  State  laws,  and  specifies  the  sanctions,  then 
the  lower  government  is  made  by  the  higher  a  part 
of  the  executive  of  that  higher  government,  and  as 
an  authorized  agent,  it  may  enforce  the  higher  laws, 
though  only  so  far  as  expressly  authorized. 


76  AECHOLOGY  ;  OB, 


CHAPTER  X. 

DIVISION    OF    RATIONAL  GOVERNMENT. 

Rational  Government  is  divisille  into  Legal  and 
Discijplinary . 

Strictly  speaking,  legal  is  applicable  to  all  govern- 
ments because  all  governments  involve  law.  Still,  as 
a  distinguishing  term  in  this  treatise,  it  will  be  used 
only  for  one  division  of  rational  government,  in  which 
the  great  importance  of  law  justifies  its  specific  use. 

Legal  Government  is  a  rational  government  w/iich 
has  for  its  aim  the  controlling  of  the  actions  of  its 
subjects  in  such  a  m^anner  as  to  insure  harmoniously 
their  securing  good,  i.  e.,  all  the  ends  cf  their  existence. 
But  Disciplinary  Government  is  a  rational  gov- 
ernment which  lias  for  its  aim  to  establish  in  its  sub- 
ject a  certain  character  or  ^peculiar  habits  of  action 
as  a  preparation  for  some  future  condition  of  the 
subject. 

This  division  of  rational  government  is  one  of  tlic 
utmost  importance  both  scientifically  and  practically 
considei'ed.  Itneedstobe  veiy  carefully  examined. 
This  can  be  done  the  most  successfull)'  by  considering 
distinct  features  of  the  two  classes  placed  in  contrast 
one  with  the  other. 
First.     In  Legal  Government  the  control  affects  all 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  77 

the  suhjeds  of  government  considered  as  co-operators 
tixjetJter. 

In  Disciplinary  Government  the  control  affects  only 
one  suhject,  or  else  each  single  one  of  many^  considered 
separately. 

While  tliere  111:13-  ^^^  many  individuals  included 
under  discijtlinary  government,  yet  as  the  design  is  to 
develo])  a  certain  character,  or  establish  peculiar  habits, 
the  control  has  reference  to  each  one  separately, 
according  to  its  results  in  its  effect  ou  character,  and 
must  be  modified  accordingly.  But  as  legal  govern- 
ment has  for  its  aim  the  harmonizing  the  actions  of 
all  in  order  to  their  securing  good,  it  has  reference  to 
all  in  their  co-actions  together. 

Second.  Legal  Government  has  respect  to  all  results 
in  their  effect  upon  the  welfare  or  good  of  its  subjects. 

Disciplinary  Government  has  respect  to  07ie  residt, 
that  of  estahlishing  a  certain  character  or  hahit  of 
action. 

Disciplinary  government  may  control  all  present 
actions,  yet  its  aim  is  only  one,  that  of  an  effect  on 
character  and  habits. 

Third.  Legal  Government  is  designed  to  he  perpet- 
ual so  long  as  the  suhjects  exist,  or  so  long  as  the  cir- 
cumstances are  xinchanged,  which  gave  occasion  for 
the  government  to  aid  the  suhjects  in  securing  the  ends 
for  which  they  exist. 

Di'<cij)/i/i((/'y  Government  is  designed  to  he  tempo- 
rary, lasting  only  till  the  estahlishing  of  character^  or 
h(d)its  of  action.  sh(dl  he  con^pletcd. 

Disciplinary  government  may  be  indefinitely  pro- 


78  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

longed,  in  itself  considered,  by  passing  from  each  one 
of  its  subjects  to  his  succ{!Ssor.  Yet  in  respect  to  each 
it  ceases  with  the  completion  of  its  woi'k  on  his 
character. 

Fourth.  Legal  Government  recognizes  the  right  of 
each  subject^  for  himself  alone,  to  choose  his  own 
objects  of  good,  the  means  with  which  he  may  obtain 
them,  and  the  actions  he  will ])ut  foi'th  for  this  ])ur- 
2)ose  j  ^Dhile  the  governmental  control  is  only  directed 
to  insuring  a  harmony  in  these  respects  a7nong  all  the 
subjects  of  government. 

Discijplinary  Government  recognizes  no  isuch  free- 
dom of  choice  or  will,  but  aims  at  originating,  chang- 
ing, fixing,  or  even  destroying  a  sjpecific  choice  of  the 
sid)ject,  in  the  process  of  establishing  his  character  or 
habits  of  action. 

Disciplinary  Government  endeavors  to  dictate  to  its 
subject  what  he  shall  be,  what  he  shall  choose,  and 
what  he  shall  do.  But  in  Legal  Government  tiie  sub- 
ject is  regarded  as  a  rational  being  with  a  free  will,  to 
be,  and  to  choose,  and  to  act  as  he  M-ill ;  only,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  he  must  not  come  into  conflict  with 
others'  interests,  so  as  to  prevent  them  from  securing 
good.  Laws  instruct  him  how  to  avoid  such  conflicts  ; 
and  government,  by  the  sanctions  of  law,  compels 
conformity  to  what  is  for  tlie  greatest  good  of  all  in 
the  case. 

Fifth.  In  Legal  Oc/vernmeid,  the  laws  and  their  admin- 
istration are  regular  and  permanent,  admitting  of  change 
only  by  the  law-making  department  in  vieio  of  a  change 
of  circumstances  affecting  tJte  securing  of  good  by  all. 


THE    SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  79 

In  Disciplinary  Government  the  laics  and  adminis- 
tration may  vary  at  any  time  at  the  will  of  the 
executive  in  this  (joverninent,  according  to  rcs/dfs 
in  t/ie  establishing  of  character  and  habits  of  the 
suhjcct. 

As  all  laws  in  Rational  Government  are  instructive 
as  well  as  obligator}',  it  is  important  that  they  be  as 
uniform  and  permanent  as  possible  in  the  case.  For, 
thus  only  can  they  be  used  by  subjects  as  a  basis  of 
calculation  for  the  future.  All  changes  are  more  or 
less  in  conflict  with  such  calculations. 

Still,  in  Disciplinary  Government,  since  the  only 
object  is  the  development  of  character  and  habits,  there 
is  no  occasion  for  calculation  after  the  development  is 
secured.  Hence,  here  change  may  take  place  accord- 
ing to  the  judgment  of  the  executive. 

But  in  Legal  Government  limitless  objects  of  good 
to  be  secured  are  ever  in  the  future.  And  laws  arc 
designed  to  be  the  expressions  of  the  reason  of  the 
government  as  to  the  manner  in  which  these  objects 
in  the  future  can  be  secured.  These  laws  becoine  the 
basis  of  calculation  to  the  subjects  in  securing  these 
objects,  and  need  therefore  to  be  as  permanent  and 
unchanged  as  possible.  On  this  account  change  will 
be  rare,  and  permanence  be  the  character  of  law  in 
legal  government. 

Sixth.  Finally,  In  Legal  Government  the  sanctions 
of  I  ((to  are  onl  y  punishments. 

But,  in  Discijjlinary  Government  the  sanctions  of 
law  are  only  chastisements. 

This  division  of  the  sanctions  of  law  into  punish- 


80  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

ments  and  chastisements  is  one,  in  importance,  next 
to  that  of  governments  into  legal  and  disciplinary. 
In  science  it  is  secondary  to  the  other  ;  but,  in  prac- 
tical application,  indeed  it  is  verily  the  first  in  im- 
portance. It  needs  therefore  an  exceedingly  careful 
examination  in  a  separate  chapter  devoted  to  the  sub- 
ject. In  the  meantime  a  review  is  here  given  of  this 
division  of  government  in  epitomized  form  for  clear- 
est remembrance. 

First.  Legal  Government  designs  an  effect  upon 
many  subjects. 

Disciplinai-y  Government  designs  an  effect  npon  one 
subject. 

Second.  Legal  Government  designs  an  effect  upon 
manv  thincjs. 

Disciplinary  Govei-nment  designs  an  effect  upon 
one  thing. 

Third.  Legal  Government  designs  a  control  of  all 
actions  for  the  securing  of  good. 

Disciplinary  Government  designs  a  control  of  all 
actions  for  the  establishing  of  character. 

Fourth.  Legal  Government  recognizes  the  right 
and  freedom  of  choice  in  the  subject,  requiring  only 
a  harmony  of  actions  with  others. 

Disciplinary  Government  recognizes  no  such  right 
or  freedom,  but  designs  the  determination  of  a  choice 
in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  executive. 

Fifth.  Legal  Government  is,  in  its  nature  and  in  its 
laws,  permanent,  or  changing  rarely  in  view  of  a  change 
of  circumstances. 

Disciplinary  Government  is  in  its  nature  and  its 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  81 

laws  temporary,  and  cliaiiging  according  to  effect  on 
character. 

Sixth.  Finally,  in  Legal  Government  the  sanctions 
of  law  are  punishments. 

In  Disciplinar}'  Government  the  sanctions  of  law 
are  chastisements. 

But  in  the  scientific  examinations  of  the  distinctions 
between  legal  and  disci i)linai-y  governments,  it  is  very 
important  to  have  in  mind  the  fact  that  these  two 
governments  often  blend  together  in  the  one  same 
system  of  control,  confusing  the  intellect  and  leading 
to  erroneous  conclusions.  Disciplinary  government  is 
rarely  found  entirely  alone.  And  where  perhaps  it  is 
thus  found,  it  very  soon  commences  to  blend  more 
and  inorc  with  legal  governoient  till  fully  supplanted 
by  the  latter. 

From  the  birth  of  a  human  being  it  is  probably  for 
a  time  wholly  under  a  disciplinary  government,  that 
of  the  parents.  By  them  that  youns:  rational  being 
must  be  most  carefully  disciplined  for  the  development 
of  a  right  character, and  the  establishing  of  right  habits 
of  action  in  view  of  its  future  condition.  And  in  this 
they  must  succeed,  or  else,  so  far,  those  j^arents,  in 
their  government,  are  a  failure ;  derelict  to  every 
government  above  them,  up  to  the  highest,  that  of 
God.  The  disastrous  results  to  themselves,  to  the 
child,  and  to  others,  none  except  one  of  unlimited 
knowledge  can  estimate. 

But  in  a  very  short  time  the  child,  through  its  con- 
nection   with    other   members    of    the    family,   other 
chiUh'cn  in  school,  other  persons  in   society,  and  other 
4* 


82  AECHOLOGY  ;   OK, 

citizens  of  the  State,  begins  to  pass  out  from  under 
the  disciplinary  government  designed  for  the  develop- 
ment of  chai-acter,  more  and  more,  into  a  legal  gov- 
ernment of  control  in  view  of  the  good  of  others. 
Finally,  at  twenty-one  years  of  age,  the  transition  is 
supposed  to  be  complete,  and  now  he  is  recognized 
solely  as  a  free  subject  of  a  legal  government,  the 
State,  the  nation,  the  empire.  No  more  is  any  one  to 
dictate  to  him  for  his  own  sake  as  to  his  character, 
habits,  choice  or  actions.  He  is  now  on  an  equality 
with  every  other  subject,  and  has  the  same  right  with 
others  to  choose  for  himself,  and  act  as  he  will,  so  far 
as  he  alone  is  concerned.  Still  legal  govei-nment,  in 
the  interest  of  others  for  the  good  of  all,  in  the  ne- 
cessity of  things,  may  dictate  to  him  so  far  as  is  need- 
ed to  insure  a  harmony  among  all  in  the  securing  of 
good. 

The  family  and  the  school  are  the  two  great  recog- 
nized disciplinaiy  governments  under  the  legal  gov- 
ernment of  tlie  State.  Yet  in  these  disciplinary  gov- 
ernments, so  far  as  the  administration  of  law  is  not 
solely  for  the  development  of  the  character  and  the 
establishing  of  habits  of  the  child,  but  is  for  the  good 
of  other  children  in  securing  a  needed  harmony  of 
the  actions  of  all,  so  far  the  government  is  a  legal 
government. 

When  the  sanctions  of  law,  in  the  school,  are  in- 
flicted upon  the  child  solely  for  his  own  good,  in  the 
development  of  his  character,  the  government  of  ^the 
school  is  disciplinary,  and  its  sanctions  of  law  are 
chastisements.  But  wlien,  and  so  far  as,  the  sanctions 
3 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  83 

are  inflicted  as  an  example  to  the  otliers  for  their  in- 
struction and  protection  from  a  repetition  of  trans- 
gression, the  government  of  the  school  is  legal,  and 
its  sanctions  of  law  are  punishment. 

The  State,  in  its  own  laws,  always  uses  punishments 
alone,  but  as  to  families,  schools,  etc.,  it  says,  judicious 
cliastisements  may  be  inflicted :  a  clear  distinction. 
Here,  therefore,  tiie  distinction  in  the  ideas  expressed 
by  the  two  words,  may  appropriately  be  considered. 


84  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 


CHAPTEE  XI. 

PUNISHMENT   AND    CHASTISEMENT. 

Punishment  is  the  deprwation  of  good,  or  the  inflic- 
tion of  suffering  upon,  the  real,  or  supposed,  transgress- 
or, hecause  of  his  transgression,  for  the  good  of  others, 
as  judged  of  hy  the  authority  which  determines  the 
suffering. 

Chastisement,  as  a  sanction  of  law,  is  the  deprivation 
of  good,  or  the  infliction  of  suffering  upon  the  real,  or 
possible,  transgressor,  in  consideration  of  transgression^ 
for  the  good  of  himself,  as  judged  of  hy  the  authority 
which  determines  the  suffering. 

In  this  defiiiition,  cliastisement  is  limited  hy  the 
phrase,  "  as  a  sanction  of  law,"  because,  occasionally, 
this  word  is  used  without  being  a  sanction.  Its  deri- 
vation is  from  two  different  verbs,  to  chastise,  and  to 
chasten.  "When  derived  from  chasten,  and  meaning 
the  same  as  a  chastening,  it  often  has  no  reference  di- 
rectly to  law.  In  tliis  case  it  may  not  be  a  sanction, 
and  the  definition  then  docs  not  include  it. 

AVith  an  underst;indii)g  of  slight  specialties,  tlie  fol- 
lowing short  definitions  are  sufficient  in  place  of  the 
longer  ones  above.  Punishment  is  the  infliction  of 
suffering  upon  the  transgressor  for  the  good  of  others; 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT,  bo 

chastisement  is  the  infliction  of  suffering  upon  tiie 
transirressor  for  his  own  i'ood. 

The  inquiry  ma}'  arise,  whetlier,  in  some  slight  pro- 
portional degree,  punishment  may  not  also  include  the 
good  of  the  transgressor.  Perhaps  it  does  as  one  of 
all  the  snhjects  of  government;  yet,  if  this  he  true,  it 
is  proportionally  so  slight  that,  for  convenience,  it 
seems  not  best  to  cumber  the  deiinitiun  with  its  speci- 
fication. 

So,  perhaps,  in  chastisement,  the  final  design  in  the 
developing  of  character  may,  in  a  secondary  sense,  in- 
clude the  good  of  others,  still  for  a  definition,  this 
])ossible  design  of  a  second  thing  need  not  be  in- 
cluded in  expressing  the  first. 

In  view  of  the  very  great  importance  of  clearly 
perceiving  the  distinction  in  the  signification  of  these 
two  words,  the  differences  need  to  be  dwelt  upon  at 
some  length  in  contrasts. 

1st.  Punishment,  in  its  use,  pertains  only  to  a  Legal 
Government. 

Chastisement  pertains  to  a  DisclpUnari/  Gover?i- 
merd.  As  in  science  the  two  species  of  government  are 
distinct,  so  are  the  species  of  sanctions;  one  is  punish- 
ment, the  other  is  chastisement. 

This  distinction  is  always  practically  observed  by 
jurists.  For  chastisement  is  never  found  used  in  the 
statutes  of  States  and  nations,  when  referring  to  any- 
thing directly  in  the  legal  government.  But  when  re- 
ferring to  inferior,  and  evick'irtly  disciplinary  govern- 
ment, the  laws  of  States  declai-e  that  in  families, 
schools,  the  army,  etc.,  '"judicious  chastisement^;  may 


86  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

be  iiitlicted."     lu  legal  practice  these  two  words  are 
distinguished  as  science  distinguishes  them. 

2d.  Punishment  is  for  tlie  good  of  many,  having 
reference  to  all  the  subjects  of  the  government. 

Chastisement  is  for  the  good  of  one.  havino-  refer- 
ence  only  to  the  one  subject  concerned. 

3d.  Punishment  has  reference  to  all  objects  of  good 
for  which  subjects  exist. 

Chastisement  has  reference  to  only  one,  that  of 
estaljlishing  character  and  habits  of  the  subject  con- 
cerned. 

4th.  Punishm^ent  instructs  as  the  legal  evidence  and 
exact  measure,  both  of  the  importance  of  law,  and  of 
the  magnitude,  or  degree,  of  crime,  involved  in  its 
transgression. 

Chastisement  instructs  as  evidence,  but  is  only  in 
part  a  measure  of  the  importance  of  law  and  degree 
of  crime. 

Inasmuch  as  chastisement  may  vary  at  any  time, 
according  to  the  judgment  of  the  executive,  in  view 
of  results'  affecting  character,  it  cannot  be  an  exact 
measure.     Punishment,  being  Hxed,  can  be. 

5th.  Punishment  depends  upon  the  law-mahing  de- 
partinent  of  government  for  all  its  peculiarities. 

Chastisement  depends  upon  the  will  of  its  executive 
for  all  its  peculiarities. 

6th.  Punishm^ent  is  generally  specified  in  quality, 
quantity,  and  duration. 

Chastisements  need  not  be  in  any  of  these  respects. 

In  all  fully  constituted  legal  governments,  punish- 
ment must  be  clearly  specified,  as  much  so  as  law  it- 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  87 

self,  of  wliiili  it  is  nil  clement.  AVHien  not  si)ecifie(l, 
punislunent  would  involve  the  element  of  ex  jjost 
facto  law,  if  intiicted. 

7th,  Punishinent  in  itself  has  no  reference  to  ref- 
ormation. 

Chastisement  in  its  nature  has  direct  reference  to 
reformation,  being  designed  to  effect  a  genuine  and 
permanent  change  of  character  and  habits. 

Punishment,  in  its  hmguage,  is,  always,  so  much,  no 
more,  no  less  ;  so  long,  no  longer,  no  shorter ;  such  in 
kind,  this  and  no  other,  all  which  would  be  erroneous, 
were  reformation  the  design  of  punishment.  If  ref- 
ormation were  the  design,  then  the  punishment  ought 
to  stop  when  this  is  secured,  since  to  continue  suffer- 
ing after  the  very  design  of  it  is  secured,  is  downright 
cruelty.  And,  again,  were  reformation  the  design  of 
punishment,  then  it  should  be  continued  till  reforma- 
tion is  secured,  since  without  securing  the  design,  the 
means  is  lost,  and  even  worse  than  lost,  because  the 
suffering  would  stimulate  the  unreformed  criminal  to 
revenge.  Thus  evidently  reformation  is  not  the  de- 
sign of  punishment. 

Sometimes,  law  specifies  a  range  of  selection  by 
the  judge,  as  to  punishment,  according  to  what  may 
seem  to  him  adapted,  the  most  effectually,  to  secure 
the  ends  of  justice.  And  at  times ''good  behavior" 
is  speciffed  as  a  fact  admitting  of  executive  clemency. 
]]ut  this  is  only  a  circumstance  or  fact  for  the  exec- 
utive to  take  into  consideration,  and  is  never  stated 
to  be  the  object  of  the  ])unishment. 

But  chastisement  is  directly,  in  its  nature,  to  con- 


88  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

tinue  till  reformation  is  secured,  then  always  to  cease; 
and,  in  all  its  administration,  it  is  to  change  at  the  will 
of  the  executive  as  he  may  judge  the  best  adapted  to 
result  in  reformation  or  the  establishing  of  cliaracter. 

8th.  Punishment  protects,  loth  hy  preventing  a 
transgression  before  it  is  committed,  and  by  restrain- 
ing the  criminal  after  its  commission. 

Chastisement  protects,  by  effecting  a  chavige  of  char- 
acter, either  before  or  after  commission  of  the  crime. 

9th.  Punishment  is  in  connection  M-ith  laws  which 
recognize  the  right  of  the  subject  to  choose  and  act  for 
himself,  as  he  will,  so  far  as  he  himself  is  concerned  ; 
but  which,  for  the  good  of  all,  hold  him  to  a  course  of 
action  in  harmony  with  others. 

Chastisement  is  in  connection  with  laws  which  do 
not  recognize  any  such  right,  but  are  designed  to  de- 
termine his  choice  and  will. 

10th.  Punishment  may  at  times  'wwoixQ.  ^^crpetiial 
confinement,  or  even  the  destruction  of  the  criminal. 

Chastisement,  in  its  very  nature  and  design,  never 
can  he  thus  severe. 

11th.  Punishment  is  never  inflicted  except  after  a 
real  or  supposed  transgression  upon  the  supposed 
transgressor. 

Chastisement,  in  modified  forms,  is  sometimes  in- 
flicted without  an  actual  violation  of  law,  in  order  to 
effect  such  a  change  of  character  as  may  prevent  a 
transgression  or  other  evil,  and  secure  good. 

By  these  eleven  distinctions  at  least  are  punish- 
ment and  chastisement  found  clearly  to  differ.  In 
two  respects  they  are,  as  sanctions,  similar ;  they  both 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  89 

are  sufferin<j,  and  both  liavu  reference  to  transj^res- 
sion.  But  in  other  and  many  things  they  are  spe- 
eitically  and  clearly  distinct.  They  must  not  be  con- 
fused, one  Avith  the  other,  nor  with  other  things.  A 
principal  error  of  the  past  has  been  that  of  regarding 
])unishinent  the  same  as  chastisement,  designed  to  se- 
cure the  reformation  of  the  transgressor,  thus  making 
the  two  words  to  be  identical  in  signification. 

Doubtless  one  cause  of  error,  in  respect  to  these 
two  important  words,  was  that  of  a  truth  which  is 
always  connected  with  punishment,  though  not  a  part 
of  it.  This  truth  is  that,  in  connection  loith  sxiffering 
ptinisJiiiicnt^  the  transgressor  ought  of  himself'  to  re- 
form. 

The  punishment  is  exactly  adapted  to  result  in  his 
reformation,  if  he  would  use  it  aright.  It  is  instruc- 
tive in  its  nature,  imparting  to  him  knoNvledge  of 
trutli  if  he  will  receive  it.  It  is  right,  M-hile  he  is 
wrong.  lie  ought  to  perceive  it ;  to  feel  it ;  to  yield 
to  the  truth,  and  reform.  This  he  Avould  do  if  he 
would  act  as  a  rational  being,  for  reason  would  lead 
him  thus  to  do. 

But,  in  the  liberty  of  the  subject,  this  is  his  part ; 
not  that  of  law,  or  of  government.  He  ought,  of 
himself,  to  reform  in  view  of  the  truth  presented  in 
punishment.  Yet  the  law  makes  no  reference  to  such 
reformation  as  its  design.  As  law,  it* requires  the 
same  suffering  with  reformation  as  without  it.  And 
the  cnmiual,  though  suffering  the  full  punishment 
of  the  law,  ought  to  abhor  his  crimes  as  bad;  and 
choose,  yes,  will,  ol)edience  to  the  law  as  riu;-ht. 


90  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

It  is  true  also  that  the  government  itself  and  the 
executive  of  law,  ought,  in  benevolence,  to  seek,  as  far 
as  possible,  the  reformation  of  the  transgressor.  This 
they  are  to  do  in  tkeir  benevolence,  not  as  the  object 
of  punishment,  but  as  a  good  to  another,  always  to  be 
sought,  so  far  as  consistent  witli  truth  and  justice. 

Tiiese  facts  as  to  the  duty  of  the  criminal  to  reform 
when  suffering  punishment,  and  of  the  executive  and 
government  to  secure  it  if  possil>le,  as  an  object  desir- 
able in  benevolence,  are  so  co-existent  w^ith  punish- 
ment, tliat  genei-ally  they  have  been  regarded  as  a 
veritable  element  in  punishment  itself.  These,  as 
co-existent  facts,  are  to  becarefnlly  distinguished  from 
the  real  elements  and  desigji  of  the  thing  itself.  In 
itself  punishment  is  to  be  regarded  as  instructive  to 
all  and  protective  to  the  obedient ;  to  be  executed 
directly  for  their  good. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  91 


CHAPTER  XII. 

PUNISHMENT   MOEE   CAREFULLY    DISTINGUISHED   AND 
EXl'LAINED. 

From  the  definition  of  punishment  as  "  Deprivation 
of  good  01-  intiiction  of  suliering  upon  the  transgressor 
because  of  his  transgression  foi-  the  good  of  others  as 
judged  of  by  the  authority  whicli  determines  the  suf- 
fering," it  is  evident,  That  not  all  suffering  is  jpnn- 
ishment,  but  only  that  xchich  accords  loith  the  definition. 

It  must  be  a  suffering  inflicted,  upon  a  being  of  a 
particular  character^  because  of  a  certain  act,  for  one 
exact  j)'U7'j)ose^  determined  upon  by  one  who  has  this 
ohject  in  vieiv.  All  this  involves  the  fact  that  tlie  suf- 
fering must  be  inflicted  by  an  intelligent  ratiunal 
heing^  on  account  of  believed  transgression  for  a  spe- 
ciflc  object,  and  to  be  right,  it  must  be  inflicted  by 
one  authorized  to  inflict  it. 

Not  all  suff'ering  resulting  from,  transgression,  of  law 
is  punishmen  t. 

A  wife  may  suffer  exceedingly,  when  flrst  learning 
that  the  husband,  whom  she  thought  a  noble  and  good 
man,  is  in  jail  for  a  real  theft.  Her  sufferings  are  the 
result  of  a  transgression,  yet  are  not  punishment.  So 
also    may    the    transgressor   himself    sufl"er  greatly 


92  archology;  or, 

because  of  his  disgrace  and  of  liis  confinement,  and 
because  of  the  sufferings  his  wife  and  friends  endure 
on  liis  account,  and  yet  there  be  no  punishment  in 
the  whole  ;  altliougli  a  part  of  the  suffering  at  least, 
was  inflicted  bv  an  executive  of  government.  None 
of  the  sufferings  of  the  prisoner,  before  he  has  been 
tried,  proved  guilt}-,  condemned,  and  the  sentence 
commenced  to  be  inflicted,  are  punishment.  All  pre- 
vious sufferings  result  from  the  circumstances,  in  view 
of  which  the  judge  may  however  see  flt  to  sentence 
the  criminal  to  a  less  severe  punishment  than  other- 
wise he  would  have  done,  but  they  were  not  punishment. 

Again,  Wo  natural  result,  however  painful,  is 
jpunishment. 

All  natural  results  are  in  perfect  harmony  with  natural 
law.  They  are  always  results  of  a  form  of  obedience  to 
them,  obedience  being  used  with  no  reference  to  intel- 
ligence in  the  case.  If  from  an  unavoidable  necessity 
the  hand  of  a  man  is  brought  into  Are,  it  comes  under 
the  law  of  disorganization,  and  is  burned,  in  obedience 
to  that  law.  There  is  no  punishment  in  it,  any  more 
than  when  that  hand  was  under  the  law  of  growth 
and  it  grew. 

The  same  also  is  true,  if  a  man  designs  to  put  his 
hand  in  the  fire.  For  the  material  law  of  disorgan- 
ization requires  the  consuming  of  the  hand  ;  and 
there  is  no  more  punishment  in  the  case  than  when 
the  man  puts  his  hand  in  cold  water  and,  by  the  law 
in  the  case,  the  hand  is  cooled. 

There  is  a  law  of  mind  that  when  a  moral  being 
intentionally  injures  another  he  M'ill  hate  that  other. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  93 

This  hatred  is  a  species  of  suffcriiii^,  and  terril)ly 
degrades  the  being,  yet  it  is  not  piini.shnieiit. 

Punishment  belongs  only  to  legal,  rational,  govei'n- 
ment,  and  must  be  suffering  inflicted  by  a  rational 
executive  in  accordance  with  law  for  a  certain  pur- 
pose, the  good  of  the  subjects  of  that  government. 

Once  more,  Remorse  of  conscience  is  not  jptinishment. 

Heniorse  is  a  feeling  of  self-condemnation  and  de- 
sert of  punishment  because  of  transgression. 

In  two  things  it  resembles  punishment :  it  is  suffer- 
ing; and  is  because  of  transgression.  But  in  other 
things  it  utterly  fails  of  the  features  of  punishment. 
It  is  not  inflicted  ;  it  is  not  specified  by  law  ;  it  is  not 
uniform  ;  it  does  not  cease  after  a  certain  amount  ;  or 
after  a  definite  length  of  time  ;  it  is  not  a  measure  of 
the  importance  of  law  ;  it  does  not  accord  with  the 
degree  of  crime;  it  varies  in  different  individuals; 
with  different  times;  with  different  circumstances; 
and  has  no  authority  determining  its  degree. 

Especially,  remorse  differs  from  punishment,  in  that, 
while,  if  a  transgression  is  repeated  after  punishment, 
the  punishment  is  always  justly  increased,  and  so  for- 
ward with  every  repetition,  yet,  with  remorse,  it  is  di- 
rectly the  opposite.  For,  generally  it  diminishes  with 
the  repetition  of  crime,  till  at  length  it  almost  or  quite 
ceases  to  act.  Indeed,  so  far  is  remorse  from  being 
punishment  that  a  major  element  of  it,  in  this  world, 
is  a  feeling  tliat  punishment  is  deserved  but  not  in- 
flicted. 

This  feeling  of  remorse  bears  a  close  analogy  to 
other   feelincrs   and    emotions   of  the  rational    being. 


9:t  AECHOLOGY  ;  OK, 

Hunger  is  an  original,  peculiar  feeling  of  suffering, 
differing  from  all  others,  and  becomes  a  powerful  im- 
pulse to  action.  Thirst  is  also  another  original,  pecu- 
liar feeling,  which  becomes  a  powerful  impulse  to 
appropriate  action.  These  are  but  two  of  many  orig- 
inal feelings  of  the  body,  each  a  powerful  impulse. 

The  mind  has,  in  like  manner,  its  variety  of  feel- 
ings, each  an  impulse  to  action.  Oue  of  these  is  the 
sense  of  moral  obligation,  an  original  and  peculiar 
emotion  becoming  consciously  felt  on  occasion  of  per- 
ceived right  and  wrong.  When  wrong  is  committed, 
another  original  feeling  is  awakened,  that  of  remorse. 
It  is  a  peculiar  feeling  of  suffering  in  the  moral  nature 
of  the  rational  being,  one  of  immense  importance,  dif- 
ferent from  all  others,  and  becomes  a  powerful  im- 
pulse to  certain  actions. 

It  is  not  punishment  any  more  than  hunger  is  pun- 
ishment. But  there  is  in  it,  awfulness,  tearfulness, 
miserableness,  agony  ;  a  suffering  at  times  which  words 
cannot  express,  impelling  to  its  own  variety  of  action. 

Yet,  this  remorse,  like  any  other  suffering,  may  be 
made  a  real  ])unishment.  Any  suffering,  when  judi- 
cially inflicted,  L  e.,  when  the  criminal  is  judicially  de- 
livered over  to  the  suffering,  becomes  a  true  punish- 
ment. To  be  torn  to  pieces*  by  wild  beasts  is  not 
punishment.  But  if  there  is  a  judicial  sentence,  com- 
mitting the  criminal  to  wild  beasts  to  be  torn  to  pieces, 
then  it  becomes  punishment.  So  if  ever  there  is  a 
judicial  delivering  of  the  criminal  over  to  the  horrors 
of  remorse  of  conscience,  then  remorse  must  be  pun- 
ishment of  tremendous  import. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT,  95 

These  spccitic  (li&tiiictioi.s  between  punishment  and 
tilings  resembling  it,  though  not  themselves  it,  are 
here  presented  to  guard  the  mind  against  confounding 
the  important  element  and  principle  of  punishment  in 
goveniinent  \vith  other  tilings  differing  from  it  in  es- 
sential facts.  Confusion  here  is  certain  to  confuse  the 
whole  science  in  the  mind,  and  lead,  in  practical  re- 
sults, to  irreparable  evils. 

In  Legal  Government  all  the  superiority  of  law  over 
advice  is  due  entirely  to  the  clement  called  punish- 
ment. The  real  value,  force,  and  obligation,  of  law, 
are  all  given  it  by  punishment.  The  entire  legal  in- 
struction given  by  government  to  its  subjects,  as  to  the 
importance  of  law,  and  as  to  the  badness  or  criminality 
of  transgression  (upon  the  knowledge  of  which  de- 
pends rational  obedience),  and  the  entire  legal  protec- 
tion of  the  obedient  against  the  evils  of  transgression, 
all  are  dependent  upon  punishment. 

Punit^hment,  in  view  of  its  importance,  should  be 
exactly  and  clearly  apprehended  by  the  scientist,  as  a 
great  central  force,  and  elemental  principle  in  gov- 
ernment. Without  it  legal  government  ceases  to 
exist;  with  it,  in  perfection,  government  is  perfect. 

Hence,  in  legal  government,  true  punishment  is  an 
expression  of  Jnghest  goodness,  a  necessity  in  henevo- 
lence  and  love,  essential  to  the  welfare  of  subjects. 
Its  true  origin,  true  administration,  and  true  design, 
are  all  found  in  its  being  useful,  as  a  means  of  good, 
necessary  to  the  subjects  of  government  in  securing 
the  ends  of  their  existence. 

This  usefulness  of  punishment  and  the  manner  of 


96  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

it,  have  been  treated  of  under  tlie  liead  of  sanctions 
of  law  (chapter  vi.).  All  there  presented  having 
referred  to  sanctions  as  a  genus,  is  also  true  of  pun- 
ishment as  a  species.  But  a  species  always  possesses 
some  peculiarities  not  found  in  the  genus.  Hence, 
in  order  that  these  peculiarities  may  be  seen  in  their 
true  connections,  and  also  in  view  of  the  great  impor- 
tance of  the  whole  subject  of  punishment  in  distinc- 
tion from  everything  else,  those  principles  there  pre- 
sented are  hero-  in  connection  with  new  features, 
repeated  with  aoridged  explanations. 

There  is  especial  reason  moreover,  for  this  repeti- 
tion, in  tlie  fact  of  the  very  grave  errors  commonly 
entertained  in  reference  to  the  subject  of  punishment 
in  its  various  applications. 

The  great  principle  in  the  case  is,  that  All  the  vir- 
tue, force,  and  excellence  of  punishment  are  fo^tnd 
in  the  fact  of  its  usefulness,  as  a  means  necessary  to 
subjects  in  securing  good. 

The  next  principle  is,  that,  The  usefulness  of  punr 
ishment  lies  entirely  in  its  two  qualities  of  being  in- 
structive and  protective. 

It  is  instructive  in  three  ways  :  First,  It  instructs 
hy  heing  the  measure  of  the  importance  of  law. 

As  has  been  said,  the  subjects  of  government  can 
act  rationally  oidy  by  conforming  to  truth  as  made 
known  through  evidence.  But,  in  their  limited 
knowledge,  they  cannot,  each  one,  from  his  own  ex- 
perience and  investigation  alone,  apprehend  the  re- 
sults of  actions  upon  all  through  the  system  of  gov- 
ernment, and  correctly  select,  each  for  himself,  those 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  97 

actions  which  are  adapted  to  result  in  good.  His 
own  reason  will  certainly  fail  him  in  the  case  and  all 
l)e  involved  in  consequent  disaster.  Legal  govern- 
ment is  designed  to  aid  the  subject  in  this  condition 
of  difficulty  by  unfolding  authoritatively,  through 
law,  the  course  of  action  adapted  to  result  in  good  to 
all. 

But  to  be  law,  as  distinct  from  mere  ad^'ice,  there  is 
a  necessity  of  the  element  of  punishment.  By  the 
magnitude  of  this  punishment  the  government  ex- 
presses its  estimation  of  the  importance  of  law.  This 
expression  of  government,  as  to  the  importance  of 
law,  is  to  the  subject  the  legal  evidence  of  this  im- 
portance, and,  as  evidence,  it  is  essential  to  his  knowl- 
edge of  this  importance.  Thus  punishment  is  instruc- 
tive, giviiig  evidence,  by  its  magnitude,  of  the  magni- 
tude of  the  importance  of  law. 

In  view  of  this  importance  must  the  subject  obey 
if  he  is  to  act  rationally.  This  he  is  to  do,  not  through 
fear  of  the  punishment,  but  through  approval  of  law, 
and  out  of  regard  to  its  importance,  as  proved  to  him 
by  punishment  taken  as  evidence  on  the  authority  of 
government. 

Corresponding  to  authority  there  is  need  of  a  coi'- 
relative  word  on  the  part  of  subjects.  Authority; 
o-iviuir  in  itself,  ?'.  ^'.,in  the  character  of  the  author,  the 
evidence  for  truth,  demands  reception  of  the  truth. 
The  subject  does,  or  ought  to,  receive  it  on  the  au- 
thority ot  government.  This  reception  needs  in 
science  a  term  expressive  of  it.  Faith  is  a  word  in 
common  use  e\[)ressing  this  exact  idea. 


98  aechology;  or, 

Faith  signifies  the  reception  of  truth  simply  on  the 
evidence  of  authority. 

Government  is  the  authority  for  laws ;  subjects, 
from  faith  in  government,  are  to  receive  those  laws  on 
its  authority  to  obey  them.  Faith,  indeed,  is  not  con- 
fined to  government.  It  expresses  one  of  the  most 
common  and  most  rational  acts  of  an  intelligent  being. 
With  little  exception  all  historical  belief  is  simply 
faith  in  the  authority  of  historians.  J^early  all  scien- 
tific belief  among  the  masses  of  the  people  is  merely 
faith  in  the  authority  of  scientific  men.  The  im- 
mensely larger  proportion  of  all  rational  belief  is  only 
faith  in  the  authority  of  the  various  sources  of  evi- 
dence. Government  justly  demands  from  subjects 
this  faith  in  its  authority  as  to  law.  It  expresses  the 
importance  of  law  by  the  magnitude  of  punishment, 
and  demands  that  the  sul>ject  obey  law  in  view  of  this 
importance.     Thus  is  punishment  first  instructive. 

Second.  Punishment  is  instructive  hy  heing  the  meas- 
ure of  the  degree  of  crime  involved  in  transgressing  law. 

It  is  in  view  of  the  badness  or  the  criminality  in- 
volved in  transgressing  a  law  that  the  subject  is  to 
avoid  such  transgression,  Eut  the  punishment  is  the 
measure  of  that  criminality,  and  is  the  legal  evidence 
of  it  to  the  subject. 

Third.  Punishment  is  instriictive  as  evincing  the 
vigor  of  vnll  and  the  power  of  the  executive  to  enforce 
the  law  and  ^protect  the  obedient  subjects  from  the  evils 
consequent  on  transgression. 

All  protection  against  the  evils  of  transgression, 
resulting  from  those  who  chose  to  violate  law,  depends 


THE    SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  99 

upon  the  will  and  the  power  of  the  executive.  Just 
in  proportion  to  the  confidence  of  the  subjects  in  the 
will  and  power  of  the  executive  to  protect  them,  can 
they  rationally  trust  this  department  of  government 
to  do  it,  while  they  peacefully  and  rationally  ol^ey  the 
laws  of  the  government.  This  vigor  of  will  and 
ability,  on  the  part  of  the  executive,  are  evinced  to 
the  subjects  by  the  punishments  he  enforces  on  occa- 
sion of  transgression.  Thus  punishment  is  instruc- 
tive by  being  the  evidence  of  the  will  and  power  of 
the  executive,  upon  which  depends  for  subjects  all 
their  rational  confidence  of  protection  from  evil. 

The  three  facts  united  in  the  instructive  quality  of 
punishment  are  necessary  to  subjects  if  they  are  to  act 
rationally,  as  rational  beings,  under  a  rational  govern- 
ment. These  three  facts  given  in  punishment  are 
formulated  in  tlie  following  manner  : 

A  law  of  little  importance,  hence  of  little  crime  in 
its  violation,  evoking  little  vigor  of  will  and  power  on 
the  part  of  the  executive,  must  have  little  punish- 
ment specified  lor  its  transgression.  A  law  of  great 
importance,  hence  of  great  crime  in  its  violation,  and 
evoking  great  vigor  of  will  and  power  on  the  part  of 
the  executive,  must  have  great  punishment  sjiecified  for 
its  transgression  ;  and  a  law  of  the  greatest  importance, 
hence  of  greatest  crime  in  its  violation,  and  evoking 
the  greatest  vigor  of  will  and  power  on  the  part  of 
the  executive,  must  have  the  greatest  punishment 
speeirted  for  its  transgression. 

Or,  little  importance,  little  crime,  little  vigor  of 
will  and  power,  little  punishment;  great  importance, 


100  archology;  or, 

great  crime,  great  vigor  of  will  and  power,  great  pun- 
ishment;  finite  importance,  finite  crime,  finite  vigor 
of  will  and  power,  finite  punishment ;  infinite  im- 
portance, infinite  crime,  infinite  vigor  of  will  and 
power,  infinite  punishment. 

Such  are  the  proportions,  such  the  correlations 
of  truth,  and  such  the  necessities  for  subjects  in  their 
instruction  by  government.  Punishment,  to  be  true, 
must  instruct  truthfully.  Its  testimony,  as  evidence, 
must  neither  overstate  nor  understate  the  truth.  By 
its  magnitude  it  must  be  the  true  measure  of  the  im- 
portance of  law,  and  of  the  correct  degree  of  crime, 
and  be  the  true  expression  of  the  vigor  of  will,  and  of 
the  poM'er  of  the  executive  of  law  to  enforce  its  claims, 
sustain  the  government,  and  protect  the  obedient. 
In  view  of  this  evidence,  the  subjects  of  government 
can  rationally  act,  and  peacefully  yield  cheerful  obedi- 
ence to  law  and  government. 

Again,  Tlie  jprotective  quality  of  punishment  is 
emnced  also  in  three  ways. 

First.  Punishment  protects  against  the  evils  of 
transgression  hy  preventing  them  through  instruction. 

Inasmuch  as  it  instructs  all  as  to  the  importance  of 
law  and  the  badness  of  transgression,  it  enables  sub- 
jects to  choose  the  good,  carefully  to  do  right,  and 
avoid  wrong.  Thus  by  its  influence  in  preventing 
evils  by  its  instruction,  it  so  far  protects  obedient  sub- 
jects against  them. 

Second.  Punishment  protects  against  the  evils  of 
transgression  hy  being  a  terror  to  those  inclined  to 
transgress  the  law^  inducing  them  practically  to  obey. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  101 

There  is  no  moral  virtue  in  this  obedience  ;  still,  to 
the  truly  obedient,  this  influence  is  of  great  iiii])or- 
tance  in  preventiiifi:  the  evilly  disposed  from  violating 
law,  and  involving  otliers  in  sullering.  Thus,  as  an 
object  of  terror  to  the  evilly  disposed,  punishment  is, 
for  the  obedient,  a  great  protection  against  evils. 

Perhaps  also  the  suflering  of  punishment,  as  an  evil 
to  be  avoided,  may  have  a  rational  influence  upon  the 
good  themselves.  They  may  perhaps  perceive  it  as  an 
evil  like  any  other  fact  of  pain,  and  Avith  a  right 
motive  avoid  it  by  obedience.  Thus  punishment,  as  a 
suffering  in  itself,  may  have  some  proper  influ- 
ence, as  an  object  of  fear,  even  npon  the  good  as  well 
as  the  bad,  to  protect  from  evil,  by  insuring  obedi- 
ence. 

Third.  Punishment  is  protective  hy  leing  such  a 
confining  and  affecting  of  the  evil-doer^  that  rejyeti- 
tion  of  the  transgression  may  not  take  place. 

Since,  in  its  very  nature,  government  is  to  protect 
its  subjects  from  actions  tending  to  prevent  the  secur- 
ing of  the  ends  of  existence,  i.  e.,  their  real  good,  it 
follows  that  if  it  cannot  protect  them  either  by 
instruction  or  by  fear,  then  it  must  give  such  protec- 
tion through  com]>ulsion  or  physical  force.  But 
because  the  will  is  free  in  rational  beings,  government 
cannot  force  or  comj^el  the  wills  of  those  inclined  to 
violate  law.  Therefore,  it  must,  by  physical  force, 
restrain,  and  conflne  those  thus  evilly  inclined,  that 
they  may  not  again,  by  transgression,  involve  the 
obedient  in  evil.  This  "inflicting  of  confinement 
upon    the  transgressor,  because  of  his  transgression, 


102  archology;  or, 

for  the  good  of  others,"  is,  according  to  the  definition, 
punishment. 

In  formulating  the  principles  of  this  chapter,  it  ap- 
pears tliat  punishment  is  both  instructive  in  three 
ways,  and  also  protective  in  three  ways. 

It  is  instructive,  1st,  as  evidence  of  the  importance 
of  law,  2d,  as  evidence  of  the  degree  of  crime,  and  3d, 
as  evidence  of  the  vigor  of  will  and  power  of  the  exec- 
utive to  enforce  law.  It  protects,  1st,  by  its  instruc- 
tion to  all,  2d,  by  its  terror  to  the  evilly  disposed, 
and  3d,  by  its  confinement  and  effect  upon  the  trans- 
gressor to  prevent  repetition  of  crime. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  103 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

OTHER     FACTS     AS     TO     PUNISHMENT      TOGETHER      "WITH 
APPLICATIONS    OF    IT. 

From  the  tact  that  punisliment  is  protective  it  is  evi- 
dent, that,  It  Tnust  involve  greater  deprivation  of 
good  to  the  transgressor  than  the  good  he  designed  for 
himself  in  his  transgression. 

For,  if  by  breaking  the  hiw  whicli  protects  tlie  rights 
of  property,  he  secures  as  a  thief,  five  tliousand  doHars, 
and  yet  is  punished  only  by  the  deprivation  of  fonr 
tlioiisand,  he  lias  made  one  thousand  dollars  clear  b}' 
his  transgression.  Protection  wonld  not  be  given  the 
obedient  in  the  case,  and  tlie  thief  Nvill  repeat  the  act. 

So  also  if  suffering  is  inflicted,  such  as  imprison- 
ment or  scourging  at  the  whipping-post,  and  yet  the 
suffering  be  to  him,  as  he  regards  it,  only  equal  to 
four  tliousand  dollars,  he  will  consider  himself  as 
clearly  gaining  one  tliousand  dollars,  and  be  ready  to 
renew  the  theft  as  an  advantageous  transaction. 

Again,  The  chances  that  the  criminal  may  escape  the 
executive  tnust  he  considered  still  more  to  increase  tlie 
jninisliment. 

For,  if  when  stealing  five  tliousand  dollars,  the 
criminal    is  to  be  punished  by  a  deprivation  of   six 


104  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

thousand,  nnd  j-et  lie  can  escape  detection  once  out 
of  three  times,  then,  in  the  three  transgressions,  he 
M'ill  secure  lifteen  thousand  doHars,  but  be  punished 
only  in  the  loss  of  twelve  thousand.  Thus,  in  this 
case,  protection  would  not  be  given  the  obedient. 

Again,  The.  hardening  of  the  criminaV s  feelings  by 
transgression  must  be  considered  yet  still  more  to  in- 
crease the  punishment. 

For,  the  repeated  transgression  of  law,  and  often  a 
single  act,  will  so  deaden  the  sensibilities  of  the 
criminal,  that  a  suffering,  as  punishment,  whieli  to  an 
honest  man  would  be  very  severe,  would,  by  him,  be 
little  felt.  Thus  protection  in  this  case  also  would 
not  be  given. 

Moreover,  from  a  consideration  in  the  quality  of  pun- 
ishment, it  is  further  evident  that,  Punishment  must 
he  to  the  transgressor  very  much  greater  than  the  good 
he  secures^  or  designs  for  himself. 

For  punishment  is  the  measure  of  the  importance 
of  law,  and  of  the  degree  of  crime  involved  in  its 
violation.  But  the  importance  is  much  greater  than 
the  good  it  protects  for  the  one  single  possessor,  since 
it  protects  also  the  same  good  of  all  like  possessors. 
Therefore  the  punishment  which  expresses  the  impor- 
tance of  this  law,  protecting  all  these  various  posses- 
sors, must  be  much  greater  than  the  sum  taken  by 
the  one  thief  from  tlie  one  possessor. 

Again,  since  punishment  is  the  measure  of  crime, 
while  criminality  increases  not  only  with  the  impor- 
tance of  a  law  in  government,  but  also  with  the  au- 
thority of    tlic  government  itself,  it  is  still  further 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT,  105 

evident  that  the  puiii.shmciit,  measuring  this  increased 
criminality,  must  often  very  far  surpass  the  individual 
good  secured  or  designed  by  the  criminal  in  his  vio- 
lating law. 

From  all  these  considerations  it  follows  that  the 
punishment  for  violating  law  ought  in  truth  often  to 
be  many  fold  greater  than  the  good  tlie  criminal 
secured  or  designed  Ibr  himself  in  the  violation  of 
law.  Justice,  goodness,  love,  demand  it  to  be  much 
greater,  and  its  execution  is  one  of  the  highest  legal 
ex|)re6sions,  which  the  executive  can  make,  of  his  love 
and  benevolence, 

AI'PLIUATlO>'S    OF    PUNISHMENT. 

The  principles  of  jninishment  in  their  application  to 
the  protection  of  property',  appear  comparatively  sim- 
ple. In  this  case  a  numerical  estimate  of  good  and 
evil  in  the  case  can  be  approximately  made,  and  a 
punishment  that  shall  instruct  and  protect  be  some- 
where near  correctly  determined  upon. 

But  in  their  application  to  the  protection  of  liberty, 
the  determination  of  just  punishment  becomes  more 
ditticult.  For  the  deprivation  of  liberty  is  generally 
felt  to  be  a  greater  evil  than  the  loss  of  money,  and 
the  law-making  department  of  government  must 
judge  of  this  loss,  with  other  considerations,  in  deter- 
mining punishment  in  the  case. 

Still  more  ditticult  and  complicated  is  the  matter 
when  these  ])rinci[)les  are  applied  to  the  ])rotection  of 
limbs,  health,  and  character.  In  determining  the 
criminality    involved   in   the    M-illful    dcsti-(»ying   of  a 


lOG  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

liinb,  or  any  member  of  the  body,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider  the  loss  of  time,  of  health,  of  wealth,  of 
comfort,  of  liberty,  of  aid  to  a  dependent  family,  of 
help  to  general  society,  of  assistance  to  government, 
and  of  all  things  involved  in  the  loss  of  the  limb,  or 
member,  in  order  that  a  true  and  jnst  punishment  may 
be  determined,  upon.  The  punishment  must  both  cor- 
rectly instruct  and  effectnally  protect  or  it  is  wrong. 

Should  the  punishment  for  willfully  destroying  an 
eye,  or  disabling  an  arm  be  iixed  at  one  thousand 
dollars,  tjien  possibly  the  anger,  spite,  malice  or  re- 
venge, of  a  rich  man  might  induce  him  to  risk  the 
loss  of  the  thousand  dollars  for  the  gratification  of  de- 
stroying the  eye,  or  other  useful  member  of  a  poor 
man  with  whom  he  had  difficulty.  In  this  case  the 
law  by  its  punishment  would  fail  to  give  protection  to 
the  poor  njan;  for  the  rich,  evilly  disposed  man  could 
easily  trample  upon  the  poor,  by  means  of  his  wealth. 
The  government  is  in  duty  bound  to  protect  all  obe- 
dient sul)jects,  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich,  yet  in  this 
case  it  seems  it  would  not. 

Probably  no  better  punishment  was  ever  specified, 
for  such  a  condition  of  tJmujs,  than  that,  after  an  im- 
partial court  trial,  the -rich  man  should  have  his  own 
eye,  tooth,  or  limb,  destroyed  by  the  proper  executive 
of  law.  This  would  effectually  protect  the  poor  man 
from  outrage  by  an  evilly  disposed  man  of  wealth. 
This  must  not  be  done  by  a  private  man  on  his  own 
authority,  for  this  M'ould  be  only  revenge.  But  it 
must  be  by  the  proper  officers  of  government,  as  an 
instructive  and  protective  punishment,  to  be  inflicted 


THE   SCIENCE   OP   GOVERNMENT.  107 

upon  the  criminal  Ijy  the  properly  constituted  execu- 
tive of  government.  Just  punishment  must  both 
trutlifully  instruct,  and  effectually  protect.  All  else 
is  false  to  truth  and  goodness. 

Finally,  in  the  application  of  these  principles  to  the 
protection  of  life,  there  is  an  inference  of  the  great- 
est importance.  The  estimate  of  life  is  that  of  a  good 
to  a  man  greater  than  any  other  object  of  desire  on 
earth.  No  sum  of  money,  no  amount  of  wealth,  and 
no  years  of  servitude,  can  express  to  a  man  the  real 
value  of  liis  own  life.  He  regards  it  to  himself  as  a 
good  too  great  to  be  expressed  in  numbei's. 

JSow  the  law,  which  protects  life,  protects  for  him 
this  great  and  inestimable  good.  But  the  importance 
of  a  law  is  equal  to  the  good  it  protects,  and  the  crime 
of  violating  a  law  is,  in  degree,  equal  to  the  impor- 
tance of  it.  And  the  magnitude  of  this  importance, 
and  the  degree  of  the  crime,  are  expressed  by  the 
magnitude  of  the  punishment  attached  to  the  trans- 
gression of  the  law.  Hence,  if  the  punishment  for 
murder  be  any  sum  of  money,  such  as  ten  tliousand 
dollars,  the  legal  testimony  by  punishment,  as  the  evi- 
dence in  the  case,  is  that  the  real  value  of  life  is  no 
greater  than  ten  thousand  dollars,  and  that  the  crime 
of  destroying  life  is  correctly  measured  by  this  sum. 

But  this  legal  testimony  would  apjiear  to  be  a  ju- 
dicial falsehood,  for  life  to  a  man  is  of  more  impor- 
tance than  any  sum  of  money.  All  the  subjects  of 
government  do  estimate  life  as  of  more  value  than 
money;  but  by  a  punishment  of  money  to  protect  it, 
the  government  declares,  by  law,  that  tliis  estimate  is 


108  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

an  error ;  that  life  is  really  of  value  only  equal  to  a  cer- 
tain sum  of  money,  and  that  the  crime  of  willfully  de- 
stroying it  is  correctly  expressed  in  degree  by  such  sum. 

Exactly  the  same  reasoning  with  the  previous  holds 
true  in  respect  to  imprisonment  for  life  being  punish- 
ment for  murder.  For  in  this  case  the  legal  testi- 
mony is,  that  the  loss  of  liberty  during  life,  is  equal  to 
the  loss  of  life  itself,  and  that  the  crime  of  willfully 
destroying  life  is  truthfully  expressed  in  degree  by  loss 
of  liberty  througli  life.  Such  testimony  is  false.  Life 
is  more  valuable  than  liberty;  and  the  importance  of 
the  law  which  protects  life,  and  the  crime'of  willfully 
destroying  it,  are  greater  tlian  can  be  expressed  by 
imprisonment,  or  by  loss  of  liberty.  Therefoi-e  they 
must  be  expressed  by  a  punishment  greater  than  the 
loss  of  any  sum  of  money,  or  than  the  loss  of  liberty 
by  imprisonment  for  life.  Otherwise  the  legal  testi- 
mony in  the  case  would  be  a  falsehood  and  a  lie,  while 
truth  and  safety  would  become  sacrificed  to  the  im- 
pulse of  sympathy  for  a  criminal,  that  had  no  sympa- 
thy for  his  victim. 

Life  for  life  is  alone  the  punishment  which  the 
science  of  Archology  can  justify  as  the  true  punish- 
ment for  murder.  This  only  expresses  as  evidence  the 
real  importance  of  the  law  which  protects  life,  and  the 
degree  of  crime  involved  in  the  transgression  of  that 
law,  giving,  at  the  same  time,  the  only  sui-e  protection 
against  the  re])ctition  of  the  transgression. 

The  princii)les  here  discussed  in  the  application  of 
punishment  to  the  protection  of  different  varieties  of 
good,  may  be  formulated  in  the  fo]h)wiiig  iiianner : 


Til]':   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  109 

The  loss  of  hioncii protects  moneu ^  or  full  equivalents 
are  admissible. 

Tlie  loss  of  lUxrtij protects  llherty^  or  full  equiva- 
lents are  admissible. 

Tlie  loss  of  lb  I  lb  protects  I'tinh,  or  full  e(juivalents 
are  admissible. 

The  loss  of  life  protects  life,  but  here  there  are  no 
sufficient  equivalents,  rationally  expressing  the  impor- 
tance of  the  law  protecting  life,  and  the  degree  of 
crime  involved  in  its  transgression.  Capital  punish- 
ment alone  for  murder  gives  the  true  instruction  and 
the  effectual  protection  requisite  in  the  case. 


110  ARGHOLOGY ;    OR, 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


THE    PAEDON    OF    CKIME. 


Pardon  is  tlie  setting  aside  of  the  punishment 
which  law  demands,  and  the  treating  of  the  criminal 
as  if  he  were  innocent. 

Punislirnent  and  pardon  appear  as  direct  opposites. 
While  punishment  is  the  infliction  of  suffering,  pardon 
is  the  non-infliction  of  that  same  suffering.  While 
punishment  is  what  the  law  demands  because  of  a 
crime,  pardon  sets  this  demand  aside  and  treats  the 
criminal  as  if  innocent. 

The  acts  expressed  by  the  two  words  are  in  them- 
selves directly  opposite,  the  one  to  the  other.  As  in 
worldly  phenomena,  the  attraction  of  gravitation  draws 
all  things  toward  the  center  of  the  earth,  yet  smohe 
ascends  directly  from  that  center,  so  punishment  and 
pardon  appear  directly  opposed.  Science  explains,  in 
each  case,  this  apparent  opposition,  and  proves  them, 
in  their  appropriate  actions,  perfectly  harmonious, 
originating  in  the  same  principle,  resulting  from  the 
same  cause  in  different  circumstances,  and,  mutually, 
of  incalculable  importance,  practically  considered. 

Punishment  is  from  the  law-making  department  of 
government,  n  direct  demand,  involv^ed,  as  an  element, 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  1  1 1 

in  the  nature  of  law  itself;  while  pardon  is  from  the 
executive  of  that  same  law,  a  direct  rejection,  in  letter, 
of  this  demand  of  law.  Yet  are  the}',  each  in  their 
appropriate  circumstances,  perfectly  rii^ht,  and  har- 
moniously tending  to  the  same  end  of  good  in  govern- 
ment. 

The  explanation  lies  in  the  one  great  underlying 
principle  and  aim  of  government,  the  one  same  prin- 
ciple and  aim  of  law,  the  one  same  principle  and  ob- 
ject of  the  whole  administration  of  government  and 
law.  This  one  principle  and  aim  is  that  of  usefulness 
to  the  subjects  of  government  in  securing  the  ends  for 
which  they  exist,  their  true  good  and  welfare. 

In  view  of  usefulness  to  subjects,  government 
and  law  exist.  But  law  being  a  uniform  rule  of  ac- 
tion, so  long  as  there  is  occasion  for  uniformity,  can- 
not specify  the  varying  particulars,  which  in  tempor- 
arily varying  circumstances,  would  be  best  in  securing 
the  general  good.  Law  is  the  uniform  great  means ; 
but  the  varying  particulars  must  depend  upon  the 
execution  of  law.  Pardon  is  one  of  these  particulars, 
the  great  and  important  particular,  admissible  when, 
in  view  of  all  the  circumstances,  it  will  result  in  the 
same  good  to  subjects  of  government  equally  with 
])unishment. 

That  is,  Wheneve)^  pardon^  in  view  of  all  circuin- 
stafwes,  will  result  in,  mid  secure  for  the  suhjects  of 
government,  all  the  sdrae  objects  of  good,  equally  with 
punisJinient,  then  pardon  is  possible  and  right  as  a 
means  of  good  in  place  of  the  punishment. 

The  law-making  department  promulgates  the  law 


112  archology;  on, 

as  a  means  of  usefulness  to  subjects ;  tlie  executive 
enforces  tlie  law  as  a  means  of  usefulness  to  them. 
Hence  when,  as  a  means  of  usefulness,  pardon  will  se- 
cure the  same  results  of  good  equally  with  punish- 
ment, the  executive  may  substitute  one  for  the  other. 
Then  Avhichever  as  a  means  is  used,  the  other  becomes 
useless  and  impossible. 

The  only  difficulty  involving  danger  in  the  case,  is 
the  liabilitj'  of  the  executive  to  err  in  his  judgment  as 
to  whetlier  pardon  will  result  in  good  equally'  well 
with  punishment.  But  science  has  nothing  to  do 
M'ith  possible  en-oi's  in  practice.  It  is  to  present  the 
j)rinciples  of  truth  in  their  true  relations,  while,  in  the 
particular  application  of  the  science  as  an  art,  errors 
must  be  guarded  against.  So  in  this  case,  the  prin- 
ciple of  pardon  and  the  possibility  of  pardon  are  as 
presented.  Hence  the  principle  of  pardon  is  possi- 
ble and  right,  whenever  with  it  can  be  secured  all 
the  objects  of  good  possible  to  be  secured  by  punish- 
ment. 

That  is,  Whenever,  with  pardon,  are  given  to  stih- 
jects,  all  the  instruction  and  all  the  protection  possible 
to  he  given  hy  punishment,  with  no  resultant  evils, 
then  is  jKirdon  possible  and  rigid. 

In  this  case  the  executive  finds  himself  in  posses- 
sion of  two  means  of  good,  that  of  punishment  and 
that  of  pardon.  He  now  has  a  choice  of  means,  and 
if  he  perceives  that  the  second  is,  in  every  respect, 
equally  effectual  with  the  first,  he  has  a  right  to 
select  it  and  dispense  with  the  first;  moreover  benevo- 
lence demands  of  him,  in  tliis  case,  to  make  use  of  the 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  113 

second,  ami  lie  would  ho  u  cruel  executive  if  he  did 
not  do  it. 

If  now  the  judicial  usefulness  of  [)ardon  be  divided, 
the  same  as  that  of  punishment,  into  the  Instructive 
and  the  Protective,  it  will  follow, 

First,  as  to  the  Instructive,  that  With  jxirdon  there 
must  be  given,  in  some  manner,  evidence  of  the  three 
great  tacts  which  ])unishment  gives,  viz. :  That  the 
law  is  just  as  htiportant  as  it  in  reality  is  ;  that  the 
degree  of  crime,  involved  in  the  transgression  of  the 
laiOy  is  just  as  great  as  it  in  reality  is  ^  and  that  the 
executive  of  law  is  of  a  vigor  of  will  and  of  ability  to 
enforce  the  laiojust  equal  to  lohat  he  in  reality  is,  the 
same  as  in  the  case  of  jpunishment. 

Secondly,  as  to  Protection,  With  ijardon,  there 
must  also  be  given  to  the  subjects  of  government  j!;/*o- 
tection  from  the  evils  of  tmnsgression,  by  instruction 
to  all ;  by  terror  to  the  evilly  disposed;  and  by  an 
effect  upon  the  transgressor  to  insure  the  non-)'epeti- 
tion  of  the  transgression. 

This  instruction  and  this  protection  may  be  given 
in  different  ways,  and  by  ditferent  actors  in  the  appli- 
cation of  pardon  to  particular  cases,  but  in  some  man- 
ner it  must  be  given.  It  may  be  done  by  the  execu- 
tive ;  or  by  the  criminal  ;  or  by  others,  such  as  friends ; 
or  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case ;  by  one  ;  by  all ; 
or  partly  by  one  and  ]>artly  by  the  others.  But  in  some 
manner;  by  some  means;  in  some  way;  there  must 
be  given,  in  the  case,  the  same  full  instruction  and 
full  protection  which  ])unishment  would  give.  "When 
this  is  done  then  pardon    is  admissible,  as  perfectly 


114:  AECHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

right,  good,  benevolent.  The  highest  good  of  all  is 
secured  ;  the  real  protection  of  all  is  certain  ;  justice 
is  satisfied  ;  the  punishment  dispensed  with  ;  and  par- 
don correctly  granted. 

In  the  above  statement,  as  to  the  granting  of  par- 
don, in  order  that  misapprehension  may  be  avoided, 
the  full  force  of  the  word  circnmstances,  needs  partic- 
ular notice.  A  few  illustrations  will  make  this  the 
most  clear.  A  pupil  has  violated  a  rule  of  the  school ; 
broken  a  pane  of  glass  and  run  liome.  The  teacher 
says,  "  I  must  punish  that  boy  to-morrow."  But  that 
evening  the  mother  of  that  boy  dies.  This  fact 
requires  that  the  teacher  refer  tenderly  to  the  painful 
bereavement,  and  pardon  the  criminal.  The  circum- 
stances make  the  pardon  more  useful  than  the  punish- 
ment. A  murderer  is  clearly  convicted  and  con- 
demned. Before  the  day  of  execution  the  criminal 
is  almost  gone  with  the  consumption  ;  utterly  unable  to 
rise,  and  is  certain  to  die  in  less  than  ten  days.  Public 
feeling  would  revolt  at  his  being  brought  thus  upon  his 
bed  to  execution.  A  pardon  might  do  more  good  if 
couched  in  proper  terms  than  the  punishment.  The 
executive  might  rightfully  j^ardon,  justified  in  so  doing 
because  of  the  circumstances.  Once  more,  an  aged 
man,  in  a  financial  crisis,  forges  a  note  ;  is  convicted, 
and  condemned  to  the  penitentiary  for  years.  Just 
at  this  time,  his  worthy  son  returns,  tlie  leader  of  a 
victoi'ious  army,  having  saved  his  country  in  the  hour 
of  her  greatest  peril.  Ife  petitions,  as  a  favor  toliim 
personally,  for  the  jDardon  of  that  aged  father  ;  prom- 
ising to  provide  for  him  well  the  remainder  of  his 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  115 

life,  and  i-eiinburse  nil  losses  to  injured  parties.  Tu 
refuse  the  petition  would  probably  be  an  outrage  to  a 
giateful  people.  In  the  circuinstances  a  pardon  would 
do  more  good  than  punishment  and  w(>nld  be  riglit. 

Circumstances  immensely  vary  ;  yet  these,  as  illus- 
trations, suffice  to  bring  out  the  i)i'in(*iple  that  when, 
by  them,  pardon  results  in  good  e(]ually  with,  or  bet- 
ter than,  punishment,  it  is  then  right. 

There  is,  however,  a  diftercnce  to  be  considered  in 
the  two  cases  of  punishment  and  pardon.  For,  while 
punishment,  in  its  nature,  as  a  suffering,  does  directly 
instruct  and  protect ;  yet,  as  pardon  is  a  setting  aside 
of  suffering,  it,  in  its  own  nature,  cannot  instruct  or 
protect.  Therefore  the  instruction  and  protection 
must  be  given  by  something  in  connection  with  the 
pardon,  as  the  ground,  or  cause,  on  account  of  which 
the  pardon  is  granted.  This  ground  or  cause,  on 
account  of  which  the  pardon  is  granted,  needs  a  term 
by  Avhich  it  may  be  expressed ;  it  needs  a  clear  and 
distinct  name. 

Inasmuch  as  this  ground  or  cause  of  pardon  is  the 
occasion  of  government  and  the  violator  of  its  laws 
becoming  fully  reconciled,  so  as  to  be  at-one  again,  it 
is  appropriate  that  that  which  is  the  means  of  their 
being  at-one  should  be  called  an  at-one-ment  or  atone- 
ment. 

Hence  an  atonement  is  that  ivhich  is  done  as  the 
ground  or  cause  on  account  of  which  a  pardon  is  ren- 
dered possWle  and  right. 

The  wording  of  this  definition  is  designed  to  ex- 
clude those  cases  where  the  cause  of  the  pardon   is 


116  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

some  defect  in  law,  or  evidence,  wliich  the  law  de- 
]>artinent,  by  statute,  could  not  guard  against;  or 
where  new  evidence  has  come  to  light  after  the  judg- 
ment of  court  has  been  rendered.  Strictly  speaking, 
in  these  cases  there  is  only  the  form,  but  no  real,  par- 
don; because  the  punishment  really  .is  not  deserved, 
and  would  be  wrong.  To  remedy  the  wrong  of  the 
technical  punishment,  a  pardon  in  form  is  granted, 
still  this  is  not  strictly  a  pardon.  In  science  pardon 
is  setting  aside  the  punishment  which  the  transgressor 
deserves*by  the  execution  of  law^  This  can  justly  be 
done  only  where  in  connection  with  the  pardon  are 
given  all  the  same  instruction  and  protection,  equally 
with  punishment.  That  which,  as  the  ground  and 
source  of  pardon,  gives  this  instrnction  and  protection 
is  called  an  atonement. 

Hence  an  atonement,  as  the  ground  of  pardon,  must 
give  all  the  instruction  and  protection  luhich  are  given  by 
punishment.  Then  is  pardon  just  and  right.  The 
language  of  law  is  punish,  the  spirit  and  aim  of  law 
admit  of  pardon  ;  and  benevolence  demands  it  from 
the  executive. 

Still,  notwithstanding  whatever  may  be  the  atone- 
ment made,  either  by  the  transgressor  or  by  others,  tlierc 
is  one  prereqnisite  to  pardon,  on  the  part  of  the  crim- 
inal, wdiich,  in  all  cases  where  he  is  to  go  out  as  an  ac- 
tive, free  subject  of  the  government  again,  is  absolutely 
necessary  as  given  in  science. 

As  a  prerequisite  to  pardon  there  must  he  a  real 
change  in  the  ivill  and  motive  character  of  the  transgres- 
sor, so  that  there  shall  he,  on  his  part^  a  sincere  approval 


THE  SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  117 

of  the  laio,  and  a  genuine^  fixed  purpose  to  obey  the  gov- 
ei'nment. 

This  necessit}'  is  very  evident  from  all  unfolded  in 
previous  chapters.  For,  witliont  siieh  a  change  in  the 
character  and  action  of  the  criminal  as  involves  a  gen- 
uine abhorrence  of  his  crimes,  and  a  fixed  will  to  obey 
the  law,  there  could  be  no  protection  for  the  obedient 
subjects  against  a  repetition  of  transgression,  and  this, 
too,  in  aggravated  forms,  with  all  the  consequent  evils. 
The  government  must  give  protection  ;  but  in  case  of 
pardon,  without  a  genuine  purpose,  founded  rationally 
in  the  very  motive  character  of  the  criminal,  there 
would  not  be  protection.  Government  would  be 
granting  the  criminal  the  privilege  of  repeating  his 
transgression  with  impunity.  There  must  be  a 
chano-e  of  character  in  the  criminal  from  the  choice 
iiilliienciiig  him  to  transgress,  to  a  choice  to  obey,  be- 
fore pardon  can  justly  be  granted. 

The  only  apparent  exception  to  this  principle  is, 
that  in  an  im])erfect,  weak  government  there  may 
rest  ni)oii  the  executive  a  necessity  to  remedy  errors 
in  law,  or  admim'stratiou,  or  in  some  other  defect,  by 
granting  a  pardon  without  the  above  principles  being 
realized  in  the  case.  J>iit  this,  like  other  necessities  in 
practice,  belongs  rather  to  art  than  ro  science,  to  dis- 
cuss and  determine.  In  science  the  principle  is  posi- 
tive ;  there  must  be  a  change  in  character  from  dis- 
obedience to  genuine  obedience  before  pardon  can  be 
granted. 

This  change  of  character  is  not  the  reason  for  par- 
don.    It  is  not  the  ground  or  rational  cause  on  account 


118  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

of  whicli  pardon  is  granted.  It  does  not  require  a 
pardon.  It,  of  itself  alone,  never  jnstilies  a  pardon  ; 
and  the  criniinal  cannot  properly,  on  account  of  it, 
demand  a  pardon. 

But  pardon  can  be  justly  granted  because  there  can 
be  given  with  it  all  the  same  instruction  and  the  same 
protection  Avhich  can  be  given  with  punishment. 
Then  is  it  possible  and  right.  Even  in  this  case  the 
criminal  cannot  demand  it  as  his  right.  By  trans- 
gression he  has  forfeited  his  rights  to  the  benefits  of 
law,  and  is  at  the  disposal  of  the  executive,  who,  in 
his  judgment,  has  the  legal  right  to  use  either  pardon 
or  punishment.  Yet  in  the  principles  of  benevolence 
he  is  in  duty  bound  to  grant  the  pardon.  But  the 
criminal  cannot  justly  demand  it.  He  may  ask  for  it, 
but  not  demand,  then  trust  to  the  clemenc}-  of  the 
executive. 

COMMUTATION    OF    SENTENCE. 

The  same  principles  which  hold  good  with  respect 
to  pardon,  also  hold  with  respect  to  commutation  of 
sentence  or  punishment,  except  that  a  change  of  char- 
acter in  the  criminal  is  not  an  essential  prerequisite. 
Whenever  the  chief  executive  of  law  ])erceive8  that  in 
all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  a  certain  legally  spe- 
cified punishment  is  defective  in  its  instructive  or 
protecti\^  efficiency,  while  another  inilder  y)unish- 
ment  is  superior  in  this  respect,  then  he  may  substi- 
tute this  second  variet}^  of  punishment,  which,  like 
pardon,  utterly  excludes  the  first  specified  punishment. 

The  process  of  reasoning  justifying,  this  conclusion, 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  119 

rests,  like  that  of  pardon,  entirely  on  the  great  prin- 
ciple, that  all  of  government  and  law  and  administra- 
tion has  its  origin  and  end  in  usefulness,  as  a  means 
to  the  securinii  of  ffood.  Hence,  when  there  is  a  cer- 
tainty  that  some  means  of  punishment,  other  tlian  tliat 
specified  by  law,  will,  the  more  effectually,  secure  the 
objects  desired,  the  executive  may  rightfully  make 
use  of  this  other  means,  and  dispense  with  the  first. 
The  danger  is  that  the  executive  may  err  in  judgment. 
But  science  nmst  give  the  principle,  while  in  practice 
the  danger  must  be  guarded  against. 

Thus,  while  strict  law  makes  no  reference  to  either 
pardon  or  commutation,  yet  both,  in  their  appropriate 
circumstances,  are  right,  just,  and  benevolent  in  the 
place  of  specified  punishment,  whenever  the  executive 
clearly  perceives  that  the  full  objects  of  the  punish- 
ment can  with  them  be  as  well  or  better  secured  than 
with  the  specified  punishment. 

Commutation,  like  pardon,  at  times,  is  designed  to 
remedy  defects  in  the  administration  of  human  govern- 
ment. The  law,  in  the  circumstances,  may  be  too 
severe;  the  jury  may  be  biased  by  prejudices;  the 
judge  may  err  in  his  renderings ;  new  and  clearly 
modifying  evidence  may  appear  after  the  sentence,  so 
that  injustice  would  be  done  by  the  exact  infliction  of 
the  punishment.  Commutation,  or  sometimes  pardon, 
is  a  remedy  in  the  case. 


120  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 


CHAPTEE    XV. 


TAXATION. 


Taxation  is  a  requisition  from  government  upon  its 
subjects  for  a  certain  amount  or  jprojportion  of  their 
wealth  to  meet  the  expenses  of  government. 

The  clause,  to  meet  the  expenses  of  government,  in 
the  definition  distingnishes  true  taxation  from  tlie  im- 
posing of  lilies,  tlie  assessing  of  damages,  the  seques- 
tration of  property,  taiitfs,  duties,  imposts,  h'censes, 
etc.,  all  of  M'hieh  involve  more  than  to  "  meet  the  ex- 
penses of  government."  Fines  involve  the  principle 
of  punishment.  Damages  involve  the  same  in  a 
lower  degree,  and  so  also  of  sequestration.  Tariffs 
are  requisitions  of  specified  portions  of  foreign  produc- 
tions imported  into  a  country,  one  design  of  which  is 
generally  to  encourage  home  productions.  So  of 
duties,  imposts,  licenses,  etc.,  each  of  which  involves, 
in  its  signification,  something  more  than  for  the  pur- 
poses of  government.  Taxation  is  properly  applicable 
to  the  property  of  foreigners  within  the  limits  of  gov- 
ernment, when  no  distinction  is  made  between  such 
property  and  that  of  sul)jects;  also  at  times,  for  the 
want  of  a  better  and  distinctive  term,  "  taxation  of 
foreigners "    is    used,    hut  the   idea  in  reality  is  that 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  121 

of  a  license  to  tlie  foreigner  to  reside  and  posses? 
property  in  the  territory  of  the  government,  while 
in  different  ways  this  license,  though  like  taxes 
lai-gely  supporting  government,  yet  includes  addi- 
tional things,  such  as  discouraging  the  residence  of 
foreignei's  in  large  numbers  within  the  territor}^  or  as 
an  inlluence  to  induce  them  to  become  naturalized,  or 
some  other  object,  besides  solely  that  of  meeting  the 
expcTises  of  government.  Taxation  proper  is  alone 
for  the  purposes  of  government,  and  is  imposed  upon 
the  subjects. 

RIGHT   OF   TA5:ATI0N. 

The  rigid  of  taxation  originates  in  the  nature  of 
things  as  a  necessity  to  government  in  its  usefulness 
for  good  to  its  suhjecis. 

Since  rational  government  originates  as  a  necessity 
to  subjects  in  securing  good,  tlie  means  needed  by  gov- 
ernment for  its  success  are  included  in  this  necessity. 
Ilevenue  is  one  of  these  means  necessary  to  human 
government  for  its  success.  Without  this,  in  some 
form,  rational  government,  at  least  on  earth,  must 
soon  cease  to  exist,  and  all  the  evils  of  its  loss  be  suf- 
fered. Hence,  it  is  necessary,  and  taxation  is  the  reg- 
ular method  of  obtaining  it. 

Now,  it  is  a  principle  of  right,  that  when  one 
rational  being  is  in  need  of  another's  help,  and  at  the 
same  time,  possesses  the  means  of  helping  the  other  in 
return,  he  ought  to  render  such  help,  and  the  two  be 
mutually  helpful  to  each  other.  This  principle  is  a 
basis  of  all  business   transactions  amouir  intellifirent 


122  AKCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

beings.  If  one  demands  an  advantage  from  another 
without  a  willingness  to  return  a  full  equivalent 
advantage,  lie  is  acting  on  the  principle  of  the  robber, 
and  is  in  conflict  with  justice.  The  government  in 
the  case  has  a  right  to  deal  with  him  as  a  wrong-doer, 
and  reqnire  him  to  do  right,  by  the  proper  return  of 
advantage  to  him  from  whom  he  receives  advantage. 

And  when  such  are  the  circumstances  that  the 
mutual  advantages,  or  helps,  are  of  very  great  impor- 
tance to  both  parties,  and  one  actually  does  receive 
from  the  other  the  advantage  he  needs,  and  yet  refuses 
to  return  the  advantage  he  can  render  to  the  other,  it 
is  right  that  the  government  in  the  case  compel  him 
to  do  it.  For,  by  so  doing,  the  government  is  insuring 
a  harmony  in  actions  necessary  to  secure  good,  while 
without  it  government  would  be  permitting  a  clashing 
of  actions  tending  to  disaster,  and  would  be  itself 
doing  wrong. 

All  this  is  still  more  evident  when  the  mutual  ad- 
vantages are  in  reality  necessary  to  both  and  one  does 
receive  the  advantage  for  himself.  Then  truly  the 
government  in  the  case  ought,  in  all  right  and  duty, 
to  compel  a  return  of  advantage  necessary  to  the  (^ther. 

Now  this  is  the  condition  of  things  between  govern- 
ment and  its  subjects.  There  are  mutual  advantages, 
necessary  to  each,  which  tliey  can  render  one  to  the 
other.  The  subject  needs  tlie  help  of  government  as 
a  necessity  to  his  securing  the  ends  of  his  existence, 
or  his  own  real  good  together  with  the  good  of  others. 
Without  it  he  cannot,  for  a  length  of  time,  secure,  or 
preserve,  either  property,  liberty,  or  even  life.   In  the 


THE   SCIENCE  OF   GOVERNMENT.  123 

necessities  of  his  circumstances  and  nature,  he  needs 
the  great  advantages  of  government.  Moreover  lie 
does  receive  these  advantages  from  government,  and 
only  thus  does  he  avoid  evils  incalculably  great,  and 
secure  real  good.  Hence  he  ought  to  return  to  gov- 
ernment such  advantage  in  his  power  as  government 
needs. 

But  the  government  needs  the  means  of  efficiency 
in  its  efforts  for  the  good  of  its  subjects.  Revenue  in- 
sures all  such  means  to  the  government.  AV^ithout  it, 
in  this  world,  rational  government  cannot  long  exist. 
Therefore  if  the  subject  has  wealth,  the  very  advan- 
tage as  a  means  necessary  to  government,  the  subject 
ought  to  return  to  government  such  a  proportion  of 
it  as,  on  the  average  with  other  subjects,  will  meet  the 
real  needs  of  government. 

Here  are  the  two  mutual  advantages,  necessary  to 
each  of  the  two  parties,  the  subject  and  the  govern- 
ment. Tlic  subject  does  of  necessity  receive  to  him- 
self the  advantages  of  government.  Whether  he  ad- 
mits it  or  not,  he  does  receive  such  necessary  advan- 
taires.  He  oujjht  to  return  the  advantage  needed  to 
that  government  in  a  proper  proportion  of  his  wealth. 

If  he  refuses  to  return  such  proportion  as,  on  aver- 
age with  other  subjects,  is  needed,  the  government  in 
the  case  has  the  right,  and  ought,  to  compel  him  to  do 
his  share ;  and  also  to  add  so  much  to  the  amount  as  a 
]innishment  to  him  as  would  prove  to  be  instructive 
and  protective  in  the  case. 

The  whole  of  the  wealth  rightfully  accpiired  by  the 
subject,  he  has  accpiired  through  the  help  of  govern- 


12-1  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

ment,  necessary  to  him  in  the  natnre  of  tilings  ;  and 
only  by  that  help  does  he  retain  that  wealth.  Surely 
he  ought  to  return  to  government  the  proportion 
necessary  to  it,  as  the  means  of  its  existence  and  effi- 
ciency for  the  good  of  the  subjects.  If  he  will  not 
do  this,  government  has  the  right  to  compel  him  to 
do  it,  and  this  is  taxation,  together  with  the  right  to 
enforce  it. 

THE   AMOUNT  OF   TAXATION. 

Taxation  is  never  to  exceed  the  necessities  of  gov- 
ernment as  a  means  of  its  usefulness  to  its  subjects. 

Since  government  exists  solely  for  the  good  of  its 
subjects,  it  is  evident  the  government  ought  to  de- 
mand of  its  subjects  only  so  much  tax  as  is  necessary 
to  its  greatest  efficiency  in  promoting  the  welfare  of 
the  subjects.  Hence  no  tax  should  be  for  the  aggran- 
dizement of  government  any  further  than  such  aggran- 
dizement will  contribute  to  the  highest  welfare  of  sub- 
jects. So  also  no  tax  should  be  for  the  honor,  display, 
or  gratification  of  officers  of  government  any  further 
than  the  real  welfare  of  the  subjects  will  be  promoted 
by  such  means. 

If  officers  of  government  manipulate  the  taxes  or 
other  affairs  of  government  for  their  own  ])ersonal  in- 
terest, overlooking  the  simple  object  of  their  official 
existence,  viz.,  the  real  welfare  of  the  subjects  of  gov- 
ernment, they  are  both  morally  and  practically  recre- 
ant to  truth  ;  they  are  at  variance  with  the  underlj'ing 
principle  of  government;  they  are  in  motive  wrong, 
and  deserve  severe  condemnation.     Their  punishment 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  125 

ought  to  be  much  more  severe  than  tliat  of  tlie  com- 
mon thief,  even,  as  tliey  are  greater  criminals. 

Archology  foHjids  the  sentiment,  "  to  the  victors 
belong  the  spoils."  There  are  no  spoils,  but  all  are 
means  of  usefulness  to  subjects  of  the  government  in 
promoting  good.  Every  rational  being  of  govern- 
ment, whether  officer  or  common  citizen,  should  be 
supremely  influenced  by  the  motive  of  usefulness  in 
the  promotion  of  the  welfare  of  all. 

"The  divine  right  of  kings,"  or,  in  science,  "the 
divine  right  of  officers,"  in  their  own  personal  inclina- 
tions, is  a  falsehood.  The  whole  i-ight  of  officers  lies 
in  their  being  of  use;  being  of  benefit  to  all  affected 
by  their  administration  of  the  affairs  of  their  offices. 

In  commercial  transactions  it  is  a  common  custom 
for  each  party  to  regard  mainly,  or  only,  his  own  ad- 
vantages, leaving  the  other  to  see  to  his  own  interest. 
But  in  government  this  practice  is  at  variance  with 
the  first  principle  of  right.  For  the  very  idea  of  true 
government  is  to  supply  to  subjects  a  help  for  their 
good,  where,  without  it,  they  are  without  help.  It  is 
so  to  control  all  things  pertaining  to  subjects  as  to 
insure  to  them  such  a  harmony  of  actions  as  shall 
result  in  their  highest  good,  where,  without  it,  they 
would  be  whelmed  in  irremediable  disaster  through 
the  clashings  of  apparent  interests  and  operations. 
This  is,  the  whole  orijiin  and  rational  aim  of  govern- 
mcnt.  Ilence,  when  in  the  administration  of  govern- 
ment the  officers  turn  from  this  very  origin  and  pur- 
pose of  government  to  manipulate  affairs  mainly  or 
only  for  their  own  gratifications,  they,  in  motive  and 


126  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

practice,  are  tiiri)iiig  from  the  very  first  and  highest 
principles  of  right  in  government,  to  put  into  exercise 
the  very  principle  of  all  evil,  tending  to  ntter  rnin, 
viz.,  the  gratiiication  of  selfish  impulse  in  conflict  with 
the  highest  good  of  all.  Tlius  the  officers  of  govern- 
ment, in  taxing  the  subjects,  are  to  require  only  such 
a  sum  as  will,  the  most  effectually,  contribute  to  the 
efficiency  of  government  in  promoting  the  good  of 
subjects. 

This  principle  of  promoting  alone  the  good  of  sub- 
jects holds  as  to  all  expenses  of  government,  i.  e.,  as 
to  its  public  buildings,  its  parks  and  fountains,  its 
roads  and  general  improvements,  its  military  and 
civic'displays  before  the  people,  and  in  its  treatment 
of  foreign  officials.  In  all  things  its  expenses  are  to 
be  limited  to  the  promotion  of  the  true  welfare  of  its 
subjects. 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  127 


CHAPTEIl  XYI. 

RianT   OF   GOVERNMENT   TO    ENFORCE   CONTRACTS. 

The  light  of  government  to  regulate  and  enforce  con- 
tracts is  involved  in  its  very  aim  of  existence,  and  ap- 
pears evident  from  the  lyrinciples  already  Pinfolded. 

Tlie  making,  fulfilling,  and  repudiating  of  contracts 
are  all  varieties  of  actions,  the  very  things  in  which  it 
is  the  design  of  government  to  prevent  clashing  inter- 
ferences, and  iHsure  a  harmony  essential  to  the  secur- 
ing of  good.  On  the  basis  of  contracts,  the  honest 
l)arties  concerned  set  in  operation  whole  trains  of  en- 
terprises designed  for  good,  all  of  wdiich  are  depend- 
ent for  success  upon  the  fulfillment  of  the  contract. 
If  the  contract  tails  of  being  fulfilled,  the  good  de- 
signed must  be  lost,  while  the  evils,  M'hich  must  be 
suffered  in  the  case,  are  beyond  all  calculation.  These 
evils  affect  not  only  the  direct  contracting  parties,  but 
they  extend  outward  and  forward  with  no  certain 
limits  to  great  numbers  of  others. 

Hence,  in  the  very  purpose  for  which  government 
exists,  that  of  preventing  evil  and  insuring  good  to  its 
subjects,  there  is  involved  the  right  and  duty  to  regu- 
late and  enforce  the  fulfillment  of  contracts  among 
subjects.  Without  such  governmental  enforcement 
there  is  a  constant  liability  that  some  party  will  fail  to 


128  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OK, 

ftarry  out  the  stipulations  of  a  contract,  and  thus  in- 
volve all  interested  in  evils.  Government  is  to  enforce 
the  fuliillinent,  and  thus  prevent  evil  while  insuring 
good. 

The  failure  of  the  fulfillment  of  single  contracts  in- 
volves many  more  evils  than  those  directly  following 
from  such  failure.  For  they  serve  as  examples  of 
what  may  take  place  as  to  all. con  tracts,  destrojnng  con- 
fidence in  the  uniform  fulfillment  of  all.  But  rational 
calculation  as  to  the  future  depends  entirely  upon  an 
intellectual  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  things. 
Therefore,  witiiout  something  to  insure  the  uniform 
fulfillment  of  contracts,  they  could  not  answer  as  a 
basis  of  calculation,  and  all  contracts  would  cease  to 
be  of  value,  or  of  use.  Universal  distrust  would  pre- 
vail, and  all  rational  action,  based  on  a  calculation  for 
the  future  in  human  enterprise,  would  fail.  Upon 
government  depends  the  insuring  of  contracts  to 
avoid  such  evils  and  to  secure  to  its  sul)jects  all  the 
good  possible  in  the  case. 

Hence  appears  evident  the  right  of  our  government 
to  enfoi'ce  uniformly  the  fulfillment  of  contracts,  in 
order  that  they  may  serve  as  a  basis  for  i-ational  calcu- 
lation as  to  the  future,  and  all  possible  good  designed 
be  secured,  while  the  opposite  possible  evils  may  be 
avoided. 

One  illustration  of  the  importance  of  the  fulfillment 
of  contracts  may  be  sufficient.  Mr.  A.  contracts  with 
Mr.  B.  to  pay  him  ten  thousand  dollars  in  seven 
months.  On  the  basis  of  the  expected  fulfillment  of 
this  contract,  Mr.  B.  contracts  to  pay  Mr.  C.  the  same 


THE   SCIENCE   OF    GOVERNMENT.  129 

sum  ill  tlie  saiiio  time,  and  so  on  tlirou^h  all  the 
letters  of  the  alphabet.  This  simi  in  all  amounts  to 
two  huiulred  and  sixty  thousand  didlars.  In  these 
contracts  are  involved  all  varieties  of  business,  such  as 
building  houses,  grading  streets,  cultivating  farms, 
constructing  bridges,  putting  np  machinery,  etc. 
Besides  the  intluence  of  these  direct  enterprises,  the 
stimulus  given  to  other  undertakings  indirectly  con- 
n(>cted  with  the  principal  series  of  contracts,  is  almost 
unlimited,  surpassing  perhaps  tlic  direct,  tenfold  in 
value. 

Kow  if  A.  fulfills  liis  contract  with  B.  and  pays 
him  the  stipulated  sum,  B.  can  pay  C,  and  thus  on- 
ward with  all,  and  the  vast  enterprises,  both  direct 
and  indirect,  be  pressed  to  successful  completion  ac- 
cording to  previous  rational  plans. 

But,  if  A.  fails  in  his  contract,  all  the  others  may 
be  compelled  to  fail ;  two  hundred  and  sixty  thou- 
sand dollars  of  debts  remain  unpaid,  the  character  of 
twenty-six  men  of  business  honesty  is  greatly  im- 
paired ;  the  Avhole  community  is  involved  in  the 
trouble  ;  while  all  enterprise  is  more  or  less  checked  ; 
houses  remain  half  finished,  bridges  half  built,  roads 
half  graded,  lands  half  cultivated,  mills  half  put  up, 
and  thus  onward  almost  without  limit,  all  tending  to 
ruin.  This  all  may  be  viewed  as  the  direct  result  of 
the  non-fulfillment  of  the  first  contract  of  A.  with  B. 
But  in  various  ways  the  evils  stop  not  with  the  im- 
mediate community.  It  extends  outward  to  far  distant 
localities,  because  of  the  world-wide  complications  of 
business,  and  cumulates  bevond  all  estimate  bv  man. 


130  aechology;  or, 

All  tliese  evils  could,  and  would,  have  been  avoided, 
had  A.  fulfilled  his  contract  with  B.  Surely  govern- 
ment has  a  right  and  a  duty,  involved  in  the  very  ob- 
ject of  its  existence,  to  control  the  matter  and  enforce 
the  fulfillment  of  contracts  to  insure  the  desired  good, 
and  avoid  the  possible  evils. 

This  right  of  government  extends  to  every  variety 
and  species  of  contracts  among  subjects,  as  those  with 
respect  to  money,  wealth,  labor,  education,  moral  or 
benevolent  enterprise,  ecclesiastical  or  religious  co-op- 
eration, marriage,  or  any  other  possible  contract 
between  subject  and  subject.  Moreover,  not  only  has 
government  a  right  to  enforce  contracts,  but  also  it 
has  a  right  to  control  them  themselves,  specifying  by 
law  some  as  permitted  and  others  as  forbidden,  accord- 
ing as  the  government  perceives  that,  as  species  of 
actions,  their  results  will  be  good  or  bad. 

The  general  principles  of  government,  as  previously 
unfolded,  settle  the  whole  subject,  because  the  making, 
fulfilling,  and  repudiating,  or  violating  of  contracts, 
are  only  varieties  of  actions,  as  to  w'hich  the  very 
object  of  government  is  to  insure  the  harmonious 
adaptation  of  all  put  forth  to  result  in  the  securing 
of  good,  by  the  subjects. 

EIGHT    OF    GOVERNMENT   TO    CARRY    ON   WAR. 

War  is  a  condition  of  regular  conflict  of  ^physical 
forces  heticeen  tv)0  or  more  (jovernments. 

All  the  principles,  unfolded  in  archology,  expressive 
of  the  right  and  duty  of  government  to  control  the 
actions  of  its  subjects,  by  restraining  whatever  tends 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  131 

to  evil,  and  insiiriii<;-  all  Avliicli  tends  to  good  within  the 
government,  prove  also  the  right  and  duty  of  govern- 
ment to  restrain  and  prevent  whatever  from  without 
endangers  the  good  of  its  gubjocts.  The  very  design 
for  which  it  exists,  is  to  prevent  evil  and  insure  good, 
and  this  it  must  do  by  all  the  means  it  possesses. 
When,  therefore,  great  evils  from  without  threaten  the 
real  welfare  of  subjects,  the  duty  of  government  is 
as  plain  as  when  the  dangers  arise  Mithin.  It  must 
use  its  compulsory  power,  its  physical  force,  to  prevent 
the  evil  and  insure  good  to  the  utmost  of  its  power. 
In  its  physical  force  lies  all  its  com})ulsory  ability  to 
enforce  the  claims  of  law  upon  its  subjects.  So  in 
physical  force  lies  all  its  coinpulsory  ability  to  repress 
evil  from  without. 

This  physical  force,  as  within  among  subjects,  so 
without  toward  enemies,  is  always  to  be  used  as  the 
second  means  of  government  after  the  first,  that  of 
instruction  has  been  tried.  Therefore,  if  the  danger 
is  not  so  great  as  to  demand  immediate  force,  the  gov- 
ernment should  first  use,  toward  the  endangering  par- 
ties, argument,  entreaty,  remonstrance,  declaration, 
command.  Then  if  instruction  fails,  the  second  means, 
compulsion,  must  be  used  and  this  is  alone  physical 
force. 

Hence,  when  one  government  finds  that  anothci- 
government  is  threatening,  with  ])hysical  or  other 
force,  to  destroy  the  good  of  its  subjects  and  whelm 
them  in  evils,  it  is  its  right  and  duty,  guided  by  reason, 
to  use  its  utmost  physical  force  if  necessary  tc»  j)revent 
the  efforts  of  the  aggressive  government,  and  protect 


132  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

its  subject,  the  same  with  the  right  and  duty  it  has  to 
exist  at  alL 

Still,  if  there  is  a  supei'ior  government  over  those 
liable  to  a  conflict  whose  duty  it  is  to  control  the  con- 
flicting parties  as  its  subjects,  to  insure  a  harmony 
among  them  for  the  good  of  all,  then  an  appeal  to 
this  superior  government  must  be  made  for  its  control 
in  the  case.  Cities  are  not  to  war  with  cities,  nor 
States  with  States,  while  there  is  a  higher  government 
over  them  to  insure  them  from  the  clashings  of  inter- 
ests and  activities. 

There  is  but  one  real  exception  to  this  statement, 
and  that  is  in  a  case  of  sudden  emergency,  M^hen  ap- 
peal cannot  be  made  to  the  higher  government.  In 
this  case  good  judgment  is  to  decide  whether  immedi- 
ate war  is  to  be  inaugurated  for  self-defense,  or 
whether  the  evil  shall  be  temporarily  endured  in 
expectation  of  a  i-edress  of  grievances  in  the  future  by 
the  hio;her  government. 

But  if  the]"e  be  no  superior  government  that  can  or 
will  control  the  conflicting  parties  and  insure  good, 
then  in  the  very  ends  for  which  government  exists  is 
involved  its  right  and  duty,  after  all  other  means  fail, 
to  use  physical  force  and  i-epress  the  aggressions  of 
the  endangering  government  to  protect  its  subjects 
from  evils.     This  is  war ;    defensive  war. 

Defensive  War  is  the  use  of  physical  force  hy  govern- 
ment in  regular  conflict  loith  another,  and  aggressive, 
government,  for  the  good  of  Us  own  subjects,  to  'protect 
tliem  from  the  evils  of  which  tiny  are  in  danger  by  the 
aggression. 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  133 

This  is  rii:,lit,  when  all  other  means  tail, and  the  pro- 
tection of  the  welfare  of  the  subjects  can  be  secured 
in  no  other  manner. 

Thus: 

The  right  of  candying  on  war,  in  the  manner  of 
defense,  is  involved  as  a  necessity  to  government  in 
securing  the  ends  for  which  it  exists,  hy  insuring  to 
its  suhjects  the  opportunity  of  securing  their  highest 
good  and  real  welfare. 

This  principle  of  right,  however,  does  not  in  all 
circumstances  justify  a  resort  to  even  defensive  war. 
For  M'hen  all  other  means  in  the  manner  of  instruc- 
tion have  failed,  and  only  physical  force  remains  to 
be  used  for  protection,  if  yet  it  is  evident  that  this  is 
not  sufficient  with  which  to  resist  the  superior  force 
of  the  aggressive  government,  and  no  other  good  can 
be  secured  by  an  (effort  at  defense,  then  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  weaker  government  to  submit  to  the  more 
powerful.  Since  the  only  ol)ject  of  government  is  to 
secure  good  to  its  subjects,  it  must  not  carry  on  a  war 
which  will  evidently  result  in  no  good  to  its  subjects, 
but  it  must  submit  to  another  government  when  that 
submission  will  result  in  such  good,  the  greatest  possi- 
ble in  the  case. 

OFFENSIVE     WAR. 

Offensive  War  is  a  condition  of  regxdar  conflict  of 
jdiysical  force  of  one  government  loith  another,  not  in 
the  7nanner  of  defense  against  aggression  hy  such  other 
government. 

This  form  of  war  is  only  in  very  rare  c<i.\c>t  right. 


134  archology;  or, 

Each  government  exists  for  the  good  of  its  own 
Bulijects,  and  not,  except  indirectly,  for  the  subjects 
of  other  governments.  Now,  in  offensive  war,  the 
government  is  generally  going  ont  of  the  field  in 
which  is  fonnd  the  end  of  its  existence,  and  is  at- 
tempting to  dictate  to  an  outside  government  and  to 
its  subjects.  Hence,  generally,  offensive  war  is 
wrong. 

Still,  in  some  rare  and  extreme  cases,  one  govern- 
ment may  become  so  inefficient  in  action,  so  perverted 
in  operation,  so  cruel  in  character,  or  so  distracted  in 
its  condition,  and  its  subjects  be  so  involved  in  mis- 
ery, as  to  be  without  hope  or  good  if  left  to  them- 
selves. 

Then,  in  such  rare  cases,  acting  with  deliberation 
and  good  judgment,  another  government  may  inter- 
fere by  an  offensive  war,  to  compel  and  insure  good 
where  all  was  anarchy  before.  This  is  in  reality 
obedience  to  a  higher  government  of  general  benevo- 
lence. Yet  such  cases  are  rare,  and  war  can  here  be 
justified  only  when  approved  by  good  judgment. 

So  also,  in  still  more  rare  cases,  it  is  possible  that,  in 
the  necessities  of  subjects,  perhaps  involved  in  fam- 
ine, or  in  some  other  cause  of  severe  suffering,  as 
possibly  by  an  excessively  over-crowded  population,  the 
government  maybe  justified  in  forcing  a  passage  even 
by  war  into  the  sparsely  settled  but  productive  terri- 
tory of  another  government.  Yet  circumstances  of 
this  character  will  be  very  rare,  and  the  case  must 
be  one  of  great  necessity  to  justify  such  a  question- 
able measure  as  offensive  war  only  for  personal  good. 


THE   SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  135 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

KIGIIT  OF  GOVERNMENT  TO  ESTABLISH  PUBLIC  SCHOOLS   OF 
INSTKUCTION. 

As  previously  shown,  both  tlic  origin  and  purpose 
of  government,  are  found  in  its  usefulness  to  its  sub- 
jects, as  a  means  to  their  securing  the  ends  of  their 
existence.  It  was  also  shown  that,  in  doing  this,  it  is 
confined  to  two  means  of  efficiency,  that  of  instruc- 
tion and  compulsion,  and  that  the  instruction  is  es- 
pecially given  in  the  form  of  law,  designed  to  be  the 
specification  of  actions  adapted  to  result  in  the  secur- 
ing of  good,  and  of  those  to  be  avoided  tending  to 
result  in  evih 

But,  in  the  very  nature  of  law,  since  it  is  only  the 
expression  of  nniform  actions,  or  modes  of  actions,  it 
can  specify  comparatively  few  of  all  which  the  sub- 
ject must  put  forth.  Vastly  the  larger  j^ortion  are  so 
variable  in  features  that  they  cannot  be  expressed  in 
the  form  of  law,  but  must  be  left  to  the  reason  and 
good  judgment  of  the  subject  alone  Such  are  the 
ever-changing  activities  of  general  life,  in  common 
conversation ;  in  the  business  of  trade  ;  in  labor  upon 
the  farm  ;  in  tiie  operations  of  mechanical  enterprises, 
etc.,  in  different  methods  beyond  enumeration.  Gov- 
ernment  can  specily  only  the  uniform   ]n-inciples    to 


136  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

which  these  shall  conform;  but,  in  no  manner,  can  it 
specify  the  acts  themselves  in  their  varying  particu- 
lars, occasioned  by  the  ever-changing  circumstances, 
in  wliich  each  subject  is  constantly  placed. 

Still,  these  actions,  each  one  of  them,  sets  in  course 
of  operation,  trains  of  consequences,  flowing  onward 
and  outward  without  limit,  to  produce  good  or  cause 
evil  to  others.  As  to  these  actions  in  their  tendencies 
the  subjects  of  government  need  information  that 
they  may  be  able  to  put  forth  only  those  adapted  to  re- 
sult in  good  and  avoid  others.  They  cannot  obtain 
this  from  laws  of  a  rational  government  except  in  part, 
because  law  can  specify  only  those  which  are  uniform 
in  mode.  But  all  of  nature  consists  of  principles  and 
tendencies  operating  as  uniform  forces,  endlessly  com- 
pounding, in  different  relations  and  proportions,  in 
which  all  action  is  in  the  line  of  the  diagonal  of  the 
parallelogram  of  the  compounding  forces.  Could  the 
subjects  of  government,  in  some  manner,  be  enabled 
to  understand  these  principles  and  tendencies  of 
forces  of  nature  in  their  varying  combinations,  in  the 
different  circumstances,  they  could  generally  judge  of 
results  with  great  accuracy,  so  as  to  select  the  good 
and  avoid  the  evil. 

If  there  exists  any  means  by  which  the  subject  can 
obtain  this  information,  it  is  of  the  greatest  impor- 
tance in  securing  the  ends  of  his  existence  that  he 
have  the  opportunity  of  availiiighimself  of  this  means, 
and  so  secure  the  needed  information.  Such  a  means 
would  answer,  to  the  subjects  of  government,  in  the 
ever-varying  actions  of  life,  the  same  instructive  pur- 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  137 

pose  witli  law,  in  the  uiiit'onn  modes  of  actions.  When 
thrown  upon  their  own  reasons,  in  deciding  upon  ac- 
tions, they  would  be  enabled,  the  most  correctly  possi- 
ble, to  judge  of  results,  choosing  the  right,  and  avoid- 
ing the  wrong. 

Such  a  means  does  exist  by  which  the  necessary 
knowledge  may  be  approximately  given.  It  is  through 
instruction  given  in  schools.  In  these  can  be  given 
information  as  to  the  principles,  tendencies,  laws, facts, 
and  results,  of  things  in  luiture,  in  themselves,  and  in 
their  endlessly  varying  combinations.  These  can  give 
the  instruction  which  statute  law  cannot  give,  an  in- 
formation of  immense  importance  to  the  subjects  of 
government  in  securing  the  true  good  and  welfare  of 
all. 

Hence,  in  respect  to  government,  there  appears  at 
once  a  right  and  also  duty  to  establish,  furnish,  and 
control  such  schools  for  the  good  of  all,  a  right  and 
duty  originating  in  the  same  source  with  that  of  the 
enactment  of  laws.  They  are  necessary  to  the  highest 
good  of  all.     The  principle  in  the  case  is  as  follows  : 

The  right  and  duty  of  government  to  establish  and. 
nnaintain  a  system  of  intljlic  schools  for  the  benefit  of 
all  is  involved  in  the  first  element  of  its  existence,  that 
of  its  being  instructive  to  its  subjects. 

In  other  lano;ua<T:e : 

For  the  same  reason  that  laws  are  needed  to  give 
instruction  as  to  uniform  rnodes  of  actio?is,  ^^^(blic 
schools  are  needed  to  give  instruction  as  to  all  ever- 
varying  actions  through  the  endlessly  diversified  cir- 
cumstaiices  of  life. 


138  AECHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

The  word  public  is  used  in  the  statement  because 
in  no  private  schools  can  the  true  design  of  govern- 
ment be  secured.  Private  instruction,  in  the  very 
nature  of  rational  beings,  will,  and  must  be,  modified 
in  its  methods  of  communication  to  secure  the  results 
designed  by  its  private  instructors.  In  private  enter- 
prise, as  previously  shown,  are  involved,  by  necessity, 
among  the  individual  actors,  clashings  in  the  objects 
of  good  desired,  in  the  means  selected  by  which  to 
secure  them,  and  in  the  actions  put  forth  for  this 
purpose. 

Government  exists  as  a  necessity  to  secure  a  har- 
mony in  these  respects  in  order  that  good  may  be 
secured  b}^  subjects.  This  harmony  is  sought  to  be 
secured,  as  to  uniform  modes  of  actions,  by  means  of 
law ;  but  as  to  varying  actions  by  schools.  Both 
design  the  same  thing  in  their  different  departments, 
viz.,  to  give  the  instruction  needed  in  order  to  secure 
that  harmony  wdiich  is  necessary  to  the  securing  of 
good  among  the  subjects  of  government. 

Government  could,  in  principle,  as  safely  give  up 
the  making  of  laws  to  private  parties,  relying  upon 
them  for  public  good,  as  to  give  up  all  schools  to 
private  control,  either  as  individuals  or  class  organiza- 
tions of  any  sort,  relying  upon  their  action  for  public 
good.  Only  through  public  schools,  public  as  under 
control  (>f  the  government  ior  public  good,  can  the 
ti'ue  welfare  of  the  public  be  secured. 

Hence,  Government  must  establish,  furnish,  and 
control,  ly  proper  superintendence,  the  system  of 
schools  designed  for  the  good  of  all  its  subjects. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT,  139 

Govcrnincnt  would  be  recreant  to  tlie  principles  of 
its  existence,  false  to  both  its  origin  and  purpose,  and 
sure  to  be  whelmed  in  more  or  less  of  evil,  if  it  should 
yield  up  its  schools,  designed  f  )r  public  good,  to  any 
class  of  private  managers  or  instructors. 

Private  schools,  like  other  means  for  securing  pri- 
vate ends,  or  individual  good,  or  class  welfare,  are  to 
be  regulated  by  their  private  managers  in  accordance 
with  their  own  designs.  With  such  government  has 
nothing  to  do,  except  to  make  sure  that  they  shall  not 
conflict  with  the  interests  of  others,  the  same  as  in 
the  case  of  all  private  activities,  in  order  to  secure  the 
harmony  necessary  to  universal  welfare. 

The  general  principle  in  the  case  is  that  private  good 
must  he  secured  hy  private  action,  not  in  conflict  with 
public  good.     But 

PuU'ic  good  must  he  secured  hy  puhlic  action,  under 
direction  of  government  so  superinte7iding  as  to  secure 
the  harmony  necessary  to  such  good. 

Schools,  in  the  department  of  variable  actions,  are 
the  same  as  laws  in  the  department  of  uniform  actions, 
of  immense  importance  in  imparting  the  instruction 
needed  in  securing  good.  Hence,  private  organized 
enterprises  have  their  private  laws  and  various  regula- 
tions, with  private  means  of  instruction,  often  regu- 
larly established  schools ;  so  the  great  public  organiza- 
tion, the  State,  the  nation,  the  government,  has  its 
laws  and  public  schools,  giving  the  instruction  neces- 
sary for  public  good,  and  it  must  superintend  them 
itself,  or  disaster  will  follow. 

Also   with  schools  are  involved  all   the  means  of 


140  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

the  greatest  efficiency  of  such  scliools,  and  even  other 
means  of  general  instruction,  such  as  the  publisliing 
of  books,  tlic  issuing  of  pamphlets  and  papers,  the 
furnishing  of  illustrative  apparatus,  the  instituting  of 
experiments,  the  appointment  of  teachers  and  other 
officers,  and  the  supplying  of  all  other  requisites  to  the 
best  instruction.  This  all  pertains  appropriately  to 
government  in  order  that  it  may  furnish  to  its  sub- 
jects the  best  opportunities  to  form  correct  judg- 
ments, in  acting  to  secure  the  greatest  good  possible 
to  all. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this,  that  government  is  to 
supersede  by  its  schools  all  private  schools,  or  that 
it  is  to  give  instruction  as  to  everything.  Private 
enterprise  has  the  same  freedom  as  to  schools,  which  it 
has  as  to  any  other  means  of  securing  private  good, 
restricted  by  law  only  so  far  as  to  guard  against  clash- 
ing interferences  with  other  interests.  And  as  to  the 
quality  and  extent  of  public  instruction,  the  govern- 
ment is  to  exercise  its  own  judgment,  how  far  it  shall 
extend  its  general  instruction,  the  same  as  in  respect 
to  law. 

Then,  witli  the  instruction  as  to  varying  and  general 
activities  government  may  come  in  with  the  great  law 
of  all  rational,  moral  beings,  and  require  a  uniform 
motive  of  li'hjhed  good  to  all^  in  all  cases.  In  this 
mannei*,  to  the  greatest  extent  possible,  can  the  gov- 
ernment secure  in  all  circumstances  the  greatest  good 
to  all  who,  as  rational  beings,  will  choose  its  help,  and 
obey  its  commands. 

The  facts  in  the  case,  are  absolute,  are  necessitous. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  141 

If  a  sul)ject  of  gov^ernment,  tliroiigli  either  ignonxncc 
or  careless,  or  willfulness,  or  in  any  other  way,  errs  in 
his  actions  so  as  to  conflict  with  practical,  or  external, 
right,  the  good  possible  in  the  case  must,  so  far,  fail  to 
be  secured,  and  evils,  which  no  one  can  estimate,  may 
result.  To  prevent  these  and  make  sure,  the  good, 
govei'nment  exists,  and  its  only  two  means  of  effi- 
ciency are  instruction  and  compulsion;  while  its 
methods  of  instruction  are  also  two.  These  are  the 
giving  of  positive  laws  for  uniform  modes  of  action, 
and  the  establishing  of  public  schools  for  the  end- 
lessly varying  particular  actions,  in  the  always  chang- 
ing circumstances  of  life. 

Therefore,  systems  of  public  schools,  in  all  their 
varieties,  in  all  their  different  furnishings,  and  in  all 
their  management,  come  directly  under  the  proper  and 
necessary  control  of  government. 


142  ARCHOLOGY  ;   OK, 


CHAPTER  XYIII. 

CONSCIENCE,  AND  THE   RELATIONS   BETWEEN    IT  AND   THE 
GOVERNMENT. 

There  is  a  feature  of  all  known  i-ational  beings,  and 
one  of  very  great  importance  in  their  relations  to  gov- 
ernment, which  has  not  yet  been  treated  of,  in  this 
work,  because  there  has  appeared,  so  far,  no  'con- 
venient place  in  which  it  could  well  be  distinctly  con- 
sidered. Therefore,  a  full  chapter  is  here  appro- 
priated to  the  subject.  This  feature  of  the  rational 
being  is  that  which  is  called  conscience. 

The  conscience,  next  to  the  will,  is  probal)ly  the 
most  important,  most  variable,  most  obstinate,  most 
positive,  and  apparently  most  independent  element  of 
inJluence  in  the  rational  being.  It  needs  to  be  care- 
fully considered,  first  in  regard  to  what  it  is  in  itself, 
and  its  diiferent  peculiarities  ;  then  in  the  relations  of 
government  to  it,  and  through  it  to  subjects. 

As  to  a  definition  : 

Conscience  is  that,  in  the  rational  heing,  which  when 
he  truly  'believes  an  action  to  he  right  for  him,  hoth 
approves  of  it,  and  impels  him  to  do  it,  vjhile  it  re- 
pels him  from  the  opposite  as  wrong. 

Conscience  is  the  mandatory  force  and  impulsive 
power  of  the  reason.     It  is  not  the  reason  itself,  but  is 


THE  SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  143 

the  impulsive  power  accoin])anying  the  reason,  in  exec- 
utive capacity.  It  is  an  imi)ulse  to  do  the  right  as 
decided  by  the  reason,  and  to  avoid  tiie  wrong,  as  de- 
cided in  the  same  manner. 

It  is  not  the  province  of  conscience  to  investigate 
truths,  and  from  tliem  to  infer  otlier  truths,  and  thus 
determine  what  is  right  and  what  is  "wrong.  It  does 
recognize  a  right,  but  it  never  does  or  can  investigate 
facts  and  trutlis,  to  determine  particuhir  and  external 
right.  Tliis  is  wholly  the  province  of  the  reason, 
which  alone  weighs  evidence,  compares  truths,  draws 
conclusions,  and  decides  what  is  right  or  wrong. 

Wfth  this  function  of  reason  the  conscience  has 
nothing  directly  to  do.  Its  whole  office  and  work  is 
that  of  an  impulse  toward  what  the  reason  decides  to 
be  right,  and  from  what  the  reason  decides  to  be 
wrong. 

It  is  of  great  importance  to  distinguish  clearly 
between  the  conscience  and  the  reason.  The  con- 
founding of  them,  one  with  the  other,  leads  to  grave 
errors  in  theory,  but  worse  in  practice. 

Perhaps  one  cause  of  misapprehension  in  respect  to 
them  is  that  of  a  metaphysical  character  in  reference 
to  the  activity  of  the  reasoning  faculties.  For,  it  is 
true  that  much  cif  the  process  of  reasoning  is  can-ied 
on  unconsciously  in  the  mind.  Trains  of  inferences, 
from  ti'uths  to  other  truths,  may  be  followed  out  in  V(,il- 
untai-ily  tlirougli  a  correct  process  of  reasoning,  and 
the  final  t-onrlusions  be  reached,  as  clearly  in  belief  as 
though  each  step  in  the  process  had  been  consciously 
watched,  and  superintended  by  the  will.     In  this  invol- 


144  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

untary  mental  action,  and  one  often  exceedingly  rapid, 
when  the  reason  has  decided  an  action  right,  the  con- 
science impels  to  its  performance. 

Then  the  subject  may  suppose  that  the  conscience 
itself  decided  the  right,  but  it  did  not.  It  is  the  reason 
alone,  whicli  infers  truths  from  trutlis,  deciding  what 
is  right  and  what  is  wrong.  Immediatel3"  after  this 
comes  in  the  conscience,  commanding,  with  the  voice 
of  authority,  obedience  to  the  right,  avoidance  of  the 
wrong. 

If  the  reason  errs  and  clearly  decides  the  wrong  to 
be  right,  the  conscience  speaks  in  perfect  harmony 
with  the  reason,  and  requires  obedience  to  the  believed 
right.  Thus,  the  conscience  of  a  heathen  woman  may, 
as  sternly  and  as  positively,  impel  the  loving  mother 
to  throw  her  helpless  child  into  the  jaws  of  a  croco- 
dile, because  her  reason,  tlirongh  education,  decides  it 
right,  as  the  conscience  of  a  Christian  mother,  to  nurse 
the  sick  and  help  tlie  needy. 

The  principle  is  tliat  Conscience  is  imperatively  in 
harmony  with  the  real  belief.  * 

It  is  possible  that  choice,  selfishness,  will  and  a  pro- 
cess of  voluntary  reasoning  may  conflict  with  truth, 
and  influence  the  judgment  to  a  decision  in  belief 
favorable  to  eiTor.  Yet  the  conscience  will  harmonize 
with  the  real  belief,  though  weakened  and  confused, 
as  the  real  belief  gradually  disappears,  and  becomes 
supplanted  by  the  chosen  belief.  At  length  if  the 
will,  or  choice,  in  the  case,  succeeds  in  the  perfect  sup- 
pression of  the  real  belief,  and  the  chosen  one  becomes 
fully  received  by  the  mind,  then  the  conscience  will 


THE    SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  145 

be  with  the  new  belief,  and  impel  to  what  the  reason 
has  finally  decided  to  be  right. 

Thus  it  appears,  that  whenever,  through  an  error 
in  reasoning,  an  actual  wrong  is  fully  believed  to  be 
right,  the  conscience  will  impel  with  all  its  force 
to  this  believed  right,  though  practically  a  great 
wrong. 

Therefore,  Conscience  is  not  a  direct  and  sure  guide 
in  reference  to  right  action  practically  or  externally 
considered.  It  is  a  \eY\  important  element  of  influ- 
ence, a  great  assistance  in  determining  upon  actions, 
and  a  vahialjle  secondary  guide  ;  yet  one  dangerously 
liable  to  erroj*.  The  one  only  direct  guide  for  the 
rational  being  is  his  reason,  for  which  he  needs  all  pos- 
sible help.  Yet,  whenever  this  errs,  conscience  will 
also  err,  and  impel  according  to  the  error. 

Yet,  at  any  moment  of  time,  since  the  conscience 
is  always  with  the  real  belief,  and  hence  real  reason, 
impelling  to  what  is  really  believed  to  be  right,  its 
voice  should  be  heeded  as  carefully  as  that  of  reason 
itself.  At  a  given  time  the  conscience  should  be 
strictly  obeyed,  for  it  is  only  enjoining  obedience  to 
the  real  belief.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  the  reason 
should  be  freely  searching  for  additional  evidence  to 
correct,  in  the  future,  any  possible  error  of  judgment 
in  the  present. 

Besides  this,  the  conscience  serves  alf»o  as  a  most 
valuable  help  to  the  rational  being  in  guarding  him 
against  self-deception.  For,  while  he  may  suppose  him- 
self acting  in  great  sincerity  according  to  his  reason, 
he  yet  may  onlj-  be  acting  in  harmony  with  the  result 


146  AECHOLOGY  ;  OE, 

of  a  \oluntaril3'  determined  process  of  reason,  effected, 
as  before  shown,  bj  the  influence  of  choice. 

Here,  conscience,  in  opposition  to  this  self-decep- 
tion, may  actively  sound  an  alarm  of  danger,  as  it  im- 
pels confusedly,  now  to  the  old,  real  belief,  mostly 
supplanted  by  the  new,  then  to  the  new,  partly  domi- 
nant over  the  old ;  and  again,  to,  or  against,  both,  in 
the  uncertainty  of  the  truth.  Hence  again,  the  prin- 
ciple, the  converse  of  the  preceding. 

No  rational  being  can  safely  follow  merely  his  con- 
science, as  a  direct  and  sufficient  guide. 

Since  the  conscience  is  only  an  impulse  in  accord- 
ance with  the  real  belief,  the  rational  being  needs  ever 
to  be  watchful,  and  suspicious  of  it,  lest,  in  his  ignor- 
ance or  carelessness,  or  willfullness,  he  may  believe 
wrong,  and  tlius  his  conscience  be  wrong.  Then,  in 
action,  he  will  be  practically  wrong,  and  the  result  be 
evil  to  himself  and  to  others. 

Once  more.  He  who  aiins  merely  at  obeying  his  con- 
science is  always  wrong.  For,  he  is  ignoring  reason 
which  was  given  him  as  his  own  direct  guide,  to  yield 
himself  to  an  impulse.  This  is  to  conflict  with  origi- 
nal principles  of  his  nature,  as  a  rational  being,  and 
to  descend,  so  far,  towards  the  condition  of  a  creature 
of  instinct. 

Conscience  was  never  given  him  for  the  purpose  of 
a  direct  guide,  but  as  a  cautioner  ;  a  monitor;  a  stim- 
ulant in  doing  riglit ;  a  goad  in  the  ])ath  of  duty,  in 
active  harmony  with  reason.  Its  function  is  that  of 
spurring  the  being  to  efi'ort  in  that  course  of  action 
which  the  reason  dictates  as  right.     But  a  goad  is  no 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  147 

guide  to  a  ratiojiiil  being,  and  lie  wlio  takes  it  as  siicli, 
is  mistaking  an  clement  of  his  own  being,  and  the 
functions  of  its  office.  Great  evil  to  him  and  others 
must  be  the  result.  His  reason  he  is  to  accept  as  guide, 
and  ever  improve  all  Hieans  for  its  instruction,  while 
conscience  is  ever  with  him  as  an  authoritative,  friend- 
ly, admonisher,  urging  him  to  the  right,  repressing 
him  from  the  wrong. 

SOME    PECULIABITIES   OF   CONSCIENCE. 

The  impulse  of  conscience  is  weakened  the  more  it 
is  disregarded. 

This  is  the  natural  result  as  to  any  impulse  of  the 
sensitive  being  on  earth.  For  a  short  season  it  may 
increase,  but,  beyond  a  certain  limit,  it  begins  to  di- 
minish, and  may  ultimately  cease  all  its  activity.  It 
is  the  same  with  the  impulse  of  conscience  as  with 
others.  With  neglect  or  repeated  violation — and  neg- 
lect is  violation — the  conscience  varies  in  intensity, 
vacillates  in  its  course,  and  diminishes  in  force,  while 
the  habit  of  willful  self-gratification  increases,  and  the 
whole  rational  being  becomes  more  and  more  pervert- 
ed to  error. 

Acting  in  accordance  with  the  co7iscience  hicreases 
the  force  of  its  acthnff/.  The  habit  of  obeying  the 
conscience,  quickens  the  sense  of  its  least  impulses, 
and  stimulates  its  action  in  harmony  with  the  right  as 
perceived  in  reason,  till  at  length  the  whole  character 
of  the  being,  intellectual,  moral,  and  impulsive,  be- 
comes fixed  in  harmony  with  truth.     The  conscience 


148  AKCHOLOGY  ;   OR, 

becomes  keenly  alive  to  every  feature  and  aspect  of 
duty,  vigorously  impelling  to  tLe  cheerful  practice  of 
right,  in  the  effort  to  promote  the  highest  good  of 
all 

Once  more:  In  the  experience  of  the  wrong-doer 
the  impulse  of  conscience  is  exceedingly  variable.  The 
will,  the  choice,  the  voluntary  reasonings,  and  the 
actions,  all  come  into  conflict  with  the  conscience  to 
check  and  confuse  its  activity;  while  the  circum- 
stances determining  the  degree  of  its  force,  snch  as  the 
recentness  of  a  wrong  act ;  the  vividness  with  M-hicli 
an  act  is  remembered;  the  clearness  with  which  the 
evil  tendencies  of  an  act  are  apprehended  ;  the  proba- 
bilities of  detection ;  the  severity  of  expected  punish- 
ment ;  the  encouragement  or  reproach  of  esteemed 
friends,  the  state  of  physical  health,  and  nerv^ous  sen- 
sibility of  the  evil-doer;  together  with  many  other 
facts,  all  endlessly  vary,  thus  occasioning  great  vari- 
ations in  the  sensitive  impulses  of  conscience. 

Finally :  The  conscience  may  sometimes  he  appa- 
rently dead  for  years,  and  then,  again,  at  length  wake 
ujp  as  with  the  voice  of  avenging  wrath. 

Yiolated,  rejected,  unheeded,  and  covered  up  with 
voluntary  perverted  reasonings  and  willful  beliefs,  the 
conscience  may  become  repressed  and  smothered  as  if 
dead  for  a  long  period  of  time.  But  it  is  one  of  the 
original  principles  of  man's  nature,  and  can  never  be 
destroyed.  At  length,  when  the  subterfuges  of  vol- 
untary reasonings  and  other  masks  are  removed,  and 
reason  clearly  apprehends  the  real  right  and  the  real 
wrong,  and  all  the  fearful  tendencies  of  evil  are  seen, 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  149 

then  tlie  conscience  may  rouse  itself  up  toward  the 
evil-doer  as  a  personal,  mighty,  implacable,  unmerci- 
ful, accusing  tormentor. 

So  terrible  may  be  its  voice  of  condemnation  and 
impulse  toward  deserved  punishment,  that  to  escape 
its  horrors  the  guilty  party  may  perpetrate  upon  him- 
self fearful  sufferings,  in  the  vain  hope  of  expiating 
his  crime,  or  may  voluntarily  deliver  himself  up  to 
the  proper  tribunal  of  justice  in  order  that  he 
may  suffer  the  punishment  deserved  for  his  wrong- 
doing. 

Such  are  the  main  features  of  conscience,  in  itself 
considered,  and  in  its  principal  peculiarities.  It  is  an 
im])ulse  of  the  rational  being,  in  harmony  with  the 
real  reason,  toward  believed  right,  from  believed 
wrong.  It  is  an  immensely  important  aid  to  the  good, 
but  a  force  of  tremendously  awful  possibilities  to  the 
bad. 

It  is  the  authoritative  mandate  of  reason,  but  liable 
to  all  errors  and  mistakes  of  reason  ;  never  to  be 
chosen  as  a  direct  guide.  It  needs,  through  the  reason, 
all  the  instructive  aids,  and  guarding  influences,  which 
reason  needs.  It  should  be  most  carefully  heeded, 
and  its  slightest  impulses  obeyed  at  the  moment  by 
the  rational  being,  as  the  most  inqiortaiit  sensibility 
in  his  whole  nature.  With  it  in  perfection,  insured  as 
right  by  right  reason,  the  rational  being  is  a  being  the 
highest,  noblest,  and  most  blessed  possible  in  his  cir- 
cumstances. \Vitli  it  violated,  rejected,  perverted,  till 
tiie  habit  of  selfish,  willful,  wrong-doing  is  estab- 
lished in  the  character,  the  rational  being  becomes  a 


150  akchology;  or, 

monster,  with  no  known  limit  to  his  willful  selfish- 
ness, jealousy,  envy,  revenge,  malice,  hatred,  and 
mental,  remorseful  misery.  Science  stops  in  the 
lawfulness  of  the  possibilities  which  the  view  prevents, 
and  would  vainly  seek  to  find  or  hide  the  end. 

KELATION    OF    GOVERNMENT   TO   CONSCIENCE. 

From  the  preceding  considerations  of  the  nature, 
office,  and  peculiarities  of  conscience,  the  inferences, 
as  to  the  relations  of  the  government  to  the  conscience 
of  its  subjects,  appear  very  evident. 

First.  Gcmernment  should  appreciate  the  great  im- 
porta7ice  of  conscience,  and  do  all  it  consistently  can 
to  develop  and  strengthen  it  ainong  its  subjects,  endea- 
voring to  establish  their  uniform  obedience  to  its 
deTnands  in  seeking  to  do  right. 

The  very  origin  and  purpose  of  government  are  in 
its  usefulness  to  its  subjects,  as  a  means  to  their  secur- 
ing the  ends  of  their  existence,  the  highest  good  of 
all.  For  this  purpose,  they  need  not  only  to  know, 
but,  also,  to  choose,  and  will,  that  which  is  adapted  to 
result  in  such  ends,  their  highest  good.  The  conscience 
is  the  one  great  impulse  of  their  being,  even  the  only 
one,  having  direct  reference  to  this  end.  All  other 
impulses  the  animals  of  instinct  may  probably  expe- 
rience. But  this  is  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the 
highest  intelligence,  and  is  the  characteristic  of  a 
rational  being.  If  this  is  destroyed,  the  rational  sub- 
ject becomes  a  fearful  creature  of  depraved  instincts, 
tiie  more  powerful  for  evil  as  he  is  the  more  instructed 
in  the  use  of  means  for  self-gratification. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  151 

It  is  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  that  gov- 
ernment have  especial  regard  to  this  feature  of  its 
sulijects.  For,  in  its  destruction,  is  the  destruction  of 
all  good  ;  in  its  weakening  is  danger  to  all  good ;  in 
its  perversion  is  loss  of  great  good ;  while  only  in  its 
obedience  is  there  the  securing  of  the  greatest  possible 
good  attainable  in  the  case. 

With  an  active  conscience,  carefully  obeyed  as  the 
authoritative  mandate  of  reason,  the  subjects,  in  per- 
fect harmony  with  good  government,  will  be  actively 
seeking  to  promote,  and  secure,  the  highest  good  of 
all  concerned,  the  very  aim  of  good  government  and 
of  its  expressed  laws. 

Thus  most  evidently  the  government  should  espe- 
cially regard  the  conscience  of  its  subjects,  and  seek  to 
give,  through  the  reason,  the  fullest  instruction  to  it, 
in  order  to  develop,  strengthen,  establish  it,  in  active 
harmony  -with  reason  and  the  right. 

.Second.  TUe  governinent  should,  in  no  case,  re- 
quire the  violation  of  conscience  on  the  part  of  its 
snhjects. 

To  make  such  a  requisition  is  to  dothat  vrhich  tends 
to  destroy  the  highest  and  most  important  impulse  in 
the  nature  of  a  rational  l)eing,  degrading  him  to  a 
creature  devoid  of  the  principle  and  motive  of  right, 
ready  for  any  act  to  which  selfish  inclination  may 
impel  him.  It  is  better  that  government  sacrifice  the 
wealth  of  tens  of  its  subjects,  and  put  scores  to  large 
inconvenience,  than  to  violate,  or  corrupt  the  con- 
science of  a  single  one.  jSTo  greater  evil  than  this 
can  befall  a  rational  being,  and  no  greater  wrong  can 


152  ARCHOLOGY  ;  OR, 

government  perpetrate  upon  a  subject.  The  very  pur- 
poses of  government  forbid  this. 

Third.  In  case  of  a  conflict  between  government  and 
the  conscience  of  a  subject,  an  equivalent  in  place  of  the 
specific  obedience  nnoAj  he  required,  but  the  government 
must  not  punish  the  individual  as  if  guilty  of  a  crime. 

While  the  subject,  in  the  exercise  of  his  reason,  is 
carefully  conforming  to  the  dictates  of  conscience,  he 
is,  so  far  as  his  motives  are  concerned,  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  the  great  design  of  good  government.  In 
disregard  of  mere  present  consideration,  he  is  acting 
under  a  sense  of  the  highest  moral  right  and  obliga- 
tion. As  such  he  is  worthy  of  all  respect  by  govern- 
ment for  consistency  in  acting  from  the  high  sense  of 
right.  Hence  the  government  should  accept  of  an 
equivalent  for  the  specific  obedience,  one  which  will 
serve  the  public  good  equally  well  in  the  circum- 
stances with  the  other. 

To  relieve  him  unconditionally  from  the  required 
service,  would  be  to  relieve  him  from  his  share  of  the 
duty  toward  the  government,  and  throw  the  burden 
on  the  other  subjects.  This  in  itself  would  probably 
be  wrong,  while  the  tendency  would  be  to  engender 
dissatisfaction  with  government  as  exhibiting  partiality 
in  its  dealings  and  its  laws.  Hence  an  equivalent 
service  should  be  required. 

Fourth.  If  still  the  conscience  of  the  subject  forbids 
him  rendering  any  equivalent,  the  govei^nment,  treating 
the  subject  with  respect  for  his  regard  to  right,  may 
take  by  force  the  equivalent,  even  increased,  because 
of  the  increased  expense  in  securing  it. 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  153 

There  is  notliinf^  wliicli  can  destroy  the  necessity  of 
government  among  intelligent  beings.  So  there  is 
nothing  which  can  destroy  the  necessit}'^  of  means  to 
the  government  in  carr^'ing  out  its  administration  for 
the  good  of  its  subjects.  Again,  nothing  can  destroy 
the  necessity,  and  heilce  obligation,  resting  upon  sub- 
jects to  furnish,  each  one,  his  share  of  service  and 
revenue  needed  by  govei-nment  for  its  administration 
in  securing  the  good  of  all.  Therefore,  government 
should  hold  each  one  to  the  requirement  of  rendering 
his  just,  proportionate  share  of  aid  in  securing  the 
good  of  all. 

Hence,  if  necessary,  the  government  may  secure 
this  aid  by  force;  yet  in  the  circumstances  supposed 
it  may  not  act  as  toward  a  criminal  and  intentional 
evil-doer. 

Fifth.  In  case  the  sul)ject  claims,  not  as  a  duty  but 
as  a  right,  in  his  conscience,  that  which  government 
forbids  as  a  vice,  the  government  is  under  no  ohliga- 
tion  to  regard  his  claim.  The  subject  may  not  be 
compelled  to  do  wrong,  yet  he  may  be  required  to 
yield  up  believed  right  in  deference  to  the  superior 
judgment  of  government.  There  is  no  violation  of 
his  conscience  in  the  case,  but  only  obedience  to  ne- 
cessary authority.  Government  is  not  bound  by  the 
judgment  of  the  subject,  l>ut  the  subject  is  bound  bv 
the  judgment  of  government. 

In  the  greater  opportunities  for  knowing  what  is 
for  the  best,  possessed  by  government,  and  in  its  re- 
lations involving  solemn  obligations  toward  all  its 
subjects,  when  once  it  has  expressed  its  judgment  in 


164  aechology;  oe, 

the  form  of  law,  the  subject  must  readily  yield  up  hia 
believed  convenience,  or  advantage,  or  riglit,  through 
due  regard  to  the  authority  of  government.  If  he 
will  not,  but  will  refuse  obedience,  then  he  may  be 
used  as  a  transgressor,  a  willful  criminal,  to  be  pun- 
ished as  the  law  requires. 

There  may  be  veiy  extreme  cases,  there  have  been 
a  few  such  in  the  world,  where  in  the  degradation  of 
certain  classes,  a  subject  of  government  may  verily  be- 
lieve he  ought  to  do  that  which  is  such  flagrant  vice, 
and  absolute  wickedness,  that  even  against  his  de- 
graded conscience,  the  government  by  force  must 
check  the  vice  and  break  up  the  wickedness ;  such 
probabl}^  were  the  Thugs  of  India. 

So  far,  in  considering  the  relations  subsisting  be- 
tween government  and  the  consciences  of  its  subjects, 
only  the  relations  and  duties  of  government  have  been 
considered.  But  the  relations  between  parties  are  al- 
ways so  correlated  tliat  a  duty  on  one  party  involves  a 
corresponding  duty  on  the  other.  Hence,  in  consider- 
ing the  relations  of  subjects  toward  government,  as  to 
conscience,  it  follows  : 

First.  That  they^  ivi  a  sjArit  of  trustfulness  and  of 
cheerful  confidence  toward  government,  are  to  seek  its 
aid  in  obtaining  all  jiosnhle  information  as  to  truth 
for  the  correction,  strengthening  and  establishing  of 
conscience  in  harmony  witli  j-ight.  Tiiey  should  avail 
themselves  of  the  instruction  afforded  by  government 
through  its  laws,  and  their  sanctions,  and  all  other 
means,  acting  conscientiously  in  their  obedience,  not 
by  force  of  compulsion  or  throngh  fear  as   before  a 


THE   SCIENCE   OF  GOVERNMENT.  155 

tyrannical  power.  But  they  should  obey  in  the  lii,''lit 
of  truth,  with  regard,  through  conscience,  to  the  right 
and  the  duty  and  the  privilege  of  being  under  the 
government.  They  are  to  regard  government  as  a 
necessary  and  most  kindly  friend,  an  efficient  power, 
aiding  them  to  secure  the  highest  possible  good, 
and  avoid  all  possible  evil.  In  this  light,  obedience 
to  government  is  to  be  cheerfully  rendered,  both 
as  a  conscientious  duty,  and  as  a  very  great  privi- 
lege. 

For  a  subject  to  go  forward  in  careless  disregard  of 
the  instructive  aid  of  government,  doing  what  he  calls 
right  merely  in  the  light  of  his  own  reason  and  con- 
science, is  for  him  to  ignore  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant sources  of  information,  that  of  government,  and 
to  pursue  a  course  M-Jiich,  if  followed  by  all,  would 
inevitably  involve  clashings  in  the  desire  of  objects  of 
good,  in  the  means  selected  with  which  to  secure 
them,  and  in  the  actions  put  forth  for  this  purpose, 
involving  incalculable  evils.  It  is  wrong  in  motive, 
and  wrong  practically  for  the  subject  to  be  indifferent 
toward  government.  This  deadens  his  conscience,  re- 
presses his  reason,  checks  his  spirit  of  broad  benevo- 
lence, and  perverts  his  character  into  that  of  narrow 
selfishness.  He  must  make  the  duty  of  obedience  an 
appreciated  fact  in  the  conscience,  awakening  its  im- 
pulse toward  right. 

The  very  purpose,  the  aim  of  government,  is  to  aid 
the  subject  both  in  apprehending  the  truth  in  its  ref- 
erence to  tlie  good  of  all,  and  in  choosing  the  truth 
because  of  this  good,  and  in  carrvine:  it  out  success- 


156  archology;  or, 

fnllj*,  to  this  result,  even  the  liighest  good  possible  to 
liiinself  and  to  others.  This,  for  him,  is  right  in  its 
fullest  sense;  morallj-  and  practically  right. 

Here  conscience  has  its  largest  field  for  exercise ; 
here  is  scope  for  its  fullest  development.  Hence  the 
subject  ought  cheerfully,  with  the  sense  of  a  privi- 
leged duty,  to  seek  the  aid  of  government  in  the  im- 
proving of  both  his  reasoning  faculties  and  his  con- 
science, acting  himself  in  a  spirit  of  trustfulness  and 
cheerful  confidence  toward  government  in  seeking 
its  aid. 

Second.  In  case  of  a  requirement  of  government 
in  violation  of  his  conscience,  the  subject  may  not  de- 
tvounce  the  government^  and  in  the  sjyirit  of  enmity 
refuse  obedience. 

He  has  no  reason  to  require,  that  government,  in 
acting  for  the  good  of  all,  shall  gauge  its  requisitions 
by  his  limited  knowledge,  or  personal  conscience,  as 
to  what  is  right  and  good  for  all.  The  government 
is  not  bound  by  him,  but  he  is  bound  by  government. 
He  ought  to  hold  in  check  for  a  time  his  own  judg- 
ment and  conscience,  while  he  recasts  the  matter 
anew,  in  reason,  to  see  more  clearly  wherein  the  error 
lies. 

Then,  if,  finally,  his  conscience  still  forbids  his 
yielding  to  the  requirement  of  government,  the  con- 
science must  he  obeyed.  No  higher  authority  than 
that  of  conscience,  carefully  enlightened  by  reason, 
can  any  rational  being  possess.  This,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, must  be  obeyed.  It  is  the  awakened  sen- 
timent within  the  mind  of  the  highest  government  of 


THE   SCIENCE   OF   GOVERNMENT.  157 

the  universe,  tlie  governinent  of  tlie  Creatcjr,  and 
must  be  obeyed.  The  conflicting  requisitions  of  tlie 
inferior  govei'nment  must  be  rejected  in  deference  to 
the  higher.  Yet  tliis  shonkl  be  done  in  no  violent,  in- 
imical spirit;  but  M'ith  a  calm  and  quiet  submis&i(jn  to 
what  the  government  may  require  as  an  equivalent, 
or  so-called,  punishment. 

The  subject  may  use  all  proper  means  to  effect  a 
change  in  the  demand  of  government,  yet  his  duty  is 
that  of  kindly  submission  to  its  dealings  with  him, 
out  of  true  regard  to  the  government,  both  in  view  of 
the  necessities  of  its  existence,  the  important  relations 
it  sustains  to  its  subjects,  and  of  its  superior  oppor- 
tunities for  knowing  what  is  for  the  best  interests  of 
all  concerned. 

Third.  One  other  case  of  conscience  as  to  the  duty 
of  subjects  with  respect  to  government,  remains  to  be 
considered.  In  the  case  of  outrages  of  (jovernment  tqjon 
the  liberties,  welfare,  and  conscience,  of  its  subjects,  there 
may  be  a  combination  of  facts  and  circumstances  icliich 
shall  justify  them  in  seeding  relief  by  effecting  a  change 
thro^H/h  violence. 

This  involves  the  right  of  forcible  revolution.  This 
right  is  as  clear  and  positive  as  any  other,  M'hen  the 
circumstances  are  realized  in  certain  combinations. 
These  may  tie  very  numerous,  but  the  following  will 
answer  for  specification  : 

The  outrages  of  government  upon  its  subjects  must 
be  severe/  they  must  have  been  &o prolonged  as  to 
prove  them  involved  in  i\\Q policy oi  government;  all 
practical  and  legal  measures,  other  than  violence,  must 


158  archology;  or, 

generallj  liave  been  tried  and  failed  •  there  must  be 
strong,  reasonable  evidence,  that,  if  the  violent  revo- 
lution succeeds,  the  evils  sought  to  be  remedied  will 
he  remedied,  and  no  other  counterbalancing  equal 
evils  be  suffered ;  and  there  must  be  a  decided  pre- 
ponderance of  evidence  in  favor  of  a  successful  result 
to  the  effort  of  the  revolution.  In  such  a  combina- 
tion of  circumstances,  all  harmonizing  to  favor  the 
effort,  witli  no  strong,  opposing  considerations,  then 
will  judgment,  reason  and  conscience  approve  the  rev- 
olution. 

Government  is  a  necessity  to  existences,  and  rational, 
legal  government  is  indispensable  to  free,  rational  be- 
ings. The  worst  government  is  far  better  than  none, 
and  a  violent  change,  in  hopes  of  securing  a  better,  in- 
volves, inevitably,  severe  evils.  It  should  be  resorted 
to  only  in  the  last  extremit}'. 

Fourth.  Finally,  in  the  case  of  good  government, 
the  conscientious  subject  ought,  in  every  manner,  to 
encourage,  aid,  support,  reverence,  and  heartily  esteem 
the  government  under  which  he  is  placed.  He  ought 
earnestly  to  seek  its  prosperity,  to  strive  for  the  pro- 
motion of  its  purity,  and  readily  contribute  to  the 
enforcement  of  its  laws.  This  he  should  do,  holding 
it  as  the  highest  conscientious  duty  within  his  sphere 
of  action. 

And  he  ought  not  to  stop  with  the  one,  or  two,  or 
three,  inferior  governments,  under  which  he  may  be 
living.  He  ought  to  think,  and  act,  with  truest  refer- 
ence to  each  higher  government  above  him,  up  to  the 
highest,  revealed  in  the  light  of  evidence  ;  up  to  the 


THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT.  159 

one,  great,  unifying  and  universal,  govei-nnient  of  God 
over  all ;  while  lie  advances,  ever  iin])roving  in  kncnvl- 
edge,  ever  strengthening  in  conscience,  ever  increas- 
ing in  rational  joy,  and  ever  securing,  more  and  more 
fully,  all  the  ends  of  existence,  even  the  highest  pos- 
sible good  and  welfare  of  all  sentient  beings. 


INDEX. 


•  PAGE 

Actions,  Two  Varieties  of 8 

Advice  Defined 44 

Aim  of  Qoverniuent 10 

Application  of  Punishment 105 

Archology 7 

Atonement 115 

Authoritative 44 

Capital  Punishment 107 

Chastisement 84 

Classes  Contrasted 26 

Classes  of  Government 14 

Commutation  of  Punishment 118 

Conscience 143 

Contracts 127 

Control  Defined 7 

Creator,  Responsible 31 

Criminality,  Measure  of 52 

Day  of  Rest 75 

Disciplinary  Government 76 

Divine  Right  of  Kings 125 

Elements  of  Law 43 

Elements  of  Punishment 

Elements,  Primal,  Control  of 26 

Entities  Defined 8 

Failure  in  Contracts 128 

Failure  of  Finite  Beings 39 

Faith  Defined 98 


162  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Feelings  Controlled 23 

Force,  Physical,  to  be  Used  64 

Good  Defined 33 

Government  Defined 7 

Government  Enforce  own  Laws 64 

Government  a  Means 8 

Government,  Manner  of •  • .  H 

Government,  Means  of 8 

Government,  Mixed 19 

Government,  Origin  of 8 

Government  over  Governments 69 

Government,  Eight  of  War 130 

Government  to  Enforce  Contracts 127 

Guide  Direct,  Indirect 56 

Higher  Government  Controls  Lower 26 

Higher  Government,  Degrade 27 

Higher  Government  over  Governments 69 

Ignorance  of  Finite  Beings 57 

Importance  of  Law 48 

Instinct  Defined 15 

Instinctive  Government 15 

Instruction 42 

Instruction  of  Government 42 

Instruction  of  Law 43 

Instruction  of  Punishment 96 

Law  Defined 12 

Law,  Elements  of 43 

Law  in  Rational  Government 43 

Law  Must  be  Expressive 59 

Law,  Origin  of 55 

Law  to  be  Kept  Pure 60 

Laws  of  Governments  may  be  Same 74 

Legal  Government 76 

Liability  of  Government  to  Err 71 

Liberty  in  Punishment 65 

LiVjerty  of  Action 66 

Liberty  of  Choice 66 

Manner  of  Government 11 


INDEX.  1C3 

PAGE 

Manner  of  Will's  Control   23 

Marriage  Regulated 75 

Material  Government 14 

Means  of  Government 43 

Measure  of  Crime 50 

Measure  of  Importance  of  Law 49 

Measure  of  Vigor  of  Will 98 

Moral  Defined 37 

Moral  Kight 36 

Motive  Defined 37 

Nut ural  Suffering 93 

Obligation  Defined 44 

Origin  of  Government 8 

Pardon  Defined 110 

Pardon,  when  Right 113 

Practical  Right 36 

Prerequisite  to  Pardon 116 

Primal  Element  in  Control  26 

Punishment 84 

Punishment  Benevolent 95 

Punishment  Instructive 96 

Punisliment,  Magnitude  of 97 

Punishment  Protective 100 

Purpose  of  Government 10 

Rational  Government 18 

Reason  Defined 18 

Religion  not  Enforced 75 

Remorse 93 

Reformation  by  the  Sinned 89 

Reformation  in  Disciplinary  Government 87 

Right  Defined 36 

Right,  Moral 36 

Right  of  Subjects  to  Choose 78 

Right,  Practical 36 

Sanctions 45 

Sanctions  Evidence  of  Truth 49 

Sanctions,  Magnitude  of 48 

Sanctions  not  a  Terror 46 


164:  INDEX. 

PAGE 

Sanctions  Protective 54 

Schools,  Private 131 

Schools,  Public 138 

Schools,  llight  of  Government   137 

Separation  of  the  Evil 66 

System  Defined 7 

Taxes,  Amount  of , 124 

Taxes  Defined 120 

Taxes  may  be  Enforced 123 

Uniformity,  Basis  of  Real 128 

Uniformity  of  Law 12 

Usefulness  of  Government 11 

Usefulness  of  Law 33 

Usefulness  of  Pardon Ill 

Usefulness  of  Punishment 96 

Vigor  of  Will  of  Executive 98 

Will,  Control  of  the  Feelings 23 

Will,  Control  of  the  Reason 23 

Will  Defined 17 

Will  Free 22 

Will  in  Instinctive  Government 17 

Will  in  Rational  Government 20 

Will,  Manner  of  its  Control 23 

Will  not  Controlled 21 

Will ,  Sovereign 22 

War,  Defensive 132 

War  Defined 130 

War,  Offensive , 133 

War,  when  Right 133 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  LOS  ANGELES 

THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


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